Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. My name is Peter Duri. 0:11 Miles Kahler of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote a very interesting piece on emerging economies titled Conservative Globalizers: Reconsidering the Rise of the Rest for World Politics Review. 0:23 We'll be talking to him for this week's report about attempts by countries like China, India, and Brazil to gain more influence and how the industrialized nations have reacted to this development. 0:35 But first, I'm joined as always by World Politics Review editor-in-chief Judah Grunstein to discuss this week's major developments in international politics. So what's going on this week, Judah? 0:46 Well, we started off the week with a, a quiet story, uh, a briefing by David Du- David Dudenhoeffer on the impact of the El Niño condition on South America. 0:58 Uh, the El Niño condition being a weather pattern that recurs every year but is cyclically some years, uh, more dramatic than others. 1:06 Um, and this year, uh, it's caused flooding and, and severe drought conditions in various countries in the region. 1:15 And the actual, actually the origins of this story, uh, in terms of WPR, it was a visit that I made to Peru in August, uh, at which time I already heard people expecting a very severe impact this year and complaining about the government not doing enough to prepare. 1:32 Um, and so already the story was sort of in my mind, and when I started seeing some news reports about actual flooding in various parts of South America, we went after it. 1:43 And basically, David looks at some of the capa- capacity constraints that regional governments face in terms of their actual ability to prepare for something like this, um, and it also ends up being something of a cautionary tale about their ability to effectively address climate change mitigation, which similarly, uh, can be expected. 2:08 Uh, we know what needs to be done and it's a question of capacity. So an interesting st- uh, a quiet story, but an interesting one and one that has larger implications. Hmm. 2:17 Especially for the people on the ground who are, who are quite impacted by these kind of weather phenomenons. Absolutely. So a- apart from, uh, from the El Niño story, what, what else has, uh, has crossed your desk? 2:29 We also ran a briefing by Nader Habibi on Iran's economy, uh, in the aftermath of the lifting of sanctions, um, f- due to the, the successful implementation of the nuclear agreement. 2:43 And if you'll remember, one of the major objectives of the nuclear deal for Hassan Rouhani and the moderate camp in Iran was to open up Iran's economy, which has suffered from sanctions, but also from poor management in the past. 2:57 And in particular, there's very high unemployment among educated youth, which is a risky demographic to have, uh, dissatisfied with the government. 3:07 And th- this past week, or, or last week actually, Rouhani was on a visit here in France and, and before getting here, he was in Italy, where he sealed a, a, a range of very major deals in the tens of billions of dollars, including purchases of aircraft, but also joint ventures, particularly here in France with Peugeot, uh, and for foreign investment. 3:28 Um, and what Nader looks at are, uh, the challenges that Rouhani faces in terms of actually, uh, achieving his objective to begin with some political opposition from hardliners who are actually opposed to economic engagement with the West, in part because they benefit from the, the state of Iran's economy now being closed off to the world. 3:52 And Nader also identifies some of the other challenges that Rouhani will face to, to, to successfully implement the strategy that don't get as much attention outside of, uh, outside of, uh, the country, uh, especially because of some of the, the geopolitical, uh, issues surrounding the deal. 4:10 Uh, there's this narrative that, uh, Iran will suddenly become a, a, a major regional power and will use the, the lifting of sanctions to dramatically improve its economic situation. 4:22 And Nader looks at some of the, some of the obstacles that still exist to actually achieve that even now that the deal has lifted the sanctions. Excellent. That sound, that, that, that sounds really interesting. 4:35 Um, you also had a piece on the elections in Taiwan, which also looked at some of the underreported aspects of, of this development. E- exactly. 4:45 Uh, it's a similar case because Taiwan, uh, the international coverage of Taiwan and the world in general, uh, views Taiwan m- through the geopolitical lens of cross-strait relations with the mainland, uh, and some of the strategic, uh, shifts going on in, in Asia these days. 5:04 And in this case, the election, although there was a high-profile meeting, uh, between the, the leaders of Taiwan and mainland China before the election, the actual election really turned on, more on jobs, the economy, housing issues, and how the previous government had handled that. 5:22 And so Joel At- Joel Atkinson, uh, who wrote the, who wrote the briefing, looked at some of these issues, and in particular, uh, s- things such as the inclusiveness, uh, for Taiwan's ethnic minorities and some of the more progressive elements of Tsai Ing-wen's successful campaign, which again, were often ignored in inter- international coverage in favor of, uh, the, the larger geopolitical aspects. 5:49 Uh, so again, an interesting briefing on a, a high-profile story, but some of the quieter aspects of it. 5:54 And in addition to covering th-this recent election, we also ran a piece this week on Uganda, which is, which has upcoming elections, and, uh, I, I thought maybe you might be, uh, interested in, in weighing in on that. 6:09 Yeah. So Uganda will have elections on the 18th of February, and the, uh, president, Yoweri Museveni, he has been in power for almost 30 years. 6:17 But, uh, the upcoming elections are widely believed to be the strongest challenge so far to his rule. 6:24 And, uh, there's isn't really a question over the outcome because, uh, Museveni has police and military well in his camp, he has control over government institutions, 6:35 but there is a really, a sense of concern in Museveni's camp. 6:40 And you, you had a really good article by Andrew Green, uh, that, that looked at these expressions of concern and, and dis- in- disquiet in, in the, in the Museveni camp and explained a bit where this comes from. 6:52 Because despite his, his capacity b- to basically force himself into office for five more years, uh, there's for the first time a real coalition of opponents who don't run on the same platform, but who can force him into a second round, who can 7:08 gather their, their supporters to go to the street if they are perceived to be, uh, uh, to be, uh, to have fraud in the elections if the government tampers with the results. 7:18 So there is a real sense of unease in, in, in, in parts of the regime, and there have been threats made, uh, that any kind of protest against results will be met with force. 7:28 Uh, the diplomatic corps, the international community has been threatened to stay out of this debate, um, so to speak. 7:35 So it's, it's, it's a really interesting situation, and I think that, uh, Andrew Green's article really managed to, to ring across this, uh, this situation on the ground at the moment. 7:46 Th-th-this is another case of a country that although a, a lot, uh, it might be less understood outside of the region, but Museveni and Uganda play a major role in terms of regional politics. 8:01 He, he's what the French call a, a pyrome- a pyromaniac fireman. 8:05 And in, in that, he's somewhat similar to Blaise Comp- Compaoré in, in West Africa in the sense that he's often had a hand in some of the cl- conflicts in the region, but because of the n- the networks of his, of his contacts and because of his, uh, influence over these proxies that are involved in, in various regional disputes, he's also often a very key mediator in terms of, uh, turning the heat down under, under, uh, some of these, some of these conflicts. 8:33 And he's increasingly become a major security partner for the United States in, uh, Somalia in particular, but again, also in, in Eastern Democra- uh, DRC, uh, and, and, uh, in South Sudan more recently. 8:48 So again, a question of, uh, a local election that is in general pl- f- being turn- turning on local politics, but with, uh, geo- geopolitical implications, and in this case, lower profile. 9:02 I, I don't think a lot of people outside the region or who don't pay close attention to Africa fully appreciate, uh, the, the significance of Uganda or the role that it plays. Yeah, no. Uh, I, I don't think so either. 9:14 But, um, if, if, if, uh, the, if you want to, uh, look at another, um, under-covered election story in Africa, uh, there, look no further than Tanzania, a neighbor of, uh, of Uganda, where you had, um, a very disputed election results in Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous province of Tanzania. 9:33 You had a very interesting y- interview with Michael Jennings, a scholar at the London School of In- Oriental and African Studies about this, so I encourage our listeners to check this out as well. As do I. 9:43 Thank you for joining me again th- this week. As always, it's been a pleasure. [upbeat music] Their economic growth has been enormous, uh, but so are increasingly their foreign policy ambitions. 9:55 Countries like China, India, and Brazil are working to get a better seat at the table of international politics, and the established economic and political powers are still unsure if they represent a threat or an opportunity to better solve the world's problems. 10:09 I had the opportunity to talk with Miles Kahler, author of a recent feature on this topic for World Politics Review, to talk about the challenges and opportunities that the emergence of these conservative globalizers present. 10:24 I'm Miles Kahler. I am a senior fellow for global governance at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, and I'm also a professor at the School for International Service at American University. 10:36 In the years immediately after the global financial crisis, the, uh, large emerging economies, as I prefer to call them, uh, particularly China, India, Brazil, but also others, Indonesia, Turkey would be among them. 10:50 Uh, during the period when their economies were performing at a, a, performing very well, and indeed performing much better than the economies of the industrialized countries, two narratives took shape. 11:02 One was that these were countries that were likely to use their new economic and political influence to challenge the existing global order, which had been dominated by the United States and the European Union and Japan. 11:16 Uh, and the other was that they could become, and were likely to become, responsible stakeholders in that established order, and, uh, that the outcome of the global financial crisis in which they had played a, an important supporting role 11:32 was evidence that they were going to become, uh, responsible stakeholders. Um, those two narratives in some sense have been competing. 11:40 I think the, the more alarmist narrative has faded somewhat, although it's still applied to China in particular. 11:48 But, um, but I think those two broad narratives are still, um, out there, and I'm not sure I would endorse either one of them wholeheartedly. I do think, uh, 12:01 that I would agree more with the second narrative than the first. I'm not an alarmist about the, uh, the emerging economies, the emerging powers. Uh, I do think that they have a very large stake, 12:13 uh, in the existing s- especially in the existing international economic order, and are very likely to be fundamental challengers of that order. 12:22 On the other hand, I don't think that one can expect them to simply sign on to the existing order as it is presently constituted without some changes and some substantial reforms. 12:34 And one can see that, for example, in the pressure for them to have more influence within the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. That's only one example. 12:43 You can see that in their efforts to change the prevailing consensus on capital controls. 12:48 They have not been in favor of wholesale capital account liberalization, opening their economy to inflows and outflows of foreign capital in an unrestricted way, 13:00 in the way that many were advising, for example, during the 1990s for the developing economies. That it's been much more gradual. Some have referred to this as gated globalization. 13:11 So there's a, there's a quality to which it has been both measured and gradual in the way that the liberalization has taken place over time, and also in terms of the endpoint. 13:21 It's not clear, for example, in the case of China, that China ever aims to have a completely open capital account in the way that some industrial account... industrialized countries might. 13:31 Uh, they see risks as well as benefits to engagement with the international economy, and they see 13:38 large benefits in maintaining a high degree of autonomy over their ability to deal with the risks that emanate from the global economy. 13:48 Uh, but once again, I would see them more as reformists, um, not as challengers, and, uh, certainly countries that are influential enough and have a sense of their own glab- global ambitions so that they are going to want to change the existing order or reform the existing order in particular ways. 14:05 [upbeat music] On the face of it, they are unlikely partners. 14:10 The so-called BRICS nations, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and more recently, South Africa, still consider to be emerging economies, but increasingly challenging Western dominance of world financial institutions. 14:25 Russia is hosting the seventh BRICS Summit starting on Wednesday in the remote western city of Ufa, and it's looking to send out a message of strength and unity. 14:35 The three largest emerging economies, and I do not include Russia among those, uh, but China, India, Brazil, um, I think do share a certain number of characteristics. 14:45 Um, they have never been close allies of the United States, so in some sense, these rising economic powers are different from previous, um, rapidly rising economic powers such as Japan, which had a strong security relationship with the United States. 14:59 That is not true of China, certainly, uh, not true of India or Brazil, uh, historically. They have, um, 15:08 a history of making large bets, uh, recently as part of their economic reform programs on engagement with the international economy. All of them have moved from a relatively closed model of economic development to, um, 15:25 a model in which they are much more open to trade and investment, and indeed have seen large benefits from that opening of their economies taking place in the 1980s and 1990s and after. 15:38 Um, they have still many of the issues and problems that other developing countries have, countries that are poorer than they are. 15:45 They would be regarded, I think, as middle-income developing countries, but they're still grappling with issues of inequality, uh, uh, pockets of poverty, 15:53 uh, of environmental degradation, and this very long domestic agenda is something they also, uh, share. 16:00 And they all have, at least these largest three countries, certainly have, uh, regional and global leadership ambitions, which they, uh, express in different ways. And there are certainly divergences among them. 16:15 For example, Brazil certainly has not chosen a path of military power, in contrast to China and to a certain degree, India. 16:23 But I think they all see themselves as operating, um, on the global stage and certainly as having a prominent role in their respective regions as well. 16:33 They want, clearly, uh, more influence within existing global governance institutions. Uh, what they intend to do with that influence is not always entirely clear. Um, 16:48 I have used the term conservative globalizers about them. 16:52 Uh, and I, I meant that to mean that they, as we've already discussed, that they are interested in engaging with the international economy and obtaining the benefits of opening to the international economy. 17:03 On the other hand, in terms of global governance and international institutions and the rules of the game as they are currently played in the international economy and the global order, they're quite conservative. 17:16 Um, and they're not always eager to move forward with more intensified collaboration or cooperation, um, that might constrain their autonomy, uh, that might set limits to their influence in the future. 17:32 Um, and they have not been, by and large, uh, major agenda setters, I would say, in, in global governance. But they have certainly made contributions. 17:42 And, uh, one would be, for example, in the evolving consensus about capital controls and the willingness of institutions like the International Monetary Fund 17:52 to accept that some controls or management of capital inflows and outflows might be necessary under certain circumstances. 18:01 Uh, that shift Although relatively gradual, I think owes something to their influence and their sense of, uh, where the international consensus should lie. 18:11 In other respects, in other domains, such as humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect, uh, they have not exactly been leaders. They have been major contributors. 18:21 Certainly, that's the case with India and Brazil in peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. 18:27 Um, but they have been very wary of, uh, claims by the United States or the European Union in favor of intervention, um, in situations of civil conflict, for example, when there has not been an authorization by the United Nations Security Council. 18:42 So, uh, quite narrowly circumscribed sense of the conditions under which the international community should intervene in issues that they see as part of the, uh, sovereign domain of, of governments. 18:57 And I think sovereignty and autonomy are major concerns of theirs. 19:01 Um, and clearly there are questions of equity that they are concerned about, and the sense that certain rules of the game have been stacked against them or have awarded an outsized role to, uh, the United States and the industrialized countries. 19:16 There, an example would be the international monetary system, where the role of the dollar is seen certainly by China and by the other emer-- many of the other emerging economies as giving the United States certain privileges. 19:29 Um, in fact, it was a Fren- a, a French statesman who said exorbitant privileges in the monetary domain that should change as the system becomes more multipolar. And I think in terms of sy- the system, if you will, 19:43 they all are very comfortable with, and indeed are very interested in having the system become more multipolar, in other words, to have different, um, poles of influence in different domains. 19:54 And, of course, they see themselves as being usually one of those poles. Well, there are two issues there. One is their, the level of their coordination. 20:03 They do cooperate on certain issues, such as the formation of the New Development Bank, 20:09 um, developing a reserve arrangement that will help them in terms of, uh, financial support during a, a, an international financial crisis. 20:17 But these are countries which have often very divergent interests and even points of conflict. Um, India and China, for example, have longstanding territorial conflict. 20:26 Uh, Brazil, as I mentioned, is not a major military power and, uh, sees its role in South America i- as rather different than China sees its role, for example, in East, uh, East Asia. 20:38 They have competing, uh, rivalries and competing friendships. 20:43 India has drawn much closer to the United States in recent years and to US allies like Japan, partly as a result of China's economic and military rise in the region. 20:55 So, um, and, and there is a divi- a big divide, of course, a- among these countries between democracies and authoritarian regimes, particularly between China and the democracies India, South Africa, and Brazil. 21:10 A- and they're all part of the G20, and that is yet another, uh, you know, membership that is important to them because that includes both the industrialized and the emerging economies. 21:21 So essentially, they are, they have, they have engaged with the existing system of global governance. They've also created their own structures. Uh, but there's a lot of overlap among these structures. 21:32 It's not as if they are forming a coherent bloc that is outside, collectively outside the existing structures or is collectively challenging those existing structures. 21:44 Um, they have a very variegated relationship with the existing institutions and, um, and generally, as I said, have become deeply engaged with those institutions, whether it's the international financial institutions, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, um, and so on. 22:01 [upbeat music] Welcome to CCTV America's week-long coverage of the IMF World Bank spring meetings. 22:09 China and Russia and other major developing nations are angry about a delay in Washington that has blocked a reform plan that would give them a bigger vote and a bigger voting share at the IMF. 22:20 Now, the countries are pushing forward with reforms without waiting for the US. 22:26 The United States, the EU, Japan, uh, the other industrialized countries, uh, they have tried as much as they can to maintain as much of their influence within the existing 22:38 institutions and structures of global governance and regional governance as they can. But they also understand that, uh, it is better to have these very large and very important 22:49 economic, and in some cases military powers inside those structures, uh, than it is to have them outside, uh, trying to undermine them or in a relationship of hostility toward them. 23:01 So it's an interesting sort of dance of conceding some influence, conceding some measure of power within the existing structures, um, but also trying to ensure that... Well, first of all, 23:16 adding these new powers doesn't disrupt the structures or make them completely inoperable or dysfunctional, which is certainly an issue, or less efficient. 23:25 Um, and also ensuring that the goals that these countries are going to pursue are consonant with the goals and norms that are already broadly being realized in these, uh, in these institutions. 23:39 And I think in general, that strategy has been successful. I think there's no question that, um, 23:45 it is their economic weight in the world economy, which has grown so dramatically over the past decade, uh, that has given them the, the ability to claim greater influence, partic- particularly within, uh, the institutions of global economic governance and also in constructing new regional economic arrangements and agreements. 24:05 Um, but 24:07 How much of that influence could fade or be reversed if their economies are not growing at such a vibrant pace, for example, if they encounter the sorts of problems that Brazil has encountered recently with its deep recession, 24:24 is not entirely clear, but my sense is that these temporary setbacks, um, are likely to be temporary, and that I suspect that their, uh, rate of economic growth and their continued catching up to the industrialized countries will continue and that their, uh, increasing influence in global governance will continue to in- to increase as well as a result. 24:46 And the, the two negative outcomes would be that, um, and particularly in the face of this difficult economic environment that, that the emerging economies are now facing, 24:57 um, they could turn to much more nationalistic types of appeals, uh, uh, much more unilateralist measures that appeal to their domestic constituencies going forward. 25:08 Um, more likely, I think, and this is a, an issue for the industrialized countries as well, is that there could be a retreat by all parties, but particularly from the emerging economies, to claims to leadership 25:22 at the regional or global level because they are simply distracted by the domestic demands that are placed on them by their electorates, or in the case of China, their, their population. 25:33 Um, demands for better environmental protections, demands for less inequality, uh, demands for dealing with whatever economic downturns or economic distress might result. 25:45 I, I think as I said earlier, they have very large domestic agendas and, and these can serve to pull them back from the kind of engagement we've seen and could leave the world without enough leadership rather than, uh, being worried about challenges from these countries, we would be worried about not having them, um, 26:07 playing their role as leaders in a collective leadership at the global level. My thanks to Miles for these insights. Be sure to check out the full article on worldpoliticsreview.com as well. 26:20 That's it for our show this week. Please subscribe to Trendlines on iTunes or in your favorite podcast app, and please also consider leaving a review and rating while you're there. 26:30 That really helps other people discover the show. Trendlines is produced and edited by me, Peter Durrie. 26:35 You can follow me and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 26:44 The additional audio u- used in the report was sourced from Al Jazeera and the International Monetary Fund this week. Have a fantastic weekend and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines. 26:54 [outro music]
