Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:13 For this week's report, Emirza AriHalandra will join Peter Durrie a little later to discuss the two major threats facing Indonesia's democracy and explain why 19 years after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia's democratic reforms remain tenuous and its institutions weak. 0:32 But first, I'll be talking with WPR senior editor Freddy Deknatel and associate editor Omar Rahman. Hi, Freddy. Hi, Omar. Hey, Judah. How's it going? I'm feeling great. How about yourself? I am surviving. 0:45 Uh, Omar, this week, uh, pronouncing your last name was a cakewalk. [laughs] I know. You're almost fluent. 0:50 I'm almost fluent, and, uh, and the competition was stiff, uh, this week for, for my limited, uh, Indonesian pronunciation skills. [laughs] Yeah. 1:00 So, um, obviously the big story all, uh, this week, and there's still some uncertainty that surrounds it at the time we're recording, uh, is the fate of the Iran nuclear deal. 1:12 Uh, President Donald Trump is set to make an announcement on Friday about, uh, broader guidelines to America's Iran policy and some particular decisions, uh, about the deal itself. 1:28 Uh, every three months, according to congressional legislation that was passed at the time of the deal, the US president has to certify that Iran is in compliance, 1:39 one, and number two, that the deal is still in the national security interests of the United States. Uh, Trump, uh, it's... 1:48 The, the reporting suggests that Trump is going to decertify the deal on the national security element, uh, but leave it to Congress to take any further action that might actually end up torpedoing the deal. 2:03 Freddy, it's sort of a, a confusing stance. Uh, Trump said the deal's an embarrassment. Uh, he's promised to get the US out of it. Uh, he seems to have found a solution where he can have his cake and eat it too. 2:17 Yeah, I think it's confusing because this is a strategy based on the reporting that, um, that's out there so far, where his national security team has basically come up with a, 2:29 a way to appease Trump's ego without yet fully tearing up the deal. Um, by kicking it to Congress, um, it keeps it intact obviously, but also, 2:39 um, this is really about satisfying, uh, Trump's desire to deliver on a campaign promise, but I think more importantly, 2:48 um, do something about a deal that he doesn't like because Obama passed it, um, which is a little outrageous obviously since Obama himself didn't just pass it. 2:57 It's a deal between obviously the United States and many other world powers. So the consequences of doing this, um, extend far beyond, uh, you know, trying to tear up Obama's legacy. 3:08 Now, now the backstory in terms of, uh, what you mentioned, it's, it's sort of a tailor-made policy recommendation from his team. 3:17 Uh, the backstory is basically that in July when the previous, uh, recertification, uh, deadline came up, uh, Trump's team essentially told him that the best move would be to recertify and Trump threw a fit. 3:32 Uh, and so basically the, the, his national security team scrambled to come up with a way to satisfy the, their boss essentially, uh, without compromising the national security interests of the United States, uh, a, a point to which, uh, Defense Secretary James Mattis in congressional testimony confirmed in, in response to a direct question that, uh, that the deal is in, according to his, uh, to, according to him, is in the best interests of the US. 4:01 Um, Omar, uh, what, what do you make of it? Uh, it, it, the, the deal obviously has limitations. What's the room, uh, for maneuver in terms of addressing them? Uh, and is this the right way to do it? 4:15 Sure, the deal has limitations, but, you know, I think it's, it's been said before, uh, when, uh, both sides leave the table unhappy, that's a good agreement, and if one side leaves the table, uh, overjoyed and the other side, uh, angry, then, you know, that's generally a sign of capitulation and, and, um, you know, the, the, the losing side may not follow through with the deal. 4:36 So I think you have a, a deal here that both sides are unhappy with. 4:39 A- and I personally don't see how blowing, uh, up this agreement on America's end does, uh, does not do damage to its credibility in the region at a time when its credibility is, is suffering. 4:49 Um, so I, I don't think it's a, a necessarily good move. At the same time, uh, you know, I'm, I'm playing advocate and sort of contributing to the conversation. 4:58 Uh, I covered the deal, and I, I took, uh, quite a bit of interest in the technical aspects of the negotiations over the course of, uh, the three or four years that even preceded the direct involvement of the US in the negotiations. 5:12 Um, the deal is a surprisingly successful arms control deal. There are some gray areas. 5:18 There are some loopholes that Iran, uh, might take advantage of, in particular the question of how much access and under what conditions the, uh, the IAEA has, uh, to inspect military sites. Obviously a prickly issue. 5:33 No, no country wants to open up their, their military sites to inspection because of the, the, the potential for abuse in terms of espionage. 5:41 Um, but given the fact that the militarization components of the program were a sticking point for so long, it's, it's a thorny issue. 5:49 Um- Besides that, though, it seems like the major, uh, the major criticisms of the deal so far have, have really little to do with the deal, but everything around it outside. 6:02 Now, one of the guiding logics of negotiating was obviously to remove the nuclear element from the broader issues. 6:09 The other was this sense that maybe having successfully negotiated a deal with Iran, uh, the US might be able to improve relations and guide Iran back into being a more responsible, uh, regional actor. 6:23 Uh, Freddy, in, in your opinion, w- a-- is it, is it fair to criticize Iran's regional, uh, behavior? Are they any worse than anyone else, uh, engaged in s- in the conflicts around the region? 6:39 And, and B, was that a reasonable hope or expectation? I don't know anyone was actually expecting it, but was it a reasonable hope at the time? 6:48 To take the second one first, I think it's, it's a reasonable hope, but one that had a longer shelf life than, or a longer timeline than, you know, two years. 6:56 Um, Obama himself, and I remember other people in an- in his administration were talking about, um, you know, a, a much more incremental shift. Um, but also, but to your-- to the first point, um, 7:10 Iran's behavior in the region is separate from the Iran deal, um, which obviously as you just said, but also, y- you know, that's the continued, 7:20 you know, evidence that, that Trump and, and other Republicans in the Senate, for example, and the people who have been trying to push back against the deal, its opposition is-- That kind of opposition is just purely ideological because the deal is doing what it was designed to do, which is limit Iran's nuclear program and it's an arms control treaty first and foremost, and it has never attempted and it was never in any of the texts of the agreement anything else about Iran's behavior. 7:45 Um, so, you know, they're trying to make this about something that the deal is not about. But also, I think the bigger point is it's, it's ignoring, um... 7:56 I think it's, it's a, it's a certain kind of foreign policy view that is dealing with the Middle East that, um, the Trump administration at least wishes existed rather than the Middle East that does exist. 8:07 And, and for a lot of hardliners on Iran, they wish Iran was not an influence in the region, in Syria, in, in Lebanon, elsewhere, in, in Iraq especially now. 8:18 Um, but they don't wanna confront the idea of, of why that is the case or, or how do you deal with the Middle East as it actually does exist. 8:25 Um, and I think a lot of that goes back to the invasion of, of Iraq and the Bush administration's Middle East policy. And there's no sort of grappling with dealing with the Middle East where Iran is a fact. 8:36 And, and, and I, I think the-- you could disagree on the merits of the, the nuclear deal itself and, and some of the nitpicking, you know, technical aspects of it, or whether Obama should have been more confrontational with Iran on certain points. 8:49 But I think that you, you know, w- what I agreed with generally was that I- Iran's not gonna go away just because you want them to and just because you, you know, saber-rattle or, or criticize them. 9:00 You know, they're a fact in the region, and I think that this kind of policy is pretending that they're not, and, and that's not gonna change anything. 9:08 And, uh, an Iran file that doesn't include a nuclear weapons program is an easier one to deal with, uh, obviously. 9:16 Now, Omar, some of the, some of the complaints in terms of regional behavior, there's support for Hezbollah. 9:22 There's, uh, the fact that Iranian, uh, militias are on the ground in Syria propping up besides, uh, uh, alongside Hezbollah, propping up, uh, Assad regime, uh, the influence in Baghdad, uh, meddling in Yemen, uh, support for Islamic Jihad, previously support for Hamas, although that has, uh, has changed in, in recent years. 9:45 Um, uh, my, my feeling has always been y- you don't have to portray Iran as, as angelic to deal with them. Uh, w- is, is Iran, uh... 9:59 There's, uh, there-- But there's also been this narrative that Iran is ascendant in the Middle East, um, and that, uh, allowing them to maintain an enrichment program and some of the sunset clauses, uh, as well as a ballistic missile program, as long as it's not intended for use with nuclear weapons, which is obviously a gray area that's hard to prove, um, that somehow allowing them, uh, the-- and, and also the financial, uh, s- the, the, the financial help that lifting the sanctions gave the regime was somehow going to push them over the edge and make Iran the dominant hegemonic power in the Middle East. 10:35 Is that a realistic fear in your opinion in terms of the, the balance of power and the conflicts in the Middle East at this point? 10:41 Yeah, first I'd like to say I think, uh, Freddy was totally on point, and I think there's no doubt that Iran is a, a sensitive issue and that policymakers are divided on it. 10:49 Um, there are those who view Iran monolithically and believe that it, it's completely ill-intentioned in the region. 10:56 And I think there are those who I wouldn't say trust Iran, but feel like something must be done, uh, and that you can incentivize and empower various forces to moderate its behavior internationally, especially in the region. 11:08 And I think, uh, the, you know, the-- Obama and his administration, uh, felt that way. 11:13 Um, and I, I think even if you look at, uh, other regional, uh, players that have a big problem with Iran, you can take Saudi Arabia or you can take Israel. 11:22 You know, I read a very interesting piece yesterday, uh, on-- in the AP that, you know, besides the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other hawks in political pols-- in political circles in Israel, the security establishment is actually happy with the results of the deal. 11:37 Uh, so, you know, that really leaves hawks in Washington and Israel as the, the only opponents at the moment. Um, and I think that's very important. And I'd say in Riyadh also That's true. 11:49 Um, and I think they, they absolutely oppose the deal, but I, I really would argue that, um, you're, you're gonna damage America's credibility even to Riyadh by undermining the deal. 11:58 I really do think you, you know, if you can't trust the commitment, uh, or the word of a country with its enemies, you're always gonna doubt that even amongst friends, and I think that played itself out, um, to some extent when now with, with Saudi Arabia's trip to Russia. 12:12 Um, you know, they look at, uh, they, you know, at first it came with Bush, and then it came with Obama, and now with Trump. You really can't... 12:20 And he's the worst of all, but it's very difficult to trust his behavior and what he's gonna do in the region. 12:25 In, in some ways it seems like, uh, whether with good intentions or bad, the, the, that Washington just doesn't get the Middle East in some fundamental ways, um, that when it speaks the language of power, which is this trope that the Middle East only understands the language of power, w- uh, the Bush administration probably erred on that side. 12:45 That didn't work, uh, and, and just unleashed all sorts of forces of chaos. When you t- when you go for negotiation and compromise, uh, which was more the way the Obama administration tried to operate, that doesn't work. 13:00 Um, and in, I think in a lot of ways for me, um, I'm, I'm very impressed by the Iranian regime's communication skills. 13:11 With the exception of the presidency of Ahmad- Ahmadinejad, uh, the Iranians are very skilled at communication. 13:19 They're very skilled at making themsome, making themselves seem like the very reasonable, uh, negotiating partner. Um, at the same time, they're very skilled at dragging on negotiations, at really winning concessions. 13:33 Um, so a- a- again, my, my, my sort of, uh, guideline over the course of the last decade whe- while this issue was really a, a top-line story is you don't, it doesn't have to be all good or all bad. 13:48 The Iranian regime can still be a, a, a troublemaking regime and in many ways have op- opposing interests to the US and US allies, but the nuclear deal was a solid deal in removing what was essentially, uh, a potential cause for war from that file. 14:08 Now, uh, y- you, I, I, I know, I notice you cagily, uh, avoided answering whether Iran, uh, is the dominant power in the Middle East. Uh, do you wanna weigh in on that? I'll pass it over to Freddie after. 14:22 Uh, whether they're the dominant power? Yeah, or whether they're ascendant, whether, whether th- we're witnessing, uh, what we'll look back on as the rise of Iran as the dominant Middle Eastern power. 14:32 I think they've been, uh, I wouldn't say dominant because it's, it's a very polarized region. It's multipolar. Uh, there's no US superpower. There's no Iranian superpower, I don't think, in the region. 14:42 But, uh, they, they certainly are a pole, uh, and they certainly wield influence and, you know, maybe are ascendant. 14:50 I think that's what people fear by removing sanctions is that you just, you know, help build their economy and, and give them more power and influence in the region. 14:58 But Iran, even in its darkest days, was able to find a way, uh, and I, I mean by darkest days even when its economy was hurting the most, found ways to wield influence in the region. So, um- 15:10 F- Freddie, is, is that what you meant when you said the, the Middle East as it is and not as Washington would like it to be, that there's no way in the Middle East that you can have an Iran that doesn't exist as a pole of power? 15:21 More or less. I mean, I think that, um, I don't think that Iran necessar- and I'm trying to, I'm not trying to minimize, um, 15:28 Iranian behavior in terms of arming militant groups or, or ties to, to, you know, extremist groups or, or, or whatever. 15:36 But I, I also think that Iran, um, I tend to think that they act r- you know, with what is rational, um, in, in Tehran's view and that there are reasons why they fund Hezbollah, for example. 15:48 There's reasons why they've moved into largely a political vacuum in Iraq. 15:53 Um, and when the US says that that's a sign of Iran, uh, meddling in, in, in the region or, or a thr- or, you know, a sign of a threat, I mean, on the one hand, the US is not gonna change the makeup of Lebanon. 16:08 Um, so I think you just have to accept that that is a reality, and then you have to work within that reality. 16:13 And on the Iraq example, I mean, the US created that situation by and large by removing Saddam Hussein but more importantly failing to actually govern Iraq during the long occupation. 16:24 Um, and, and that's just a subject that I find so frustrating again and again, that nobody in Washington actually wants to deal with that. Um, and, and, and so that's what I mean. I just think that... 16:35 And that's what I still respect about the Obama approach to the Middle East, um, which is sort of why the tragedy of Syria is, is even more tragic in a way because, you know, that's s- widely seen as a failure, Obama's Syria policy, um, even though he was sort of, 16:50 you know, damned if he did or damned if he didn't. But, um, elsewhere in the region, especially with Iran, this was a success, I thought, and I think the approach that it, that it represented was one where Iran 17:01 is, you know, an actor in the region. It has interests. Some of them align with us maybe in some ways. Many of them don't. 17:07 But you have to formulate policy with that reality in mind, not with the idea that Iran is a bogeyman and e- every US policy has to be to oppose Iran and to try to minimize its influence, because all that's going to do is, is raise tensions and raise the risk of, of conflicts or open war. 17:25 I'd wanted to maybe mention, uh, the question of diplomatic isolation among the allies that were involved in the negotiations, but we might have to get into that next week. I thought I'd wrap up our discussion. 17:37 I, I've got an iconoclastic take on the Middle East, I admit. Uh, it, uh, I'll wrap this up with, with that take. 17:45 It reminds me of, uh, of the Godfather movies Uh, we root for the Cor- Corleone family, but that's really just because the story is told from their point of view, and if you take a step back, uh, they're another crime family and they're not really that much better than any of the other crime families. 18:02 For me, when I look at the Middle East, I see a lot of, a lot of governments that are destabilizing, uh, situations in other countries, that are arming militant groups that are, uh, not necessarily, uh, that are somewhat unseemly. 18:16 Uh, Iran is obviously opposed to American national security interests, so it makes it, it makes Iran a, a natural adversary. 18:25 Uh, but it's very hard to, to paint the, the region in terms of good guys and, and bad guys and, uh, and have any success, I'd say. 18:33 Um, there's obviously a ton more that we could talk about, and, uh, it's possible that, uh, tomorrow's announcement, uh, might not be quite what we're expecting. 18:42 In any case, I think the topics that we discussed will remain relevant, uh, regardless, moving into the future. 18:49 Um, before we go over the articles that you both wanted to flag, uh, let me just mention to everyone that we're now halfway through our three-month subscription drive, and our goal for the coming week is, once again, to sign up 50 new subscribers. 19:05 Paid subscriptions are our only source of income, which means we work for our subscribers, not for advertisers. So if you like what we do and have thought about subscribing, please take the plunge now. 19:17 You can do that at bit.ly/joinwpr, and if you enter the word "podcast" in the box marked Coupon or Referral Code and click the Apply Code button, we'll throw in a 25% discount on the first year of an annual subscription. 19:33 Freddy, which article did you have in mind for this week? Uh, I was gonna flag a briefing by Eli Miksler, um, who has been writing for us from Myanmar. 19:42 Um, and he, he has looked at why Israel's resisted calls to suspend its military ties to Myanmar, um, which includes an interesting look at, uh, what I did not know about the extent of ties between Israel and Myanmar, or as it was known earlier, Burma, going back to, uh, the 19, late 1940s and onward. 20:03 And, uh, Israel, um, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, uh, in the early '60s even declared that, "In all of Asia, there is no more friendly nation to Israel than Burma." 20:14 That was, uh, definitely an eye-opening piece. Omar, which one did you have in mind? 20:18 Uh, I wanted to flag Frida's column, uh, from this week on King Salman's visit to Russia, uh, especially for the, what it signifies for US-Saudi relations, and I know that's something we talked about on last week's podcast, but I thought, um, there were some great points that needed to be said that she addressed, and it was, uh, an insightful piece. 20:36 Frida is Frida Ghitis. We're, we're on first-name basis with our columnists- [laughs]... just for everyone listening. All right. That's just about all the time we have. Thanks, guys. Thank you. Thanks, Judah. 20:44 And now over to Peter for the report. [instrumental music] A new poll has found Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama is more popular than any potential opponents in the 2017 gubernatorial elections. 20:58 If the vote was held today, Basuki would likely win comfortably, but crucially, the majority of respondents remain undecided. 21:04 Christian Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, an ally of current President Joko Widodo. 21:11 Tens of thousands of people in Indonesia have marched against the governor of Jakarta, accusing him of insulting the Quran. 21:19 The Christian governor known as Ahok has faced a backlash after he dismissed a Quranic verse which his opponents used to suggest a non-Muslim should not be governor of the city. 21:31 Despite a blasphemy trial and mass rallies against him, the Christian governor better known as Ahok managed to win the first election round in February, but failed to get more than the 50% which was needed to win in the runoff against Anies Baswedan, a Muslim. 21:48 Early results show the former minister and university dean has won. Baswedan's victory is seen as a setback for Indonesia's multi-religious foundations. 21:57 Almost two decades have passed since Indonesia started its transition to democracy. 22:03 The process has been successful in many ways, but perennial challenges of corruption as well as increasing religious and political tensions are threatening the gains made in recent years. 22:14 Much will depend on the 2019 general elections, but the challenges facing Indonesia were already made clear during the recent Jakarta gubernatorial elections, which despite its regional character, are an important indicator for things to come. 22:29 This is a big elections in Indonesia. It's a regional elections that involve around seven million voters. 22:35 This is Mirza Ali Jaelendra, a senior analyst at the Indonesia Program at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. 22:47 And the social media scene was also very vibrant, so it was the most discussed event in Indonesia. 22:54 Those who compete in the election will get a national spotlight, and the Jakarta election has also known to catapulted, uh, President Jokowi, uh, from a less-known mayor of Solo to the nat- introducing him to the national scene in 2012, and this helped him to gain the recognitions to enable him to win in 2014 general election. 23:18 So the election was m- more than just a gov- gubernatorial elections. There are basically two insights that I think we can see from the last Jakarta gubernatorial elections. 23:32 The first one is that identity politics play an increasingly major role in the elections, and this is also an indication that Islamic hardliners that is traditionally at the fringe is gaining ground, and it's, it is likely to be replicated in 2018 regional elections and also the upcoming general election in 2019. 23:56 And the second insight is also having several old political figure, an oligarch- Uh, several oligarchs such as the former President Yudhoyono or, uh, chief patron of Gerindra Party Prabowo Subianto or chief patron of Democratic Party Struggle Megawati actively endorsing each favorite. 24:18 This is an indication that this election is an avenue for them, for the oligarchs to advance their individual interests. Emirza argues that the gubernatorial elections provided two key insights into Indonesian politics. 24:32 First, the contest was fought as much on a national level as on a local one, with all major political forces rallying behind their respective champions for the mayorship of Jakarta, hoping to gain an edge in the upcoming general elections. 24:46 Second, political Islam has become a force to be reckoned with, with mass mobilization by radical clerics sinking the re-election of incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a close ally of President Jokowi. 24:58 There was a controversy surrounding the incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, or known as Ahok, as there were a series of attacks from the opponents towards him, mobilizing the issues of religion to attack his popularity. 25:16 This is not uncommon. The mobilizations of religion or identity politics has been there since a long time in Indonesia. However, the size of the attack was unprecedented. So 25:32 Basuki or Ahok is a double minority. He is Indonesian Chinese and he is Christian, although he was later adopted and raised in a Muslim family. And he slid into controversy when he publicly disputed this, 25:50 a verse in Quran where that barred Muslim voters to back non-Muslim candidates. And he said that who bought into this idea had been the sheep. 26:02 And this statement was later posted online by independent blogger and went viral. And his opposition picked this opportunity to paint him as a blasphemer. 26:17 And of course, the society was angry and is easily galvanized. And at one point in last December, more than 20,000 Muslims gathered in Jakarta demanding him to be charged. And at the end, 26:36 it was politically fatal. He lost the elections in April from his challenger Anis Baswedan by a final tally of 10% margin. 26:46 Not only that he lost the elections, but he was also found guilty of blasphemy and sentenced two years in prison. 26:54 And this was harsher from what the prosecutor demanded because they've only demanded him to be in two years probation. 27:02 So many have seen that this is a move to a peace, to make peace with the Islam, the angry Islamic populations in Indonesia. You can see that it is more complex than just 27:17 the issues of the rise of political Islam because Anis Baswedan himself, he was generally viewed as a progressive Muslim. And 27:28 he aligned himself with Prabowo Subianto with a party platform that is also nationalist, not an Islamist. And behind him, there are also many business moguls with Chinese Christian backgrounds. 27:43 So it was a consortium of Jokowi's, the President Jokowi's enemies more than Islamic groups. So 27:55 in the sense, we can also conclude from the events surrounding it that the mobilizations of religion is not ideological per se, but it's also very, 28:13 it was moved pragmatically by Jokowi's opponents to gain ground here. Religion or identity politics is not necessarily dangerous in itself. However, when 28:27 it goes to restricting diversity of view, this can be dangerous for democracy. And as we can see in the aftermath of Jakarta elections in Indonesia, they are inspired by the success of movement against Ahok. There are 28:45 many groups consolidating power and start to attack non-Muslim candidates in different areas in Indonesia, like in West Kalimantan, for instance. 28:57 There's this Christian governor, Cornelis, that increasingly being criticized. And there are a group of Islamic hardliners campaign against him and say that they want a Muslim candidate to succeed him. 29:12 Not only a non-Muslim candidate, but progressive politician and female politicians is also under attack. And there are also different social media vigilantes rising up. For instance, 29:29 there's this Muslim cyber army that is trying to regulate people who express disagreement toward the activities associated with Islam, such as the activities of Islamic Defender Front. 29:47 So those who criticize them will face an intimidation, even physical violence to withdraw whatever they said. 29:57 So this is a worrying trend in a sense because they are restricting diversity of view that is very important for democracy. 30:07 Fortunately, support for democratic values remains strong in the Indonesian public, says Amerza, despite the strengthening of radical voices. The public is still supporting a democratic system in Indonesia. 30:20 For instance, in a survey conducted by Indonesian Institute of Science in 2012, they found that 70% of Indonesia think democracy is the best system for Indonesia. 30:33 And these sentiments reflected in the following survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, and also last year a survey by Center for Strategic and International Studies, SIS Indonesia, that find the attitude toward democracy is still positive. 30:56 And of course, they are concerned with a movement such as money politics and weak law enforcement and corruptions undermining the quality of democracy, but they are still aspiring to be a democracy. However, in this 31:15 democracy setting, Islamic movement that used to be controlled by the authoritarian regime is also 31:25 getting a room to voices their aspirations to make Indonesia more Islamic, to institute a Sharia law in Indonesia. And they are gaining ground here, especially 31:44 after they have proven themselves in last Jakarta elections. Many politicians will increasingly embracing them. They are not necessarily Islamic or ideological themselves. 32:00 However, they will not hesitate to align themselves with this hardliner in order to increase or to court vote or to increase a political This is just a political calculations. 32:18 And in exchange, these Islamic hardliners will demand protections or cover for abuses perpetrated against those they conclude have offended their faith. So the relationship sometimes very transactional in nature as well. 32:35 At least since his ally Purnama was defeated in the Jakarta election, President Jokowi has recognized the threat that an alliance of his political opponents with religious movements would pose to his re-election in 2019. 32:49 But his reaction is unfortunately not limited to the radical fringes of society. Until now, President Jokowi's chances to get re-elected is still positive. 33:00 However, how much political concession or dealing he needs to make or whether there will be a credible challenger is still largely determined by the upcoming regional elections next year and also 33:17 going forward in general in 2019. And to consolidate his power, he's done 33:25 many things, including giving political concessions with different oligarch, powerful political players, aligning himself with different, 33:39 although controversial, however, strong military leaders such as Wiranto, Luhut Panjaitan and Riya Kudu. And he also aligned himself with corrupt politicians like Setiano Vanto. 33:53 And he has thus far able to consolidate his power, indicated by his control in the parliament. After he made a lot of concessions, he was able to gain at least 70%. So he is very powerful. 34:11 However, from the last gubernatorial elections, we can see that the opposition is getting stronger as well. And they've able to consolidate themselves with different 34:26 parties, especially by utilizing the Islamic hardliners against Jokowi. And 34:34 the loss of Ahok, Jokowi's preferred candidate, has also opened up the possibility of another challenger, which is Prabowo Subianto, to challenge him in the next election. 34:49 So in order to defend himself against this 34:58 different Islamic hardliners attack towards him and toward his camp, he has pursued a number of decidedly anti-democratic moves, including arresting opponents or 35:14 in order to create this chilling effect and claiming the authority to unilaterally disband civil society groups deemed a threat to the state. 35:22 He wasted no time after he announced the regulation in lieu of law to disband civil society groups. He also has banned Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, one of the 35:35 mobilizing votes against, mobilizing power against Ahok in Jakarta elections. 35:43 And he also targeted many opponents that has been vocal towards Ahok, such as Habib Rizik, this controversial ulama that has been very vocal toward Ahok. 35:57 So in order to preserve his positions, he also have pursued this strong armed tactics against his opponents. 36:09 Civil society groups have managed to fight back against some of the more heavy-handed or corrupt moves by Jokowi's government, says Emerza, but their political impact relies heavily on their unity, which has its limits. 36:20 Indonesia civil society has resisting both right-wing Islamic promoting hardline religious view and government attacks on the rule of law. 36:30 I mean, it's a very tall task, but they are well prepared because there are diverse group and vibrant civil society scene in Indonesia. 36:41 And so far, they have proven themselves to be able to resist many anti-democratic movement when they are united. For instance, they have about the appointment of Budigunawan, this official suspected of corruptions. And 36:58 the interesting part about it is that Budigunawan was vouched by Megawati, an oligarch, a chief patron of Democratic Party struggle, Jokowi's political party. 37:11 So Jokowi has been pressured by the civil society group to disregard the man of his party. So that was one of the example. 37:23 But another example is also when they are able to beat back an effort to abolish direct election in 2014 and also so far have managed to block Jokowi's effort, the president effort to criminalize insulting the president. 37:41 So when they are united, they are very strong. However, Indonesian civil society is not a monolith. They are very fragmented. And 37:51 sometimes when they are not in one voices, this will reduce or weaken their efficacy, their effectiveness against the ongoing anti-democratic movement. 38:05 For instance, when Jokowi issued the regulation in lieu of law to enable government unilaterally disband civil society, 38:16 different civil society group has different opinion on this because some was disagreed toward it because they are in solidarity with his Butare Indonesia, one of the organization that got disband as a result of the announcement of the law. 38:34 The other was not really worried about the disbandment of HTE and they agreed with it. 38:40 However, they are worried about the law that can be widely interpreted and can be widely used against whomever government deem as a political threat. So they are worried about the authoritarian tendency of this law. But 39:00 there are some civil society group that has been leaning closely toward the government. For instance, Nahdlatul Ulama that has been in support. 39:09 Nahdlatul Ulama is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and they've been very close toward the government. So because there are no one voices, 39:21 so far it's a bit difficult for civil society to resist the law that many has seen as a step backward toward Indonesian democracy. 39:32 Looking forward, Indonesian politics will likely see more of the opportunistic and at sometimes dangerous cooperation between political forces, Emerza thinks. 39:41 I think the first trend that we can see is that both camp, the establishment and opposition, are likely to court Islamic groups for support. 39:54 Like Jokowi now has been courting Nahdlatul Ulama to support whatever policy he's made. And in return, he has given them many concessions, many attentions. And the opposition, 40:12 primarily Prabowo Subianto, that we can see from the last Jakarta elections, has also made an alliance with different groups, especially the Islamic Defender Front, 40:26 which is the main, one of the biggest forces behind anti-Ahok rally. So we can see that in the future, 40:41 in the upcoming 2018 regional election and most likely in 2019 general elections, that mobilizing the issues of religion and identity politics to court votes will likely to be replicated. 40:59 Not only in national level, but also in regional level, where pragmatic politicians will likely to increasingly embracing the Islamic hardliners for political gain. The second trend that we can see is also 41:18 the increasingly stronger approach from the establishments against the oppositions. Especially Jokowi is currently trying to secure a second term in 2019. And he seems to 41:34 be more and more comfortable to tolerate a stronger approach and striking a bargain with different political actors, giving them more concessions. And I think 41:46 going forward, the shape of Indonesian politics will largely determine by the relations of three powerful groups. The first one would be the oligarchic political establishment. 41:58 The second one would be the military, that although they are behind the scene, but still very dominant players in politics. 42:06 And the third one is the increasingly powerful non-state actors, the nationalists, the Islamists, and different interest-based society that will shape 42:16 And the dynamic, the interplay between three of them will shape the Indonesian politics. Of course, the worrying trend of it is that the nuance of relationship has thus far very transactional rather than programmatic. 42:31 And more and more policy will be geared to cater the interests of political elites than the greater good of society. 42:39 However, the assuring fact about Indonesian democracy is that the society still has these huge aspirations of democracy and freedom. 42:53 And the democratic institutions such as Corruption Eradication Commission or Constitutional Court has been fighting hard to safeguard this democracy in Indonesia. 43:06 And the vibrant civil society movement is also resisting any movement, any anti-democratic movement and movement backsliding to authoritarianism. So in a sense, it is still very 43:23 promising picture for Indonesian democracy going forward. Many thanks to Emirza Ari Shalendra for joining us this week. 43:35 If you'd like to read more about the threats facing Indonesia's democracy, you can find his in-depth article on worldpoliticsreview.com. 43:43 If you like what you hear on Trendlines, go ahead and subscribe to it in the podcast app of your choice. That will save you the trouble of downloading each new episode. 43:51 And if you like what you've seen on WPR, please do subscribe. You can do that at bit.ly slash joinwpr. 43:59 And if you enter the word podcast in the box marked coupon or referral code, we'll apply a 25% discount to the first year of an annual subscription. 44:09 We've got just under two months left in our subscription drive, and our goal for the coming week is to sign up 50 new subscribers. I hope you'll be one of them. 44:17 And finally, if you'd like to send comments or questions, email us at podcast at worldpoliticsreview.com. Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Durrie, who also conducts the report interviews. 44:30 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 44:39 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines.
