Transcript 0:05 Welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. My name is Peter Durrie. 0:12 For this week's report, Bertel Lindner will give us some fascinating insights into a country you probably think about rarely. 0:19 President Obama will be the first sitting US president to visit Laos this year, and we take this opportunity for a closer look at the Southeast Asian Asian nation. 0:28 But first, I'm joined, as always, by Judah Grunstein for a briefing on this week's major stories in global politics. So Judah, there were quite a few interesting stories on the website this week. 0:38 What do you want, uh, to talk about? 0:40 Well, to start with, I'd like to mention a briefing that was co-authored by Johan Berggren and Grace Mahoney on the OECD's recent redefinition or expansion of the definition of what constitutes development aid to include activities that traditionally have been considered, uh, part of the military, the defense, and the security sector. 1:06 Um, and, and the move has created a, a great deal of concern in the development community, uh, namely in particular that, that it's going to divert already scarce funds from 1:20 so-called ordinary development to the security field. 1:24 And Johan and Grace discuss the ways in which this really is part of a trend that's already pretty developed toward framing some aspects of security assistance as development aid due to the areas where there's convergence and overlap in terms of the goals, but also the implications. 1:43 And Johan has written for us in the past quite a bit about the, these trends and in particular, for instance, anti-poaching efforts, where there are both security and development implications, uh, in terms of reducing illicit financing for traffickers and s- and insurgents who often use poached ivory, for instance, to, to fund other illicit activities. 2:06 But at the same time, by reducing this, this violent crime on natural reserves and, and parks, uh, it also increases tourism revenues for some of these states that depend on that for other development aid. 2:22 So there's this complicated overlap and convergence of these two fields that the rigid definition no longer really, uh, reflects. 2:31 And so this latest piece also comes in the context of the United Nations' recently adopted sustainable development goals, which as, as Johan and Grace point out, uh, the Goal 16 includes objectives like reducing arms flows and trafficking and terrorism as, as well as violence in general. 2:52 So, uh, Johan and Grace note that, uh, or they point out that moving forward, 2:58 what's going to be essential for this to not generate division and conflict is that both sides of the development spectrum will need to make efforts to communicate their end goals and their methods in ways that reduce misunderstanding and mistrust and increase both sides' ability to, to cooperate along complementary and, and sometimes intermingled pathways, such as in, in the case of anti, anti-poaching efforts. 3:27 Mm-hmm. 3:28 Actually, I think that this, this change of the official definition won't actually change a lot in pr- in, in the practice because as, as the two authors point out, uh, a lot of this has already been happening under various labels and, uh, and, uh, the-- both the development and se- the security institutions are like the big behemoth of international politics. 3:50 They move very slowly, and they rarely change course drastically. 3:54 Um, but what I do think is that this will, that we will see a lot of countries in the coming years patting themselves on the back that they have reached their official goals for develop, uh, official development assistance. 4:06 Because the interesting thing about this O- OECD definition is that it's used in international treaties and, and, uh, um, in, in bila- bilateral agreements about the, the amount of, uh, ODA or official development assistance given to the, to the Global South. 4:23 So countries like the US, uh, and Great Britain suddenly, uh, are probably in for, for a huge sta- statistical bump of their ODA. Um, yeah. But I, I actually don't think that it will have a huge effect in practice. 4:38 I, I agree on, on both counts, and, and there's also something to be distinguished in terms of, for instance, humanitarian work in conflict zones, where the very strict separation between humanitarian work and any security assistance is absolutely necessary so that humanitarian and aid workers are not targeted by the combat- combatants. 5:02 Uh, so that's one area where the, the definitions really need to be strictly observed, uh, whereas in, in, in development aid and security aid to, to non-conflict zones, there's a lot more room for compatible and complementary objectives. 5:20 And again, the, this, the, 5:23 uh, there, there does need to be vigilance so that there isn't a cynical, uh, misappropriation of the, of the terms and, and, and just, uh, using the redefinition to essentially, uh, put a stamp of approval on aid that previously was not considered development aid. 5:44 And, and I think that, for instance, this will be especially, uh- 5:49 relevant in countries like Burkina Faso, on which we ran a briefing this week as well, which is a country that's in a fragile transition from longstanding rule under a single authoritarian leader to a, a nascent democracy, uh, that includes a lot of elements of the old regime, and which is at the same time in this fragile transition facing, uh, a number of security threats from, uh, outside in term- in, in the, in, in the form of the, uh, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb terrorist attacks, but also from inside in terms of disgruntled members of the military who have seen their power diminished. 6:31 And this is a country, uh, that, that you've, uh, covered for us in the past. This particular brief- briefing was by Ernest Harsch. 6:39 Uh, but, uh, I'm, I'm, I'm sure that you've got some insights in terms of how this, this kind of, uh, this kind of change could, could play out there. Yeah. 6:48 So this briefing was really, really interesting because Ernest, uh, goes into, into the question of how, um, how the new government of President Kaboré, which, which is, has been in power for a few months now, um, how they have approached this challenge, uh, of terrorism and the combi- the combined challenge of terrorism, uh, and, uh, disgruntled militaries, um, that has ri- risen practically at the same time. 7:14 And he makes the argument that the initial reactions that the government has shown are quite, yeah, leave a lot to be wanting, um, because they, the first thing they have basically done is shut down a newspaper over a repor- uh, a report on, uh, on ex-militaries raiding an armory. 7:31 And this is not really the, shouldn't be the, the highest priority in any case. 7:35 So, and I think he, he goes into a lot of detail about what's going on in Burkina Faso, including, um, that, that, uh, something that I've noticed when I've lived there and which has been in the press at that time, that there's a lot of banditry in, in the countryside, um, armed men just holding up people in, on the streets or on the... 7:55 And this is probably more relevant to the ordinary people in Burkina Faso than terrorism is. 8:01 Um, so you, you have a very dis- uh, disjointed, um, perception probably of the security threats from, from the government's and the people's perspective in some parts of the country. 8:12 And he makes the point, I think, which is very, whi- which is very right, that, um, the government doesn't seem to be very well positioned and doesn't show any signs of, of, like, going under- after the underlying reasons of these various, var- various threats to the country's security. 8:29 And it... I, I really encourage people to, to read the full, the full briefing, and, uh, we will have a link on the, uh, on that in the show notes and so on. But, um, yeah, I think he... 8:38 A very, very prescient take on, on the situation in Burkina Faso. Yes, I agree. I thought it was a very, a very insightful and thorough treatment. 8:44 And I think that the point that you bring up, for instance, um, highlights some of the, the, the th- the aspects of, of this new definition of aid, uh, that, that we need to be vigilant about. 8:58 So you mentioned banditry, uh, as opposed to international or transnational terrorism. And so there are two, there are two things. 9:07 First of all, i- in this case, increasing the capacity of the police force might be a better development approach for B- Burkina Faso in terms of empowering, uh, civil society and, and, and making the economy, uh, less, less vulnerable, economic exchange, for instance, or, or, or markets less vulnerable to this kind of banditry. 9:29 That might be a better development approach than, for instance, uh, developing the military and security forces in terms of counterterrorism. 9:38 And so that's an area where im- im- improving police capacity, which is traditionally a security sector, uh, reform, in this case might actually have positive development aspects. 9:51 H- however, it also adds this other element where w- if security aid or s- or assistance is now considered development aid, uh, the outside donors might start seeing the security needs through their own prism. 10:07 And obviously for France and the United States, the major security issue in West Africa right now is transnational terrorism and not local banditry that has a bigger, for a, perhaps a bigger day-to-day impact on the population. 10:22 But, uh, but again, a, a great, a great briefing that does highlight a lot of the, the, the subtleties and nuances and, and, uh, and, and challenges in terms of how to address security and development in, in ways that are s- mutually sustainable and where one doesn't outweigh the other. 10:39 And then, uh, something more or less completely unrelated, you had, you had a very good column by Michael Cohen on the, uh, on a more US, uh, domestic topic. Yes. 10:48 I, I thought it was a, a- again, another very interesting, uh, take on the US presidential campaign. 10:55 Uh, and, and Michael weighs in on a, a, what's been a recurring theme in the campaign, namely the tendency to label candidates as a hawk or a dove based solely on their positions with regard to the use of military force. 11:09 And he's responding in particular to the succe- suggestion that Hillary Clinton, who is now the Democratic frontrunner, is the most hawkish candidate in the race in both parties based on that criteria. 11:22 And, and Michael points out that despite the appearances, there are actually more similarities than differences among, uh, the various candidates in both parties with regard to the use of military force. 11:34 Uh, and, and, and he says that there are actually other indicators that are more relevant to whether a candidate is a hawk or a dove, uh, such as their approach to diplomacy, to institution building, to collective ser- security in the US alliance system. 11:49 And he points out that there, in those areas, there's a very clear and stark divide between the candidates of the two parties. Um, and he, he, he, he goes into detail abou- about what those are. And 12:02 Michael is arguing that more than this, this idea of the use of military force, where in general most American presidents will be apt to use Amer- uh, military force to advance or defend America's vital interests, uh, where th- so there will be more overlap. 12:20 He argues that, uh, these latter aspects, uh, of, of statecraft, uh, are, are more relevant today for determining who is a hawk and who is a dove and for assessing the various candidates, uh, in the campaign. 12:35 So a- again, another interesting approach to, to something th- that we take for granted, in this case, uh, certain uses of language, uh, but that may no longer mean what we thought they did. 12:46 Yes, a nuanced approach in, on an election that is all about nuances. [laughs] Well, to be determined. Okay. Thank you very much for joining me again this week, Judah. Thanks. It's, uh, it's been a pleasure as always. 13:00 If you want to check out these and other stories on worldpoliticsreview.com, we have a special deal for you. 13:05 If you go to about.worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast, you will find instructions on how to get a 25% discount on WPR's yearly subscription, which gives you access to all coverage on the site. 13:21 Laos is one of the world's last surviving communist regimes, and just like with Cuba, President Obama is preparing for a historic visi- visit to the country. 13:30 I had the chance to talk to Bertil Lintner, author of a recent feature for World Politics Review, about the challenges the landlocked nation faces and its s- strategic importance. I am Bertil Lintner. 13:44 I'm a journalist based in, in Thailand. I was born in Sweden, but I've been in Thailand for 35 years. 13:52 Uh, and for 20 years, I worked for the Far Eastern Economic Review, a Hong Kong-based, uh, weekly, and for that magazine, I covered Burma and Laos and, uh, related issues. 14:04 Well, Laos is a landlocked country in Southeast Asia, and it's sort of sandwiched between China, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and it's also got a very short border with Burma. 14:16 And, uh, it's a fairly, fairly sparsely populated country. It's not more than, I think, about seven million people there. But in terms of area, it isn't really that small. 14:25 It's about the same size as the United Kingdom in, in Europe. 14:30 But it's a l- country that's al- almost very, very often forgotten when we're talking about Southeast Asia because there doesn't seem to be much happening there. But, uh, if you look at it historically, uh, it 14:42 was, you know, very close to Thailand or Siam in the old days. And the language they speak in Laos is very similar to, to Thai, so they're closely related to the Thais. 14:52 But it was a French protectorate until 1953 when it became an independent kingdom. And, uh, in 1975, a communist, uh, movement took over, uh, Laos and seized power. 15:05 And, uh, that was after a v- very long struggle that lasted for about 30 years, and, uh, where the Lao communists got support from both China and Vietnam. And it's been under communist rule since then, since 1975. 15:19 But in, uh, recent years, it has opened up the economy very much like Vietnam and China. 15:24 So although it's an authoritarian government, it's a one-party system, the Communist Party is the only legally permitted political party, but the economy is fairly free and open. 15:38 Laos, you know, on areas like health and nutrition and basic education, you know, the United States i- is, is increasingly a real partner. You know, uh, w- I went because they are gonna be hosting ASEAN next year. Right. 15:50 And, you know, I think that's an important opportunity to support them as they, uh, undertake this massive endeavor. Um, the president will be making history. Uh, no president's gone to Laos. 16:01 But also, there is, uh, I think, um, uh, you know, a sense of potential in that relationship for the first time in a long time. Mm-hmm. You know, we, we are d- making good progress on the historical legacy issues. 16:12 I think we need to do more, uh, candidly, but, uh, we've come a long way. Yeah. Significant because it's the first time we've got an American president visiting Laos. 16:23 And, uh, if you look at, uh, President Obama's recent visit to Cuba, an- another communist-ruled old foe, so to speak. 16:31 Well, uh, L- Laos, like Cuba, is a communist-ruled country, but relations with Laos have, of course, been much smoother than with Cuba because America didn't really have any important issues with Laos. 16:42 And the Lao community in the United States has been far, much less political than the Cuban American community, for instance. 16:49 But nevertheless, it's quite important that, uh, Obama is mending fences with an old foe because even if relations have been relatively smooth, it is a communist country which has been closely allied with Vietnam and China. 17:03 And now for the first time, there is a visit by an American president, and I think most people in Laos are looking forward to that, and they would like to improve relations with the outside world, including the United States. 17:15 Laos is strategically very important, actually, because it's a kind of buffer between China and the rest of Southeast Asia. And, uh, there's been a kind of power struggle between, 17:26 uh, Vietnam and, uh, China about, you know, over influence in, in Laos. But I think the Lao themselves are primarily pro-Lao. They don't really care if they're an- pro or anti this and that. 17:38 They want to have good relations with China and Vietnam and Thailand as well, because there's no way, other way a landlocked country like Laos could develop in terms of trade and exchanges with the rest of the world. 17:50 There's no doubt that there's a lot of anti-Chinese sentiment in Laos right now. And, uh, in fact, uh, over the past, uh, few weeks, there have been, uh, physical attacks on, uh, Chinese citizens in Laos. 18:04 That is quite a serious matter. And many people see this as a s- kind, some kind of anti-Chinese, uh, trend in, in, in Laos, and that Laos therefore will move closer to China's regional rival and enemy, Vietnam. 18:21 But it's not quite as simple as that because the Lao leadership is primarily pro-Lao and they're not really anti this and that. 18:30 The anti-Chinese sentiment which you'll find among the public is mostly directed against very shady Chinese businessmen who are exploiting Laos, a much smaller and much poorer country. 18:43 And over the past decade or so, a lot of black money from China has been invested in various dubious projects in Laos. Basically, they've been laundered through projects and financial institutions in Laos. 18:56 So there's a drive against Chinese businessmen in Laos, where the government is also taking part, of course. 19:04 But that is not entirely unwelcome by the Chinese government either because they don't want to see all this black money disappear into Laos. 19:12 They want to control that as well and have more sort of normal relations with Laos. They want to have an appropriate investment, not gangsters coming there investing in casinos and nightclubs. 19:25 So it is not necessarily an anti-Chinese wave as such. 19:29 It's more directed towards a certain type of people from China and a certain type of Chinese interests with its interests in the black economy in shady and unsavory sectors of the economy. 19:45 Well, in the 1990s, Laos established a number of special economic zones where they invited foreign investors to come and set up factories and businesses and shops and so on. 19:56 And the idea was that this foreign investment would lead to an increase in the, it would raise the living standards in the rural areas, which are still very poor in Laos. Laos is a very poor country. 20:10 But with all this Chinese investment coming in, primarily, and that was primarily Chinese investment we're talking about here, 20:15 the government had initially hoped that this would help develop the countryside and uplift the people there and improve living standards and so on. 20:24 But it didn't really happen that way because very few serious investors were interested in building factories or manufacturing plants and so on in Laos. 20:36 Instead, it was gangster-type groups of people who came in and built casinos inside these special economic zones, nightclubs, brothels, and that sort of thing. 20:48 And there's been, of course, a backlash against this, even from Lao officials who say that, okay, this is not the kind of development we thought we would get when we invited these foreign investors. 21:01 And most of the foreign investors in Laos are from China. Well, what happened is that, you can see the revolutionary veterans. 21:09 I mean, they were the old guard who fought in the 1950s and the 1960s and the early 70s for what they believed in, which was communism and a socialist state. Suddenly, these old-timers who 21:23 seen people who were the lieutenants and much lower down in the hierarchy during the struggle are now suddenly driving around in Mercedes-Benzes and BMWs, living in big, lavish villas. 21:39 And they resent this, and I think this is wrong. This is not what they fought for during this war. 21:43 One also has to remember that it was actually this old guard that initiated the economic reforms in the first place in the late 1980s, early 1990s. But this is not what they had envisaged at that time. 21:57 They didn't want to see this kind of economy emerge. So these old men, many of them are now in their 80s, they got together about two years ago and decided we have to clean up Laos now. 22:08 We cannot put up with, we can no longer put up with this kind of black economy and Wild West capitalism. So they are the ones who actually launched this drive. 22:18 And the targets naturally have become Chinese businessmen because those are the ones who have invested in this kind of undesirable enterprises in the country. But it's not really against Chinese as such. 22:32 It's against these kind of business practices. That is quite important to remember. 22:37 So when these people have been, people who have been close to these Chinese investors have been purged or sidelined over the past few months, many outside observers 22:47 get to the conclusion that, okay, and now they're moving away from China and a more pro-Vietnamese leadership is taking over. But the way I see it, no, that's wrong. That's not what is happening. 23:01 The value of Lao minerals exports has increased substantially after expansion of excavation capacity by both domestic and foreign investors. 23:11 The Ministry of Energy and Mines reportedly recently that in dividends and tax earned from these exports has made a significant contribution to the government's budget, helping to push economic growth. 23:26 And it's very difficult for a country like Laos to attract serious investors. I mean, the labor force is fairly small and inexperienced and not particularly skilled. Where the investment is going is mainly in 23:40 resource extraction. I mean, Laos is a rich country when it comes to mineral resources. Mining is a huge sector. But even there, the 23:48 foreign companies that have invested in the mining sector are mostly Chinese companies who have been using the mines in Laos to launder their dirty money from China rather than to develop a healthy mining industry. 24:05 And I think Laos is hoping that maybe other countries will come in, like Australia, maybe even the United States, and that mining in Laos will become something where it's not just run by shady businessmen from China. 24:19 Laos is still not a p- a very open country. It's very difficult to do business there. There's a language problem. Uh, there's a huge bureaucracy, and, uh, corruption is another big problem. 24:29 Western companies are not willing to pay off government officials or pay them under the table in the same way as, uh, investors from China have been doing for the past, you know, two decades or so. 24:40 So it's, it's v- it's been very difficult for Western companies to establish themselves in Laos. So therefore, most of the investors are from China and also some from Thailand, from Taiwan, from Malaysia. 24:51 So it's not only China that's invested in, uh, various sectors in Laos, but it's, it's a country where it's, it's not easy to do so what one would call normal business. I mean, there's no functioning banking system. 25:06 Is-- Their currency is not convertible, and, uh, wherever people, you know, turn in the country, there is, you know, all this corruption. There are officials asking for money and gifts and so on. 25:16 So it, it's not a, a very favorable environment for serious investors from the West for, and, uh, you know, Japan and so on. 25:26 Human rights is another serious issue because we have to remember that Laos may appear to be a very laid-back, friendly kind of country. 25:33 That's the impression most visit- visitors get, you know, tourists and so on when they go there. 25:37 But it has been ruled since nineteen seventy-five by a fairly brutal communist government, and, uh, if you criticize that government, then you disappear. That has happened to a number of social activists over the years. 25:53 They're not partic- particularly political. These are people who have been trying to, trying to organize local communities to defend the land rights and things like that, and one day they're just gone. 26:03 So it i-- there's no room for any kind of political opposition in, in Laos. And that makes it different from, even from Vietnam. Vietnam is also very authoritarian, but Vietnam is much more pluralistic society. 26:16 There are many more intellectuals there. The people are on the internet, and they're on social media in a way that people in Laos are not. 26:23 President Obama's visit to Laos could help open up Laos, but it's going to take time, and it's not going to happen overnight. It would be a very, very long process. 26:32 We're probably talking about perhaps a generation here, 'cause Laos is not a country where things happen, you know, very quickly and, you know, right away and this sort of thing. 26:41 Uh, I mean, the joke is that the official name of the country is Lao PDR, which stands for the Lao People's Democratic Republic. But, uh, what everyone calls it is, uh, uh, Lao-- We Are Lao. Please Don't Rush. 26:59 Many thanks to Bertil for taking the time to sit down with me. You can read his excellent feature titled Laos Is Open for Business But on Its Own Terms on worldpoliticsreview.com. 27:09 Please make sure to subscribe to Trendlines, and don't forget to check out about.worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast for a special deal on WPR's subscription. My thanks for tuning in again this week. 27:20 Trendlines is produced and edited by me, Peter Dory. 27:23 You can follow me and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 27:32 The additional audio used in the report was sourced this week from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and ALN TV English. Have a fantastic weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines
