Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. 0:17 I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:20 Before we get started on today's big picture interview, just a quick reminder that you can make sure you don't miss a single episode of Trendlines by subscribing to it on iTunes, Spotify, or the podcast app of your choice. 0:34 Over the past two decades, perhaps no region of the world has seen such a dramatic reversal of fortune as South America. 0:42 Beginning in 1999, a political shift to the left combined with an economic boom allowed governments across the continent to make dramatic inroads in the fight against poverty and exclusion. 0:55 The region's transformation was held up as a model of what governments can achieve when they make addressing inequality a central priority. 1:04 But beginning in 2013, the end of the commodities boom led to slowed growth and, in some cases, political instability, calling into question the sustainability of the previous decade's gains. 1:18 In today's big picture Trendlines interview, I'm joined by Frida Ghitis to discuss the changes the past two decades have brought to South America and where they leave the region today as it faces longstanding challenges exacerbated by the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic. 1:36 Frida is a contributing columnist at The Washington Post, as well as a frequent on-air analyst and commentator on several radio and television outlets, including CNN and CNN en Español. 1:49 She has been a WPR contributor since we first started publishing in 2006, and her weekly column appears every Thursday. You can sign up for her weekly newsletter at fridainsight.substack.com. 2:04 Frida, thanks so much for joining us on Trendlines. It's good to be with you, Judah. Uh, when you look at South America today, uh, and try to make sense of it, it seems to me that, uh, you have to start 20 years ago. 2:20 Uh, it's, it's really hard to overstate how much that first decade from 2000 to 2010, uh, really marked a change and, and transformed the region. 2:32 Uh, so I guess to start off, I wanted to ask you how you saw that decade in terms of some of the changes across South America. Yeah, I think you're absolutely right. 2:42 I think that decade, decade, the decade of the aughts from 2000 to 2010, which actually started in 1999 and ended in 2013, uh, is the one that really shaped the, the conflicts and the policies that have defined the region, uh, over the past 20 years. 3:02 Uh, 1999 is when Hugo Chávez was elected president of, of Venezuela, and he was really the, the figure that stood at the center of the changes and, and the tensions that have shaped the region, uh, during that decade, and even after his death, they, they continue to linger. 3:19 Uh, you know, Chávez was, you know, the former leftist military man who came to power through a demo- through democratic means, and that in itself was a, a shift from the days when military coups were almost routine in Latin America. 3:34 Uh, Chávez himself had tried unsuccessfully in 1992 to, uh, to, uh, overthrow a government, and he spent a couple of years in prison. 3:42 But in 1999, he managed to take power, uh, and he, he pioneered and crafted a way to transform countries, uh, through what started as democratic means, and it was a, it was a path, it was a, a model that was emulated by other leaders, and it's what brought about what came to be known as the Pink Tide. 4:05 Uh, you know, he... W- we saw, we saw the playbook unfold, uh, in Venezuela and repeated across the region. 4:12 We saw how he won the presidency, and then he, he launched a process of rewriting the constitution, and the constitution only allowed for two consecutive presidential terms, so he decided to not count the first one so he could run actually for a third time, and then he started doing, carrying out all these m- maneuvers to stay, to stay in power, uh, and he did until he died. 4:36 And we saw that model repeated across the region. 4:40 Uh, and in fact, you know, I was remembering, uh, writing an article, it may have been for World Politics Review, and you might have been the editor, I'm not exactly sure, but it was back in the days, it was before Chávez was, became ill, uh, when he was playing all these games with the constitution, and I wrote an article. 4:56 My suggested headline was, "Chávez Is Determined, Determined To Die In Office," and my editor, who might have been you, said, "No, no, no, that's, that's too much." But that's actually what happened. 5:06 You know, I didn't expect him to become ill so quickly, but he just refused to give up power. And so that's one of the things he did. Uh, and w- we saw it, you know, we see it, we saw it in, in Bolivia later on. 5:18 Uh, we saw it in so many other countries. And he also brought the, the fight against poverty to the forefront of, of politics in Latin America to a degree that even the right could no longer ignore. 5:34 Now, I, I wanna focus on that because, uh, to my mind, if there, if there is a, a sort of one element of the, the Chavista revolution that, uh, I don't wanna say justifies the rest or the anti-democratic slide, uh, but if there's one positive, uh, outcome, it's this idea that, um... 5:57 And again, when he takes power, it's at the height of the Washington Consensus, uh, and, and almost single-handedly, he reintroduces the idea that the state... in South America can do something about, uh, 6:13 alleviating poverty and intervening for the most disadvantaged. So talk about that and, and, and how that affected, uh, the rest of South America. 6:23 You know, it was interesting that, you know, Chavismo was controversial from the very beginning. He was, you know, Chavez was a very histrionic, very controversial and abrasive character, and he frightened people. 6:35 He, he frightened the people who were... You know, he was incredibly divisive. He, he spoke, uh, in, in very, uh, uh, disparaging terms of, of the, of the opposition and of the wealthy. 6:47 But he did bring up, you know, this concern for, for the poor. 6:51 So what we saw that was very interesting was that in, in Brazil, we had another figure from the left, Lula, who became, became president, and he, he became an alternative to Chavismo, a leftist alternative to Chavismo, a more palatable, uh, less divisive, less controversial figure, and he also focused on improving the lot of the poor. 7:11 He also had came from very, very humble beginnings, and he introduced a program, uh, Bolsa Familia, that, that was giving, giving aid, giving help to the poorest of the poor to raise the bottom. 7:22 Uh, and he did it in a way that was less confrontational. 7:26 Uh, but you know, the two of them, they were offering what looked like, like alternative leftist a- approaches, but they both focused very, very sharply on the need to, uh, to alleviate poverty and to lessen inequality in Latin America. 7:41 And I think, you know, whenever you're talking about Latin America, you have to f- you have to keep in mind that poverty and inequality, especially inequality, are one of the most distinctive fig- uh, features of the region. 7:53 And, and because of what happened in, in, during that decade, no politician can hope to succeed without addressing that. 8:01 And in terms of the, the impact on the societies, uh, across South America, in terms of this, this new political presence of people who had previously been excluded, uh, whether economic classes or ethnicities, indigenous communities, for instance, in Bolivia, how, how did that, uh, that transformation, uh, sort of reshape these societies and these, these, uh, political arenas? 8:29 No, it's, it's, that's a really interesting question because on the one hand, the, the, the people who promoted the, uh, the political participation of, of, uh, groups that had been marginalized in the past, that had not, not been a part of the political process, these people really expanded, uh, democracy in their countries. 8:48 They, they really widened the, the, the democratic arena. But ironically, these were the same people that started, that started cutting back on, uh, on, on the principles of democracy. 8:58 Somebody like, like, uh, Evo Morales, who came from, from an indigenous community himself. He was the first indigenous, uh, Bolivian to become president. 9:08 He empowered, uh, the majority of Bolivians who are indigenous, and so in, in that respect, he really, really invi- gave new vigor, invigior- invigorated, uh, Bolivian democracy. 9:20 But then he started just, you know, like we've seen across the region with all, as part of this pink tide, he started, he started, uh, monopolizing power and becoming more and more reluctant to, to surrender power himself. 9:33 So it was, there were forces going in opposite directions. But I think it's very difficult. 9:37 Once you, once you communicate to the people that they, that th- these are their countries, you know, that they have a right to have a say in how they're governed, it's very hard to remove that. 9:47 So I, I think that is a, a lasting impact of what we saw during that decade. 9:52 Uh, I'm glad you mentioned this sort of s- co- simultaneous, uh, seemingly coexistence of opposites, the expansion of democracy at the same time that there were these anti-dem- democratic trends, because it seems to be a real characteristic of, of South America during that decade. 10:11 And, uh, if I remember correctly, I th- I, I, I remember, uh, editing one of your columns in which you talked about South America in particular almost a- a- as a model of democracy in terms of the popular aspiration, the polling that showed how popular democracy was, but also as a laboratory of democracy and of these, these social welfare programs. 10:35 So talk a little bit about that in terms of, um, I, I, I wanna say almost the pride that, that the region might have been taking at the time. 10:44 It was one of the most stable regions, one of the most democratic, one of the most prosperous. 10:50 And, and, and what did that mean for a region that so often historically has been seen as, as unstable and, and has a long history of military dictatorships? You know, Judes, it's almost sad to reminisce about that time. 11:03 It was, it was a period of so much, so much hope and optimism. There were, there were good things happening, but there was, there was this dark cloud on the horizon. 11:13 You know, the, this, this expansion of, uh, of the, of democratic participation also had in it the seeds of, of really harmful, uh, populism. 11:23 The, you know, the, this advance of leaders who were concerned about the poor had, had all the elements of, of, of, of dictatorship built into it. 11:33 Uh, and at the same time, and we'll talk about this later, the, the money that was propelling these governments to, to develop programs, that was funding the programs that made it possible to, to fight, uh, poverty, that money was about to be pulled out from under these economies. 11:50 So, uh, the region was w- it was a time of, of great excitement. 11:54 You know, the, the Cold War was over, and the, the, the energy, the resources that had been spent, uh, fighting a, a, an ideological conflict, that was mostly over. 12:06 Uh, the future really looked Limitless, and you know, it's the old, the old line that is used so often about Brazil, that it's the country of the future and always will be. 12:16 That seems to be, uh, coming true again in Latin America. Th- that rug, uh, getting pulled out from under the region that you just mentioned is obviously the end of the commodities boom in, in 2013. 12:28 One last look at that first decade, though, before we start, uh, move on and talk about the, the, the following years. Uh, one of the things too that really marked that period was, uh, a, a real heightened regionalism. 12:43 Uh, all sorts of regional integration projects, uh, whether it was UNASUR, the, the, the continental, uh, uh, regional, uh, body that, uh, that was sort of a political talk shop and crisis management forum. 12:58 Uh, then you had the Chávez-led ALBA, uh, bloc of the like-minded, uh, pink-tied leftist, uh, countries. 13:07 But there seemed to be a sense that South America as a region was self-reliant, autonomous, able to handle its own crises that did arise from time to time. 13:18 I remember one between Colombia and Venezuela in the later part of that decade. Um, how, how would you describe that, uh, a- as, as one of the features of, of that decade? 13:29 I, I think one of the things that was happening was a sense of, uh, of, of dignity, of, uh, taking control, of not being... 13:38 And also, this is also, I think, a, a consequence of the end of the Cold War, of not being, uh, a region that is simply a satellite of another one. 13:47 Countries that, uh, were tired of being, uh, drawn into the orbits of the, of the great powers. They, you know, Latin America was going to forge its own path. 13:55 But those, those alliances that you were talking about also, were also, uh, separating, dividing the, the continent into, into poles that would become, that would oppose one another, and Chávez was at the core, uh, of, of, of his leftist bloc, uh, financing it using Venezuelan oil money to bolster regimes that were, that would become very un- anti-democratic, uh, sowing suspicions among voters in other countries about how much they could trust politicians that were close to Chávez. 14:29 I remember when, uh, Peru was going to have an election and Ollanta Humala was running. He was desperately trying to tell voters that he was not going to be like Chávez because he had a similar background. 14:41 He also came from the military. He also had, had attempted a coup and, and there were rumors that, that he was going to be a, a pawn for Chávez. 14:50 And by then, of course, towards the end of the decade, uh, the, the rest of the region had gotten a good look at Chávez, and even though he still had money and he was still, uh, improving the lot of the population, there were a lot of suspicions about his, uh, a- about other aspects of his rule, and Latin America was really, to a large degree, beginning to turn against that model and to really fear it. 15:14 And, and so that brings us to 2013, which as, as you point out, it's, it's, it's a good point. It was really a 13-year decade, uh, or even 14 years if you wanna start in 1999 for, for South America. 15:27 And in 2013, you have the slackening in demand, uh, from China, especially for commodities, uh, that had really fueled, uh, a lot of the, the social welfare programs of the previous decade. 15:41 Um, so talk about that, that period, tho- those next few years, uh, and what the, the, the, the commodities bust, uh, revealed, uh, about the, the, the previous decade's gains, um, and the impact the, that, that the, the bust had on the, the, the region's economies. 16:01 Well, you know, the, the, the leftist governments that had been, uh, that had washed ashore with the pink tide had looked for a time like they were geniuses. 16:11 You know, these, they were, uh, the, the economies were growing. The, uh, poverty was, was being reduced. 16:17 Uh, they were generally, generally popular, although there was a lot of discontent among the opposition that, you know, when they were seeing their, their rights curtailed. 16:26 But on the whole, it looked like maybe they had struck on a, on a, on a formula for, for, uh, developing the economy, fighting poverty, and, uh, and staying in power. 16:39 Uh, it turned out that their, the secret of their success was China's growth, which just shows us how, you know, what a small world we live in. 16:48 China's explosive growth meant that, that, uh, the country was consuming so many raw materials that the price of commodities had, was through the roof, and, and it, it wasn't going to stay there. 17:01 So when demand started s- dropping and prices returned to more normal levels, suddenly these countries that had been spending so much money to, to support these programs and incidentally to support, you know, patronage to, to keep, uh, these, these, uh, governments, these regimes in office, uh, suddenly saw the money evaporate. 17:24 Uh, interestingly, the, the drop in oil prices in Venezuela, uh, meant that other countries that were not oil exporters were suddenly suffering because Chávez had been so generous with, uh, with, uh, Venezuela's oil money. 17:41 So suddenly these countries were, you know, suffering. Suddenly Cuba was in trouble also because it had been getting money from Venezuela. By then, you know, then, you know, Chávez died. We got Maduro. 17:51 Uh, Venezuelan democracy became more and more transparently phony. 17:57 Um, and- And the, the opposition to these count-, to these, uh, governments from the left, the, the moderates and the right started becoming much more suspicious and much more nervous about, uh, leftist regimes after seeing what happened in Venezuela, and really the gloves came off. 18:14 Uh, prosperity has g- had, was disappearing, uh, money was disappearing, and suddenly, suddenly they were out to, uh, to get rid of these, these leftist governments. 18:23 And we saw that in Brazil, for example, where the part- the, the gov- the, uh, the Congress got rid of, uh, Dilma Rousseff, the, the successor to Lula, uh, and we started seeing all these, uh, anti-corruption crusades. 18:38 Um, and I think another, another thing that we saw that I think was very interesting is that the experience of Venezuela, Venezuela was starting to fall apart. 18:46 It wasn't anywhere near where it is now, but Venezuela no longer looked like an appealing model, uh, and the Venezuelan people started to become the object of pity more than envy. 18:58 And I, I, I really think that both the extreme left and the extreme right, uh, had an awakening at the time, and I think, I think countries, the, the people became slightly more centrist. 19:11 I don't think any model of any extreme was as appealing anymore as it wa- as it had been before. 19:17 Now, you, you mentioned the, the political backlash and in, in the past five years starting really I, I, I guess in, in Argentina, there's been a return or, or, uh, before the most pre- the most recent el- election there, there was a return to the right, and part of that had to do with, um, the w- as the economic tide, uh, sort of moved out, uh, it, it became clearer and clearer ha- that, uh, a lot of the pink tide governments had mishandled government finances, that the, the, these poverty alleviation programs weren't necessarily sustainable, um, and that, uh, a lot of the fiscal policies and monetary policies, uh, were unsustainable. 20:00 And so you have a return of the right starting in about 2015 and, and some austerity policies or, or, uh, structural reforms. 20:10 Uh, what, what is the impact of that, uh, in this period, the, the middle of the, the, in, in around 2015, 2017? 20:18 Well, Argentina is an in- interesting example there because you had Mauricio Macri come to office and say, "Look, the previous government, uh, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, really, really messed up the books." 20:30 You know, he was left with a huge budget deficit. Nobody knew what the real inflation was. When, when the inflation numbers were started to look terrible, uh, Fernández just basically shut down the statistics office. 20:40 So Macri came with a market approach and he said, "It's going to take a while." 20:46 It's g- I think he said a year, you know, "It's going to be one year that we're, that's going to be painful and then the economy will start getting better." 20:52 But it didn't work out that way, and, you know, as we were talking about earlier, fighting poverty has to be at or near the top of the agenda in Latin America now, and Macri was, was betting on his programs bearing fruit 21:10 soon enough that he could start really helping the poor, and that just did not happen. Other events around the world, uh, conspired, uh, and, and it just didn't work. So the right couldn't, didn't succeed either there. 21:23 And what started to happen is that I think gradually what we're seeing is that these divisions between left and right in Latin America are starting to fade, and we're, we're headed in the direction more of pragmatism. 21:35 Uh, th- the, the governments that could produce results were the ones that people wanted. People didn't want, you know, that we saw in, in Colombia, you know, the, the f- the peace deal with the FARC. 21:46 People were s- you know, it was interesting c- in Colombia where, uh, where the government of, of, uh, President Santos managed to w- to work out a deal with, uh, with FARC. 21:58 The people, the people, uh, who were opposed to the deal, one of the things that they were afraid of was that, that, uh, FARC newly turned into a political party was going to do very well, and it turned out that voters wanted nothing to do with, with the, the people who had been members of this, uh, leftist, you know, far left Marxist group. 22:20 So the population really turned against the extremes. They turned against the far left and they turned against the far right. 22:26 And, you know, speaking of that, I think it's worth mentioning that these, these leftist governments that we've been talking about, they were never really full Cuban-style Marxist regimes. They never, they never, uh, 22:42 did away with, with private property. They nationalized some key industries, but they allowed private businesses to continue to function. 22:48 There was an awareness, there was a realization that, uh, that at least a big element of, uh, free market economics is basically indispensable, and that is a huge transformation for a region that, for the, for the, the continent of Che Guevara. 23:03 I, I think it's worth noting that. 23:05 A- and a- at, during this period too, the mid 2010s, uh, there's this huge corruption scandal that, uh, that's brought to light in Brazil, uh, that then, uh, is traced across the continent, um, a- and, and really well prosecuted. 23:24 Uh, there are people, uh, in office that are brought down. There are, uh, very major players, political and economic, that are prosecuted and, and jailed. 23:33 Um, talk about that, the, the, the, this, this wave of anti-corruption, uh, that swept the, the continent in, in starting in about 2015 and then for, for the next few years, and what that meant in terms of what, what you're talking about, this, this pragmatic desire for, for effective but also clean government. 23:54 Yeah, I think, you know, that was a really, it was a very exciting time I think, you know? And, and it was also a time of, uh, mixed emotions of, of excitement and anger, you know, of optimism and frustration because- 24:07 Everybody knew that there was a lot of corruption in Latin America. That had never been a secret, and it was taken as a given. It's, it was one of those realities of life that felt, that, that felt, uh, un- unchangeable. 24:19 And suddenly, uh, maybe, maybe in part because the eco- the economies have stopped growing, and I think when there's a lot of prosperity it's easier to overlook the, the corruption. But suddenly people started noticing. 24:32 You know, first it, it all started with the scandal at, at the oil company at Petrobras in Brazil, and it just mushroomed into this monster corruption scandal that the, the Brazilian government, the Brazilian prosecutors started... 24:44 You know, they started pulling on that thread and, and it unraveled a massive wave of corruption that engulfed the, you know, the entire continent and even beyond. It went to, to other countries. 24:56 Uh, this big, huge, uh, engineering firm, Odebrecht, have been, had the- they had, like, a ministry in, within the, within the company of bribing, uh, leaders. 25:06 And, you know, when you think about poor countries with very limited resources and tremendous needs, you know, with, with people in poverty, with, uh, you know, healthcare and education needs that are so desperate, when you think about them spending millions, even billions of dollars more than they need to on projects that are not necessary or spending more than, than they would have had to to build a road so that a company in Brazil can make a, a higher profit, uh, and in the, and they ac- and the company in Brazil manages to do that by giving a bribe to some corrupt official, the, the anger that that caused, uh, is, it's not only understandable, but more importantly, that the prospect that you could put an end to that is more important, I think, than... 25:51 It, it could have an impact on, uh, on wellbeing, on economic growth that goes far beyond anything that the commodities boom of, uh, a decade earlier would have done. 26:01 You know, if you, if you can really get rid of corruption in Latin America, or really anywhere in the world, but in Latin America, the, the, the region would grow so much more, more, um, sustainably than it does now with, with all these, uh, all these deals, all this graft going on b- under the table. 26:21 So it was a time of optimism, and it, and it looked really good and it looked really promising. 26:26 And, uh, then it started to, to slow down because, I, I don't know if you want to talk about that now, but, uh, the, the gov- As the corruption investigations reached higher and higher, the people who were still in power started, started getting more and more nervous and started winding down the investigations. 26:44 Well, we c- we can maybe get back to it, but, uh, but I, I want to, I want to, uh, look also at, um, uh, the, the, the role of the United States in the region. 26:55 But before we do, there, there are three, for, for me, there are three really major symbolic events, um, or, or trends, uh, from this period in the decade, uh, or the, the, this, these last five years of the decade starting in 2015. 27:11 The first... A- and you've mentioned all three already. Uh, the first is the FARC peace deal, uh, which really almost historically closes the book on this period of, of Marxist insurgency. 27:24 Um, the second to me is the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and, and the subsequent, uh, descent of Brazil into political and economic chaos, and then also the, the catastrophe in Venezuela. 27:38 Uh, in terms of the symbolism for the region, um, one obviously an optimistic, the other two much more pessimistic. So, uh, w- w- why, why don't you talk a little bit about those and, and take them in the order you want. 27:51 Um, but the, the meanings that those three events had in terms of the, the, the region's history, its, its self-image, and its, its sense of what was lying ahead. 28:02 Well, I think that what, what the three, uh, events that you mentioned, what the three have in common is that they, they are all representations of the, of the internal conflicts withi- within those societies. 28:14 You have, in, in Brazil you have the left against the right, you know, the, the, the ruling, uh, members of, the, the members of Congress, the, the non-Workers Party members of Congress going against the Workers Party. 28:29 In, uh, in Colombia, you have the conflict between the Marxist guerrillas and, and the rest of society. And in Venezuela you have, again, you know, a left against right, uh, conflict. 28:41 And it, what we have, these, it, these, these are, these are, uh, instances of societies working out the deepest conflicts that are dominating the political arena and that are really dominating the, the decision-making for, for what the future is going to bring, for what kind of a country they are going to be. 28:59 And you're right to, to mention those three because they really were pivotal. They really represented a, a shift in the direction of these countries. 29:07 Uh, but each one really took, took the, the country in a slightly different direction. 29:12 And y- you know, I think for, if you, if you talk about Venezuela, uh, the, the collapse of the, of the Venezuelan economy, of its society, um, 29:22 is really, it, I think the, the answer to, uh, the Maduro, the Chavista model, uh, the answer to whether or not it works is here. We already know. You know what? 29:33 I don't know how long they are going to hang on, but we already know that it didn't work. It was a disaster. It was a calamity. It was a tragedy for the people of Venezuela. 29:41 So, you know, the, the question has been answered, uh, even if the crisis has not been resolved. Colombia also, you know, they're, you know, the, the peace deal is, you know, it's, it's full of problems and, uh, 29:54 people have very strong opinions one way and the other. But that, that war, uh, about whether or not Colombia is going to be a Marxist, a socialist country, that war is over, that... 30:05 You know, there may be, uh, outbreaks of fighting, but you know, the Colombian people have made their decision. 30:10 Uh, and you know, Brazil is, is still working out its relationship to, to, uh- To democracy, its relationship to, to, uh, to the left. 30:21 Uh, they're still fighting it out, and they're, they're swinging from one extreme to the other. Uh, you know, interestingly, we, we talk about, uh, Brazil swinging from one extreme to the other. 30:31 I, you know, I, I'm, I was just reading recently just a few days ago about, you know, Bolsonaro. 30:36 You know, we're not talking about, about the president yet, but he is actually continuing some of these social support programs that were introduced by Lula in, you know, in a so- somewhat different, uh, shape. 30:47 But that, that, uh, notion that we talked about at the beginning that you have to address poverty is not lost even on a, on a president that is from as far to the right as the, as been, as Brazil has had in decades. 31:02 Turning to the United States and America's presence in the region, its involvement, the perception of America in the region, um, I, I, I don't wanna go all the way back to 2000, but very clearly in, uh, in, for Hugo Chávez and other leftist leaders, uh, the United States and demonizing the United States, uh, was a big part of the rhetoric and i- that they used to mobilize, uh, their, their popular movements. 31:32 Um, and, and one of the things that struck me about the Obama administration when it came in, uh, in 2008, uh, is that, uh, at, at, at the very least, its goal was essentially to remove as much as possible the United States from that conversation, uh, so that, uh, so that, uh, tho- those governments could be judged on their own, and the US could try to reset relations with, with the countries in, in South America. 32:00 Would you agree with that as, as, as a, as a sort of framing of, of their goals? And how successful would you say they were? 32:08 Yeah, I, I think that's correct, and I think that was part of what, uh, Obama was doing worldwide. 32:13 You know, he came after America's reputation had been so tarnished by the war in Iraq, and he wanted to improve America's standing around the world and including in Latin America. 32:23 Uh, the, the Iraq issue was not such a, such a major, uh, determining factor in Latin America. 32:31 Uh, but there the United States has and may always have, uh, tension with, with the population for, for a number of reasons, not, not least of them the, the, uh, s- the Cold War days when the United States supported brutal dictatorships as long as they were anti-communist. 32:50 Um, and you're right that, uh, one of the things that Obama tried to do was, uh, remove from Hugo Chávez the, the tool, the, uh, the ability to use the United States to prop himself up, and you know, there were these fa- you know, Chávez had really personalized the, the, the relationship for domestic political reasons. 33:13 There was that famous moment at the United Nations during the General Assembly when he, when he stood there at the podium and he said, "Oh, I can still smell the sulfur from Bush," I guess had just been speaking there and, and he knew that Bush was very unpopular. 33:27 So, uh, Obama tried to take a step back and, uh, make, make countries, uh, not be able to use the United States as a, as a, as a foil. 33:37 Um, but he also wanted to make some very serious, very major changes to American policy. Uh, you know, that there was the, the Cuba, uh, diplomacy move. 33:49 Uh, the United States had ha- has had a 60-year policy of, uh, trying to, to s- to squeeze the communist government of Cuba out of power, and it has not worked, so Obama wanted to try something different. 34:05 And, you know, the US policy towards Cuba has been an irritant in the relationship between the United States and the rest of the, of the continent. 34:13 Uh, the, you know, the, uh, there is every year at the United Nations there is a resolution condemning, uh, the, the American embargo, and every year the United States is almost alone in voting against it. 34:25 So, so Latin America was, was, uh, ready for a change in policy. Obama came on, and he said, you know, "I'm going to..." He was, he was... 34:34 He made a very, very explicit appeal, uh, a very e- explicit commitment to treating, uh, Latin American countries as, as neighbors and partners, not as, uh, not as part of the United States', uh, sphere of influence. 34:51 And to a large degre- degree, he was successful in doing that. Uh, his Cuba policy, uh, was controversial. 35:00 It was, uh, you know, and for, for people who were, uh, very, you know, who are very, uh, viscerally opposed to the left, which is a large, large percentage of Latin America, uh, there was unease, uh, with, with Obama's, uh, um, res- restoration of relations with Cuba. 35:21 They felt, and in fact, you know, I, I felt that he was, he missed an opportunity to extract more concessions on human rights from the Cuban government. 35:30 But he was, he was eager to try a different approach, uh, because the, the other approach has clearly not succeeded. So he, he made some progress in that area. 35:40 Um, he tried to encourage the, the, um, Colombian peace process. 35:46 Uh, he, he continued supporting, supporting the Colombian government in its, in its efforts to rebuild, you know, switching to what used to be called the Plan Colombia, which was a, it, a, an American, uh, U- uh, Colombian-US partnership to fight the Marxist guerrillas. 36:04 He transformed it. They transformed it together into a, an effort to try to rebuild the Colombian economy and society. 36:10 So he tried, and I think to a large degree he was successful, but there was, there, there were many people who thought he should have been harder on, uh, on, on Venezuela. 36:19 Um, although I think now we can see that the, the opposite approach has not proven particularly effective either. 36:26 Well, getting into that, when, when Trump is elected in two thousand sixteen, very clearly there's an abrupt re-reversal on both of those, uh, policy approaches, uh, and, and we see a, a maximum pressure on Venezuela, maximum pressure on Cuba. 36:41 In some ways it's hard to tell, uh, whether the maximum pressure on Venezuela isn't actually a, a tool to try to squeeze Cuba even more because the impact has, has been pretty hard on Cuba as well. 36:53 Um, how, how effective has that been both in terms of the, the objectives with those two countries, but also in terms of perceptions around, around the region in terms of, uh, in terms of, uh, American involvement? 37:06 It seems to me that it's, it's much more reduced and limited than, for instance, the, the Obama administration's outreach, uh, whi-which seemed a, a lot broader. 37:17 Yeah, you know, the, the, uh, Trump approach, with the exception of Venezuela, is really, uh, very US-centered. There is really no, n-no effort to even appear to be, uh, concerned with the wellbeing of the people there. 37:32 You know, Trump came on, he barreled onto the, to the electoral stage in the United States calling, calling, uh, Mexicans rapists and, and murderers and drug traffickers, and his approach to, uh, to 37:48 the large scale migration from Central America was to, to propose building a wall. There was never any talk about helping figure out why people were leaving in droves and trying to, trying to help. 37:58 So it was really a very, very jarring, uh, shift from the, from the Obama days. On the other hand, uh, the, there was a very pugilistic approach to Venezuela. 38:13 I, I remember the first time that, that, uh, Trump met with Latin American leaders was, I think it was during the UN General Assembly. 38:21 There was a dinner, uh, that, uh, Trump attended with presidents of Latin American countries, and they walked out of there in disbelief, uh, saying that Trump had proposed invading Venezuela, and nobody wanted to see that happen. 38:36 I, you know, of the people who were attending that dinner, not even the countries that were most disturbed by what was happening Ven- in Venezuela wanted to see an American invasion. 38:45 And by then Venezuela had become a very, very serious problem for the entire region because, because millions of Venezuelans were leaving the country and they were, they had, they were refugees a-a-across the region. 38:56 So, so Latin America, South America especially, was eager to work together with, with the United States, so Trump suddenly proposing military action was really shocking. 39:07 Uh, but later on Trump actually did, uh, engage in one of the few occasions when he has, he has really embraced multilad- multilateralism, uh, building a coalition to, to support Guaidó in his efforts to, to, uh, bring, take Maduro finally out of power. 39:26 Uh, so far there has been, of course, as we know, no, no meaningful movement in that direction. But, uh, overall Trump's policies on Latin America are, um, very reminiscent of, uh, s- the Cold War. 39:41 He, he is against socialism and, uh, then he is against, uh, immigration. 39:48 Uh, he even, even for Venezuela he refuses to give, uh, um, special rights to, you know, temporary protected status to Venezuelans fleeing the regime. 39:58 Uh, he is, he is concerned about two things, uh, migrants and socialists, and, uh, he... 40:06 But above all I think, to me it seems very transparent that his main concern is winning the vote in Florida where many of the voters have links to Venezuela and Cuba. 40:15 I w- I was gonna say, uh, oftentimes US policy to Latin America is actually domestic politics in terms of trying to win Florida. 40:23 Um, but, uh, in, in terms of, uh, you mentioned Trump's focus on, uh, ending immigration, which is mainly from Central America, uh, not exclusively, but mainly. 40:36 Um, and at the same time this is a, a, as you also said, a period when millions of Venezuelans have been, even if over time the, the welcome has changed, initially, uh, the, the countries where, uh, Venezuelans found themselves, at least the governments, uh, responded with, with, uh, a, a s- a sense of, of generosity and attempt to try to address it humanely. 40:59 Um, so even if Trump's anti-immigration stance didn't directly impact South America, um, what, how was it perceived there in terms of, uh, in terms of his approach to everything south of the border and especially at a time when South American countries were be- were, were being so generous with, uh, trying to, uh, address the Venezuelan, uh, asylum and, uh, or refugee and, and migrant crisis? 41:27 Yeah, I think, you know, you, you said that the, the governments were generous with the Venezuelans, but the people were also generous. 41:32 And of course there were, there were difficult times and, and there were, you know, unpleasant, ugly incidents, but for the most part Latin America was, was, you know, the, the people in, uh, were very... 41:43 tried to help Venezuelans coming in. And I think what Trump did, the, the, the actions at the border, you know, the, the family separations, so they have been really, really shocking. 41:52 And, you know, Judah you said that, uh, US policy towards Latin America has, has been, uh, if, has been mostly a, a, an, an answer to domestic political needs, but I don't think that's necessarily true. 42:06 I think it's, it's maybe true particularly with regard to Cuba, but the United States during the, during the Bush and, uh, Obama administrations had a, a distinct and clear, uh, policy of promoting, of, of trying to support democratic movements, of tr-trying to support rule of law, uh, projects around the world, um, without regard to impact on, on domestic, uh, voting situations in the United States. 42:35 I think it's only under Trump that that has basically disappeared. It's a good point. Um, get, it gets us to, uh, more recent developments and, uh, in, in South America. Um, and, and before I think we get to today, uh, 42:53 w- uh, one, one of the things that, that, uh, that I think we have to talk about are the, the social protest movements that, that just erupted, um, uh, almost out of nowhere and in places that were really unexpected, um, uh, particularly in Chile, uh, but also in Ecuador, uh, where the, the successor government to Rafael Correa under Lenin Moreno was trying to implement, uh, austerity policies. 43:20 Um, and, and th-this, uh, this, these social protest movements, um, that, that really w-were, were an attempt, I guess, to say, uh, "You can't take this back." 43:32 Um, uh, now, now a lot of them got shut down because of the coronavirus pandemic, but what did, what did those social protest movements say to you and, and what did they mean to you in terms of, uh, where, where the, the, the region was, uh, pre-pandemic, uh, socially, politically, uh, and the prospects for, for, uh, as they looked at around, uh, the end of last year and the beginning of this year? 43:56 When, when, uh, economies grow and people become more educated and, uh, a certain level of, uh, s- of prosperity, uh, is attained, uh, people demand more from their governments, and I, I think that's something that the, the, you know, political scientists, you know, Huntington, they have, they have noticed. 44:16 It's, it's part of the process of modernization. And Latin America, as we were saying at the outset, is a region of extreme inequality, and that combination of, of, uh, poverty living alongside wealth 44:30 with, uh, corruption known to all is a, m-makes for a very explosive mix, and I think that's what we were seeing in 2019. And, you know, it's, 44:41 y- it's, it's curious that Chile was one of the places where that happened when Chile is one of the most prosperous countries in Latin America, and I think that proves, proves the point that actually the prosperity can engender more demands, the prosperity and the education. 44:55 Uh, all of that came to a grinding halt with the pandemic, but I think the, the fuel for it is only building up. I, I think we're going to see, we're going to see more of it when the pandemic ends. 45:08 Uh, all, all those factors are not, not just there, but they are there in much greater and with mu-much greater intensity. I-Inequality is going to be worse. The needs are going to be more. 45:20 The resources are going to be less, and the demands are going to increase, and I think there, we're going to have a period of, uh, if not, you know, of a certain amount of unrest, and it's going to be a very serious challenge to the, to the, to the governing classes, to the people in power, to the people who have to make decisions. 45:39 The, the good news is that what, what the people want is results. I really think we have moved beyond this left and right, uh, division, this... 45:49 What people want is, is results and, you know, we-we're starting to see these kinds of, uh, figures emerge like the, you know, the president of, of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, who is, he's, you know, he, it, it, nobody knew if he was a leftist or a rightist and, and he, he liked to, uh, embrace that, that uncertainty. 46:08 He is a, you know, he claims that he's all about results. People are tired of, of left and right. Nobody wants to be Venezuela. Nobody wants to be Venezuela. Uh, but nobody wants to live in poverty either. 46:20 So, um, it's, it's really tragic that so much has been lost with the pandemic because Latin America is a, is a region of so much, uh, human potential, uh, of, of so much, you know, you, you've spent time there. 46:34 You know, there are amazing people there who are very committed to, uh, to improving their lives and the lives of the people that they live with. 46:42 Uh, they are not, for the most part, extremist in one direction or the other. So it's just really heartbreaking that so much has been lost. 46:49 You know, so many people who had managed to build small businesses to, to, to acquire a small home are, are losing everything. 46:56 So I, I expect that, um, there will be th-these, there will be challenging times ahead and, uh, US policy will be very interesting to watch if we have a change of, uh, president here. 47:08 I-i-it's also a, a region that is very resilient, uh, in so many ways, which, uh, which is, which bodes well for s- for a, a time ahead that, that, uh, that does promise to be challenging. 47:20 Um, I, I, my last question to wrap up, uh, 47:24 South America i-is, is a region that for me, uh, I don't think it's unique in this, but in terms of, uh, the, the, the way in which I follow world politics and global politics, it, it seems to me to be characterized more than any other by cycles and memory. 47:41 Um, anything that happens is seen through a prism of recent history, uh, particularly American involvement in the region, for instance. 47:49 But there's also, like you said, these, these tensions and these conflicts between left and right, between military dictatorships and leftist dictatorships and democratization. 47:58 Everything seems to have to be an echo of the past and, and to cycle where you have these booms and these busts. 48:07 F-looking ahead, uh, and looking at what you see now, uh, for, for the outlook, uh, what are some of the memories for you, the, the prism that you see the next decade ahead, uh, for S- for South America? 48:22 How, how, w-what are the memories maybe that you want to see or that, that you hope inspire, uh, what, what happens in the next 10 years? 48:31 Well, you know, one thing that I would like to see is a return to the fight against corruption. I think that's, that's, uh, fundamental to, to 48:40 true sustainable growth and prosperity in Latin America, and I think if corruption is not dealt with effectively, the region is condemned to continuing to struggle this way. 48:51 Um, I think- The, the other thing that I would like to see is a continuing drift of both ex- extremes towards the middle. 48:58 You know, there, there has been a, this polarization that marked the, the Chavista, uh, trend, uh, is so harmful for a, for a region that, that has so many needs, so many urgent needs, and so many complicated policy choices to make. 49:14 Uh, I, I would, I would like to see a return to a democratization, uh, trend, which is something that has been reversed not just there, but around the world. 49:22 Uh, you know, all these presidents that, that stay in power forever, you know, that, that's, that has to end. 49:28 You know, no country can succeed if its, if its wellbeing depends on a single human being, and no, no human being, however talented, uh, i- is capable of resisting the temptations of unlimited power. 49:42 So, uh, I, I would like to see Latin America, uh, strengthen its democratic institutions, strengthen the rule of law, combat, uh, combat corruption, and, uh, move away from, from extremist utopian options. 49:59 Before we say goodbye, Frida, I mentioned it in the intro, but why don't you tell everyone a little bit about your new newsletter? Uh, yeah. I started my newsletter. It's called Insight, Insight by Frida Ghitis. 50:09 Uh, I started it a couple of months ago, uh, partly because, uh, in the United States, the, the Trump administration, the Trump drama has really sucked the oxygen out of the news environment, and I felt like a lot of important stories were being left out, and, uh, we were, we were caught in a, in a storm of day-to-day, uh, Trump minutia. 50:31 So my newsletter is a short weekly read that it consists of, at first, one, uh, s- medium-length article in that, in which I analyze an important feature, uh, of what's happening in the world today, which right now happens to be the American elections, and then three or four other, uh, stories that are either below the radar or just above the radar that I think are important that, uh, that we should be paying attention to. 50:56 Frida, thank you so much for your time and insights. Thanks very much, Judah. 51:05 If you like what you hear on Trendlines, you can find links to subscribe to it on the podcast platform of your choice at worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast. Trendlines is edited by Peter Dury. 51:18 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter. Thanks for listening, and tune in again next week. 51:25 [outro music]
