Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:14 In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, many countries took steps to protect their economies from international instability and foreign competition. 0:24 That put the world economy in a vicious cycle of creeping protectionism and diminished growth that it can't seem to break. 0:31 Daniel McDowell will join Peter Dury a little later to explain why Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States don't signal the beginning of de-globalization, but instead are the result of a gradual process that has been unraveling economic interconnectedness for nearly a decade now. 0:49 But first, I'll be talking with WPR senior editor Freddie Dehnatel about this week's top stories in international affairs. Hi, Freddie. How you doing today? Hey, Judah. I'm surviving. How about you? 1:00 I'm actually feeling great, um, and surviving. Mm-hmm. Uh, obviously, uh, we look forward to being able to cover stories that are not about Donald Trump in the near future. 1:13 Uh, but for now, that still is really the, the major story going on in international affairs, the early days of his, uh, presidency, uh, which have been very active in terms of, uh, executive orders and declarations and things of that nature. 1:29 Um, most of them until yesterday's having to do with, uh, suspending travel and, and the, uh, the entry of refugees to the United States still were more bark than bite, and, uh, and most of them need some sort of congressional follow-up to actually be implemented. 1:46 Uh, but, uh, already there's, uh, indications that, uh, more than just taking Donald Trump seriously, uh, people actually need to take him literally in terms of what he promised to do during the campaign. 1:59 To try to take a, a different angle on, on, uh, talking about this, I thought we could look at some of the, the ways that, uh, some of the strategies that are emerging, uh, around the world for actually how to respond to the Trump presidency and to taking very seriously and literally, uh, what he plans to do. 2:19 Yeah. 2:20 I think, um, as American voters and, um, just observers have learned, you know, since the cam- during the campaign and since, you know, Donald Trump will do what he says, um, even if people don't believe him at first. 2:34 Um, and I think in terms of the global reaction so far, there's sort of two camps. One, those that are hedging, and those that are, at least so far, seeming to get on the bandwagon with Trump. 2:46 Um, and am- among the first group, uh, that's hedging, I'd point first to countries in Asia. 2:52 These are places, for example, like Japan and Vietnam, um, that have signed on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that have been key allies of United States, and were, and were central to Obama's Pivot to Asia, and they see coming US retrenchment, and so they're preparing for, um, a world where they maybe don't necessarily have to, have to or can rely on the United States as much as they would've expected to, um, under a Clinton presidency, for example. 3:21 And I think you're seeing something similar as well, um, in other regions, uh, in Europe and also south of the border in Mexico, and we can get into those in a bit more detail. Sure. 3:32 And in Asia, obviously, the Trump's order, uh, essentially putting the America's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership to, to rest, uh, even though it was widely anticipated and it had, had been stalled in Congress, um, is sort of crystallizing this sense of, well, uh, what's the alternative? 3:53 Can we do a TPP minus one, uh, or do we have to sign up to essentially the Chinese trade program, uh, in, in Asia? So that there clearly there's a, a sense of urgency. 4:07 Um, and I think in Europe too, as I, I wrote a few weeks ago, uh, there's the possibility that, uh, given Trump's declared hostility to the, to the European Union, um, 4:21 that there could be a sort of circling of the wagons and, and more of a solidarity, uh, uh, a position of solidarity. 4:28 Um, I think we're seeing the beginnings of that in w- in terms of Mexico, where there's pretty, pretty loud calls for the Mexican president to cancel his trip to Washington and his meeting with, with Donald Trump in response to the executive order on, on the wall. 4:44 Uh, in terms of bandwagoning, you have sort of a range of, of responses, some more comfortable and some a little more uncomfortable. 4:53 I think, for instance, uh, British Prime Minister Theresa May's, uh, options probably aren't that attractive to her. 5:00 In, in on one hand, uh, a close trade relationship with the US is her best option in terms of negotiating Brexit from the European Union. 5:09 On the other hand, uh, it's kind of like, uh, the, the, the store owner who gets bailed out by the mafia. Uh, I can't imagine her being particularly enthused about Donald Trump being Great Britain's savior. 5:22 Uh, she has an upcoming, upcoming meeting with, with Trump. Um, in the Middle East too, there's a, a certain amount of, uh, satisfaction, but also, uh, might be misplaced in terms of, uh, Israel. 5:35 Uh, Freida Ghitis in her column today talks about how the outcomes there might be, uh, not as favorable to the far right as, uh, as they might believe. 5:45 Um, and elsewhere in terms of, uh, in terms of the Arab world, Persian Gulf, Egypt, uh, there also could be some surprises. Yeah. 5:53 I think, um, Egypt, as you mentioned, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, countries that, um, are- Welcoming the fact that they won't be criticized for their human rights record, for example, or for their opposition to the Iran deal, um, as Obama had to deal with. 6:10 Uh, they could find that, uh, you know, between, um, the sort of Islamophobic rhetoric from Trump, but, you know, the impact of, of that on, on countries, for example, in the Egyptian government. 6:23 Um, I think the, the impact more is, um, what do you do when the US pursues policies arguably perhaps in the Middle East that will, uh, that, that will do very little, um, for example, to help Egypt's fight against the Islamic State or other terrorist groups in the Sinai Peninsula, for example. 6:40 Um, I think that the... To just bring it back to Theresa May briefly as well, I think her domestic standing is, is going to be undermined, um, by th- by going along with Trump too strongly. 6:53 There's already, um, you know, a lot of criticism that she's receiving back at home. 6:57 Um, and I think that, you know, the British opposition is pretty scattershot right now, but, um, you can't discount, A, the, the huge amount of, you know, half of the electorate in Britain that voted against Brexit doesn't exactly give May a mandate already for, uh, her agenda. 7:13 There, there's also the fact that, uh, Nigel Farage, uh, even though his, uh, campaign for Brexit was successful, is not a particularly popular politician in the, in the UK, and his party w- is not a, a popular party. 7:28 Uh, and he's sort of Trump's man on the ground in Great Britain. 7:31 So in some ways, uh, for May to collaborate very closely with Donald Trump m- means she's collaborating somewhat closely with, uh, with Farage, which can't, I imagine, can't help her domestically. 7:44 Um, and in the Middle East, uh, as you mentioned, there are these countries that, that, uh, are, are somewhat enthusiastic about, uh, what they expect from Trump once he's in office, uh, compared to, uh, their, some of their misgivings with, uh, f- former President, uh, Barack Obama. 8:01 At the same time, there's so many internal, uh, incon- inconsistencies, incoherences in terms of Trump's approach, uh, that I think that they too might be in for a surprise. Um, uh, I think a lot... 8:15 For me, a lot of this gets, gets back to a, a certain sort of, uh, a certain landscape, uh, in international affairs that I don't think we've seen really since, uh, 2003, where you have basically the United States, um, b- uh, which traditionally is a force for global stability, uh, being really a potential threat to global stability at this point in terms of some of the policies that Trump is promising to pursue, especially the economic policies with regard to China, um, the protectionism, um, and, and even these measures with regard to immigration and, and refugees, which, uh, which really sort of create an, an America against the world, uh, 9:01 dynamic that, uh, the Obama presidency, uh, strove so, so, so, uh, strenuously to, to overcome. 9:09 Uh, what, what happens, uh, what happens in the world when the United States, uh, is sort of a, a, a force of instability and, and, and unpredictable? Yeah. 9:20 It's, it's a new frontier of, of uncertainty and potential instability that, you know, to contrast it with the George W. Bush administration, you know, it... 9:31 that was in a way a little bit more, um, at least in hindsight, predictable in terms of the US was acting like the s- e- even more like a superpower. 9:40 It was, it was launching a war in Iraq, um, despite international protests. 9:45 Um, it was acting unilaterally, um, in defense of, you know, certain ideas and certain, and certain policies, um, and it was extremely aggressive in, in, in that. 9:55 And I think that, you know, Trump represents, uh, in a way, um, you know, similar aggressive moves, but not to, uh, not, for example, to topple a dictator, but rather to, you know, dismantle some of the longstanding, um, tenets of the international order. 10:12 Um, obviously we can't also ignore the fact that he has also said he might want to go and take Iraq's oil back, um, whatever that even means in practice. But the, yeah, the- there's a... 10:22 And, uh, obviously we've talked about uncertainty many times before, but there's, you know... How will the European Union respond? 10:29 How will the bloc of countries that have been traditional allies, uh, of the United States in, in Asia, for example, in the Pacific region, how will they respond? 10:36 Will you have camps of countries forming their own blocs, um, while on the one hand still obviously working with the United States, but having to take matters sort of into their own hands to insulate themselves from a president who nobody can really predict what or what he will do? 10:54 That idea of having to insulate oneself from the United States obviously, uh, is something that, uh, that is, is hard to, to grab ahold of. 11:04 Uh, we saw some of that with regard to the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East. There was quite a bit of alarm. 11:10 Turkey even, uh, denied access, uh, to its bases for launching, uh, the invasion into the north of Iraq. 11:17 Um, but nothing really to, to, to the degree that we're seeing now in terms of the potential for not just regional, uh, destabilization, but global destabilization. 11:28 Uh, so definitely stuff that we'll be keeping a close eye on here, uh, as we, uh, as we cover events from week to week. Um, I think that just about wraps it up. 11:37 Before we pass it on to Peter, any articles we ran this week that you wanna call people's attention to? 11:43 Um, yeah, one was a briefing by Christopher Louft, um, about Brazil's prison crisis, uh, and all the challenges that Brazil faces, uh, facing austerity, but also in dealing with a, a, an escalating crisis in its jails. 11:59 And I wanted to flag the first in a series of Global Insider email interviews we'll be running on workers' rights, this one an interview with Cynthia Estland about workers' rights in China, which was very informative and insightful and for me, a Uh, educational. 12:18 I learned quite a bit from it. That's just about all the time we have, Freddie. Thanks a lot. Thanks, Judah. And now over to Peter for the report. 12:25 [upbeat music] During the past few weeks, Thomas Rader has observed a steep decline in sea transport. He blames the financial crisis. 12:36 Since many banks are no longer issuing loans, even to some of their long-standing clients, global trade is slowing down. 12:43 The World Trade Organization expects growth in volume of world trade to remain unchanged from two thousand and fifteen at two point eight percent. It will be the fifth consecutive year that growth is below three percent. 12:56 There is a large and growing constituency in the US, in Europe, and in the UK that disputes the central assertion of international macroeconomics that more trade is good. 13:10 Both the successful campaign for the Brexit and Donald Trump's election bid leaned heavily on a criticism of globalization. 13:19 But global integration has been under pressure since the global financial crisis in two thousand and eight. The events of two thousand and sixteen only brought into focus what had already been a well-established trend. 13:33 Trade growth is slowing, and protectionist measures are outpacing new trade agreements. 13:39 I'm joined today by Daniel McDowell, who is an assistant professor for political science at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, to talk about the challenges to globalization in recent years, as well as possible scenarios for the future. 13:53 The state of, of global trade, and frankly, even more broadly than trade, if we just think about globalization, um, a-and, and global economic integration in the, in the largest sense, uh, I think we can see that, uh, the last, uh, eight years or so since two thousand and eight, uh, we've witnessed a slowing and even a deterioration, uh, in terms of global economic integration, specifically in terms of trade and finance. 14:19 Uh, and what we're-- what we see looking forward, especially, uh, with the warnings of twenty sixteen, namely, uh, Brexit, uh, as well as the election of, uh, of Donald Trump in the United States, uh, and the economic slowdown in China are some clear signs that moving forward we're unlikely to see globalization pick up anytime soon. 14:42 And frankly, if anything, we should expect to see, uh, more trade conflict, perhaps more slowing of international trade and, uh, continued stagnant international financial integration. 14:54 So, uh, the big picture is it's not been a good, uh, a good eight years or so since two thousand and eight for global economic integration, and the future, uh, looks even more, uh, even more tenuous. 15:06 How do we know that global economic integration is slowing down th- since two thousand and eight? Two key indicators to look at are global trade volumes and the number of new trade barriers, Daniel says. 15:18 The IMF, uh, has been really speaking about the, the decline in global trade recently. 15:24 Uh, and it's noted here that, you know, if we look at the last thirty years or so, that, uh, growth in trade, uh, globally has more or less outpaced global economic growth by a ratio of two to one. 15:38 In other words, right, uh, trade is growing twice as fast. Um, prior to two thousand and eight, say the three decades prior, uh, trade is growing about twice as fast as the global economy itself is growing. 15:50 And what we've seen, um, since twenty twelve, um-- and I say twenty twelve because those first few years after the financial crisis, things were, were pretty volatile. 15:58 We saw a very sharp drop in trade in two thousand and, uh, in two thousand and nine, and then a very quick recovery in twenty ten. 16:05 By twenty twelve, we had sort of, you know, stabilized the worst parts of the crisis, and you could say maybe we've entered into sort of a more normal, uh, a, a more normal econo-- uh, global economy again. 16:17 Uh, but what we have not seen is since twenty twelve, uh, world trade go back onto that same trend line where it's outpacing global economic growth by a two-to-one ratio. 16:27 Instead, what we're seeing is global trade barely keeping pace with global economic growth. 16:33 Um, and this year, the World Trade Organization has effectively said its expectations, uh, are that it will be below global economic growth. 16:41 Um, and what makes this especially concerning, if you think trade is good, is that, uh, global economic growth has been quite slow over the past few years. 16:50 Um, and so what this means is not only do we see, uh, the world economy growing at a slower pace, uh, than decades past, uh, even at that slow growth rate, trade isn't able to keep up, uh, right now. 17:02 So that suggests that there are a couple of things going on. Um, one is that, of course, trade is, uh, trade growth is slowing because the, the world economy is not growing fast enough. 17:14 So the two are somewhat interrelated, and it's, it's difficult to disentangle the two. 17:19 But we do know that part of the reason world trade has not grow-- uh, has not grown as quickly as it has in decades past is because, one, uh, we've seen a s- a slowing down in the number of, uh, trade agreements that have been signed. 17:33 We've seen a, uh, a slowdown in tariff reductions, uh, and we've seen an uptick in protectionist measures, uh, across the world. 17:41 And this includes many of, uh, many of the world's largest economies like the United States, China, like the-- like Europe. Uh, and so, you know, it's a combination of factors. 17:51 Global economic stagnation is contributing to slow trade growth. But, uh, protectionism, uh, creeping protectionism, uh, disguised protectionism, these sorts of, uh, these sorts of policies, uh, are becoming more common. 18:04 Uh, in fact, uh, Trade Alert, uh, which, uh, tracks these things, has identified, uh, since two thousand and eight, basically, uh, global protectionist measures, uh, have outpaced liberalizing measures by a ratio of three to one or four to one, depending on what year we're looking at. 18:21 So in other words Protectionism is spreading more quickly than liberalization, uh, since the crisis. Of course, protectionism is the result of policymaking on the national level. 18:33 In some ways, Daniel argues, the reaction of politicians around the globe to the 2008 crisis was relatively mild when compared to the spread of protectionist policies after prior economic crises. 18:47 So in terms of the political, uh, underpinnings of this rising tide of protectionism that we're witnessing today, um, I, I think it's important to imagine a number of different scenarios that we could have, have, have witnessed, uh, in the post-2008, uh, world. 19:03 And, and one of course is a much darker scenario, uh, a world that looked something more like, uh, the world in 1930. 19:10 Uh, and I think that in the immediate post-crisis period, there was this sense of relief among many observers that, wow, you know, we had this horrible financial crisis, and the only thing we can really compare it to in modern history is what happens in 1929 and 1930. 19:26 And if you look at history, right, um, what happens in the aftermath, uh, of the financial crisis in 1929 is, uh, is a, a complete unraveling of the global economy. 19:35 We see the passage of Smoot-Hawley in the United States, and within two years, sixty different countries have, have, uh, applied retaliatory tariffs, and the global trading system has effectively collapsed. 19:46 And we didn't see that in 2009 or 2010. We saw the G20 holding many summits and saying all the right things. 19:53 And so in one sense, we could say that, you know, politically, that the, the major economies of today have been quite resilient in the face, uh, in the face of these very, uh, troubling economic headwinds. 20:05 Uh, on the flip side, right, uh, I think that because of the, the, the sense of relief that we witnessed, there has been less of a realization that there has been this rise of creeping protectionism. 20:20 And so what are the political causes of that? Uh, you know, I, I, I frankly think there's a nexus here between the two. You know, we have... 20:27 When, when there's periods of, of economic stagnation, when there's periods of, uh, stubborn high unemployment, individuals, uh, look for something to blame. They look for, uh, solutions. 20:39 And, and, and generally, it's easier for, for people to blame outsiders. 20:45 Uh, I think if we look at the rhetoric from, uh, from President Donald Trump during the campaign, it's clear that he was able to tap into, uh, a sense of suspicion among many Americans, not just of globalization, but of outsiders in general. 20:59 And he tied trade to those sorts of, those sorts of, uh, beliefs and attitudes. And so, uh, I think that because of this period of persistent slow growth, uh, people are just looking for answers. 21:12 And if the last fifteen years haven't worked out for you, and for you, the last fifteen years, uh, in terms of the economy, uh, represent this attempt at globalization, and you say, "Well, that hasn't worked for me," well then, why not go the opposite direction? 21:32 The problem, of course, is, is that the, the things that are happening to many people, these, uh, job losses, uh, uh, slow economic growth, right, stagnant wages, um, in many cases are not directly the consequence of globalization. 21:46 They're a consequence of other things like automation and technology. That's not to say that people haven't really been hurt in, in certain specific cases. But again, the scapegoat is trade. 21:56 The scapegoat is globalization. 21:58 Uh, and, uh, if there are leaders who are willing to tap into those, uh, those beliefs, then, uh, you know, I think what we're, what we're witnessing is, um, a real, a, a real desire to, to pull back on these things among many people, especially in the advanced, uh, industrial democracies. 22:15 And, and the last thing I would add to that is once these things start to move in that direction, then I think we can see that even outside of domestic politics, they can take on a sort of momentum. 22:29 If the United States decides that it's going to start embracing a more protectionist, uh, uh, foreign economic policy, then what that's going to do is it's going to increase the likelihood that foreign economies will decide to follow in, in turn with similar protectionist responses against the United States or against other countries, uh, that they view as harming their own economic interests. 22:53 We know from research that policies diffuse. 22:57 There's a lot of research in the field of international political economy where, where I, uh, do, do my research that has shown that liberal economic policies tend to spread across borders, that countries seem to copy one another. 23:10 Um, and as competitors open up their economies, that they tend to follow suit. 23:13 And, and I think, I have a hunch, right, that what we're witnessing right now is sort of the opposite effect, that, that countries, uh, see other economies adopting protectionist policies, and they're either following suit because they're retaliating or perhaps because they think, well, maybe that's the right type of policy. 23:29 Maybe this is a, a, a situation where we need to be more, uh, more protective of our own, own industries. And so some of it is self-feeding, um, as states just sort of copy one another or retaliate against one another. 23:42 With a sworn trade skeptic in the White House and populist movements in other Western countries demanding less international integration in all domains, a continuation of the trends that shaped the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st seems unlikely. 24:01 But proponents of protectionist and isolationist policies, Daniel says, are mistaken if they think that stopping globalization would solve the social and economic problems they are highlighting. 24:13 Sort of the great economic debate of the next, let's say at least four years, but maybe the next ten years, is going to be, uh, is, is globalization always good? 24:24 Is there, is there sort of no limit, uh, to which, uh, we should embrace, uh, reducing barrier, economic barriers between, between states? 24:32 And I think it's a fair debate and a debate that needs, needs to take place, in part because, uh, in many of the countries that have most hearted-- uh, most, uh, intensely embraced globalization, we're talking about, uh, democracies, of course. 24:44 And I think what we've seen over the last, uh, year or so is that many people don't feel that they've had much of a say 24:52 in what's happened, uh, to, to, uh, the global economy, or more specifically, to their national economies in light of all of these, uh, these, uh, economic deals that have been struck between countries. 25:03 So the first thing is I think we do need to say it's okay to sort of pause and step back and have, uh, have a real national debate about this. 25:11 Um, the, the flip side of this, of course, is the, the debate has to be, uh, based on facts, um, not based on fear. 25:18 And I s-- I, I think what we see in a lot of places is a debate that's not very factual and a debate that's really based off of generating fear in, in people's minds. 25:27 In terms of the actual consequences, I think, you know, if we have this debate that's only based on fear and we see this sort of backlash to trade and to globalization in general, uh, I think the consequences are, are going to be quite harsh. 25:39 So if we, if we think about tariffs, for instance, you know, just because this is the policy, uh, that, that, uh, President Trump has been, uh, tossing about the most, uh, right? 25:48 Slapping a forty-five percent tariff on China or a thirty percent tariff on Mexico. We have very unfair trade with China. We're going to have a trade deficit of five hundred and five billion dollars this year with China. 26:01 What I said to The New York Times is that we have great power, economic power over China, and if we wanted to use that and the amount and where the forty-five percent comes in, that would be the amount based on their devaluations that we should get. 26:16 That we should get. 26:18 What I'm saying is this, I'm not saying we do it, but if they don't start treating us fairly and stop devaluing and let their currency rise so that our companies can compete and we don't lose all of these millions of jobs that we're losing, I would certainly start taxing goods that come in from China. 26:35 We know, for instance, that tariffs are, are very regressive taxes. Um, right? They're taxes on imports. Uh, and when prices rise, in-inevitably when tariffs are, are placed on imports, well, who's hurt by this the most? 26:47 Well, people at the bottom of the income ladder. We think about, uh, for instance, President Obama in, in two thousand and nine imposed tariffs against Chinese tires. 26:56 And, uh, a study by the Peterson Institute effectively found that, uh, what this did is it, it, it generated about twelve hundred new jobs in the United States tire industry, and it cost consumers about one point one billion dollars in higher tire prices. 27:11 And, uh, so the, the, the cost per job there is about nine hundred thousand dollars, uh, per new job in the US tire industry. 27:18 And of course, if you're someone who's, uh, uh, a millionaire, uh, and you have to buy new tires for your car, and that's an additional, say, two hundred dollars to, to put four new tires on your car, that's not that big of a dent in your, in your actual annual income. 27:34 On the other hand, if you're someone who's working, uh, a minimum wage job, that two hundred dollars could be the difference between paying your rent and putting tires on your car. 27:42 So one of the real problems we're struggling with in the, in the developed world today, of course, is, uh, rising income inequality. 27:49 Uh, so tariffs, uh, a, a reduction in global trade is going to lead to higher prices, higher prices for consumer goods that are going to hurt people at the bottom of the income ladder the hardest. 28:00 Uh, people, frankly, that, that voted for politicians like President Trump, uh, who advocated these very policies that will ultimately end up hurting those same individuals. Uh, so that's just one tangible cost. 28:12 And then the question is, what are the benefits? Well, will it bring jobs back? It may, right? The tire example there, right? 28:18 Some jobs, we, we think, at least the study thinks, were, were perhaps brought back to the United States. 28:23 But we're not likely to see, uh, the kind of manufacturing renaissance we saw in the United States in the nineteen forties and fifties and sixties. In fact, I would go as far to say, uh, it... 28:34 We're, we're, we're not going to see that ever again, and this is because of technology and automation. 28:38 Uh, and so even if jobs come back, they're not going to employ the share of the, uh, of the US working population that they did forty, fifty years ago. 28:48 And finally, without trade barriers, those jobs are already coming back to the United States, to Europe because, uh, precisely because of, uh, advancements in technology in, in these advanced countries. 29:03 It's now easier for advanced, uh, industrial countries to compete with countries like China in manufacturing because workers are so much more productive in those countries. 29:13 So the long and short of it is trade protection is gonna lead to higher prices. It's gonna hurt people at the bottom of the income ladder the most. It's not gonna bring back as many jobs as many people expect. 29:22 And there's a good chance that those jobs, uh, will come back anyway, or at least some of them will come back anyway in the absence of trade barriers. Many thanks to Daniel McDowell for joining us this week. 29:36 If you'd like to read more about globalization's decline, you can find his in-depth article on worldpoliticsreview.com. 29:43 If you like what you hear on Trendlines, go ahead and subscribe to it in the podcast app of your choice. That will save you the trouble of downloading each new episode. 29:51 Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Durrie, who also conducts the report interviews. 29:56 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 30:05 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines. [outro jingle]
