Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:13 A series of high-profile terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire earlier this year demonstrated the resilience of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb despite the military defeat the group suffered in northern Mali in 2013, as well as a period of infighting that followed. 0:31 Now the group is competing with affiliates of the so-called Islamic State for influence in parts of West Africa that have until now been beyond its reach. 0:39 Anouar Boukhars will join Peter Dury a little later to explain why the region makes for fertile ground for violent extremism. 0:47 But first, I'll be talking with WPR senior editor Freddy Deknatel about this week's top stories in international affairs. 0:54 And once again, Freddy, there's one story, even though it happened, uh, at the end of the, over the weekend, I guess, that's been dominating the headlines this week, and I'm talking about the death of Fidel Castro in Cuba. 1:08 And I guess one of the things that I wanted to begin with is the idea or the question of his legacy, how he, how he is remembered, beginning with, uh, a lot of the controversies over what kind of statement to issue with regard to his death. 1:24 So you had, uh, obviously in some parts of the world where he is considered a hero in, in Latin America and the Global South, very laudatory declarations. 1:35 Um, other countries that have, uh, some, some misgivings about his human rights record had to temper those a little bit. 1:44 And I guess, um, uh, you know, for, in some ways there's something of a generational divide as well. 1:50 I know for, for someone in, of my generation who grew up, uh, during the Cold War, Castro was a very, uh, divisive figure, uh, depending on where someone fit in in terms of, uh, the left-right spectrum, uh, especially in terms of post-colonialism and wars of liberation, uh, in the Global South. 2:12 I don't know whether, for instance, for someone, uh, who grew up after, for the most part, the Cold War, Castro really was that much of a public figure or someone in the landscape. Yeah. 2:23 I mean, I think the, uh, that's certainly one of the first reactions is that, you know, m-in my memory and, and, and more recently even, you know, whether talking about the '90s or the last 15 years, you know, Castro didn't really have an immediate political impact on someone growing up in the United States really. 2:41 I mean, in the '90s it was, the, the issue was, you know, Elian Gonzalez and Cubans trying to leave Cuba or issues around, uh, migration. 2:50 Nothing of the sort from the Cold War that Castro was either this, you know, revolutionary hero for resisting American imperialism, you know, in, in the words of his supporters, and neither was he a sort of communist bogeyman. 3:03 And then especially in more recent years, the fact that, you know, he'd sort of stepped back from the limelight, his health had deteriorated, and he had passed a lot of, effectively all of his powers more or less to his brother, Raúl. 3:15 You know, the symbolism of his death is undeniable, but it's, it's hard to not see it, at least from a, a, a younger generation, um, as it doesn't change much now, not only because he had, like I said, sort of faded from the scene a little bit, but he wasn't the figure now that he was, uh, for people who grew up during the Cold War. 3:35 I remember films, uh, when I was growing up where there were actually Cuban troops that were occupying the U.S. 3:42 as part of an invasion and, uh, at other times in other parts of the world where, where, uh, in movies, uh, the U.S. military would intervene and face Cuban, uh, Cuban adversaries. 3:55 That obviously is, is not part of the, the sort of cultural consciousness or, or landscape these days. 4:03 Um, and I think in, in a lot of ways the, just the changed nature of, of, uh, the international order and global affairs since the end of the Cold War also sort of, uh, makes some of the divisiveness of Castro as a, as a public figure, uh, perhaps difficult to understand. 4:23 Uh, when he was, you know, when he first shows up in history, even though it was before my time, he's this sort of romantic, heroic, uh, revolutionary figure who has brought down what really [chuckles] was a corrupt and, and brutal dictatorship. 4:36 And at least for an initial period, the reception of him in the U.S. was, uh, one of wariness, but, uh, maybe this is a guy we can work with. 4:45 And it's only later that his nationalization of, uh, various American properties and, and businesses in Cuba puts him on a collision course with Washington. 4:55 And then obviously there's the legacy of the political repression and the dictatorship. 5:01 And I think for me, what's, uh, what's very, I want to say ironic, but it touches on issues that are tragic and horrifying, is the way that in some parts of the left in Latin America, for instance, uh, you have people who are willing to sort of overlook in Castro some of the same, uh, behavior, political behavior that they suffered under dictatorships. 5:23 So in a lot of ways, uh, the divisiveness, uh, that he represented in life is, is in some ways, uh, is, is in a lot of ways, uh, visible with his death. 5:35 Uh, it also comes at a very, a moment of, of enormous uncertainty, and it raises more questions, uh, with regard to some of the reforms that, uh, have been initiated by his brother, Raúl, in Cuba and now with the transition in Washington to the Trump administration, uh, both of which we've covered quite a bit. 5:53 Yeah. And I, I, I think the sort of the, the divide that you're talking about, you know, you, it, you can see it in the, in the political reactions in the United States in particular. 6:02 Um, and you know, a sort of anachronistic, at least the way I read some of it, um, from some of the Re- Republican Party officials and obviously now also the president-elect, Donald Trump, talking about Cuba as if it is still the 1960s. 6:16 Um, and, and that, that isn't to say, you know, the Castro's human rights record, like you said, shouldn't be criticized. 6:22 Um, but at the same time, the sort of tone they take acts as though Cuba, you know, it's, it's still s- stuck in a time warp and that the last several years of reform that took place when Castro was still alive and his brother, Raul, was more or less running the government, doesn't suggest how things have been changing in Cuba, um, and not, not least since engagement between the Obama administration, um, and the Cuban government. 6:46 And I think that th- the challenge in, in our own coverage and also, um, you know, the problems I have with some of these, uh, you know, very heavy-handed political statements is they overlook, you know, the complexity in Cuba. 6:59 And, and certainly, you know, a, a lot of the businesses there are still run by the government or run by the military, and this is not a... It's still in many ways a communist country. 7:07 But as a lot of our coverage has shown, you know, Raul Castro is really balancing, uh, the need to open up the economy to continue to sort of provide the social services and the, and the social welfare programs, whether for education or healthcare, um, that are popular among Cubans, um, and that, you know, the Castro brothers themselves sort of, their defenders will always point to the fact that they have helped out a large section of, um, poor Cuban society. 7:35 But to pay for that, you know, the, the economy does need to be opened up. But obviously there's the challenge that that poses to their own political legitimacy. 7:42 So it's a very interesting and, and complicated story, and one that isn't nearly as simple as saying, "Well, we don't like the Castro regime because of, because they're communists," or because Fidel was, uh, you know, the, like I said, you know, this com- this Cold War era villain. 7:59 And I think that, uh, particularly briefings that we've published by William Leogrande, who's been covering this steadily, make clear that it's really sort of a one step forward, one step back for the Cuban government, or they, they, they have a lot of constituencies to appeal to and that just raises the question of, of possible changes, uh, under the new administration in Washington, how those will play in Havana. 8:22 It's an irony in a lot of ways because both sides conceivably, uh, will achieve their goals, but not how they foresaw. 8:30 So for instance, uh, Castro's major goal among oth- a- among many others was sort of bucking American hegemony in Latin America and, uh, and affirming Cuban sovereignty and Latin American sovereignty. 8:44 And in a lot of ways, when you look at the Obama administration's regional policy, for instance, it has to do with America acknowledging that Latin America can take care of itself now and that America can't just, uh, decide what goes on in the Western hemisphere. 9:01 But that took place not because of revolution, and certainly not because of a Marxist revolution, but because of, uh, economics and, and, uh, and politics. 9:11 And at the same time, what Raul Castro is, is so, uh, wary about in terms of opening up Cuba too much to the US is the idea that the, the United States might finally achieve regime change, not through the Bay of Ki- Pigs invasion or assassination attempts, but basically through investment and business ties. 9:29 So ironic on both sides. I think that just about wraps up the time we have. Would you like to talk about any other articles, uh, we ran this week that caught your eye? Yeah. 9:38 There was a, a briefing by Kimberly Ann Elliott looking at the costs of uncertainty of Trump's trade policies, and this is the latest piece in a really sort of ongoing series of briefings that we have looking at the looming Trump era. 9:53 And I just wanted to call people's attention to a email interview that we ran as part of our global insider format on, uh, in a series on, uh, climate change about Iran's, uh, climate change approach and its, uh, its challenges in terms of balancing economic growth with its, uh, commitments to reducing carbon emissions. 10:18 Uh, an interview with Gary Lewis, who is the United Nations resident coordinator in Iran. Okay. I think that about wraps it up. Thanks, Freddy. Thanks. You too, Judah. And now over to Peter for The Report. 10:29 [instrumental music] [gunshots] Our war is a sacred war. It's a legal war in the name of Islam. 10:41 Our adversaries have been stopped and they suffered heavy casualties, but our mission is not over. French paratroopers have been hunting for jihadists in the Ifoghas Mountains in northern Mali. 10:54 26 weeks into France's war in Mali, and French President François Hollande is touching down to deliver his mission accomplished speech. 11:00 Al-Qaeda linked Islamist militants have launched a surprise attack on the French forces and Malian troops currently occupying the town of Gao in northern Mali. 11:09 27 people are believed to have been killed after an attack on a luxury hotel in the Malian capital, Bamako. 11:15 US counterterror experts this morning say has clearly become an important but ruthless strategy for Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 11:25 Since taking over the northern part of Mali in 2012, the activities of militant and extremist groups in the Sahel have entered the global consciousness. 11:35 But the origins of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, of Ansar Dine, and of course, the Islamic States affiliates in Libya and Nigeria go back further than that. 11:51 Joining me for this week's report is Anouar Boukhars, associate professor of International Relations at McDaniel College and a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to explore the drivers of militancy in the Sahel and discuss the recent spread of attacks into countries like Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. 12:13 By 1998, uh, 1997, the Algerian army and its security services, they have successfully, uh- emasculated this armed Islamist insurgency. 12:27 This had spillover effects because the Algerian military and security services, they were pretty good at cracking down and at pushing the threat into the Sahel and outside of Algeria. 12:42 So when the insurgency was contained and some say ended in Algeria, it forced a repositioning, geographic repositioning of the base area of this insurgency. 12:58 So the Algerian terrorist group, the GSPC, it moved or it was forced to move into the Sahel, Sahara region, particularly into northern Mali. And then came the franchise. 13:15 This Algerian terrorist group, because it was losing recruits, because it lost militarily in Algeria, so it figured that if it can associate itself with Al-Qaeda that was operating, as you know, in Afghanistan and moved into Pakistan at the time, 13:35 that would give it a cachet, obviously, of legitimacy and authority. In 2007, this Algerian terrorist group, it changed its name into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 13:49 And that's when we saw the development of an Algerian-centric militancy into a broader regional phenomenon. 14:02 And then there is a newcomer that is encroaching or intruding into the region, and that's the so-called Islamic State, as you know, that operates from Syria and Iraq. 14:15 So these groups, they thrive on the backs of disillusioned clans, on the back of communal and ethnic organizations. 14:27 They have repeatedly proven good at exploiting long-simmering communal distrust between communities and within communities. They have been adept at exploiting local conflicts. 14:44 And also, they have been pretty good at exploiting regional rivalries. The occupation of parts of Mali is perhaps the masterpiece of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its various allies and splinter groups. 15:01 When Tuareg rebels forced out government troops from the country's northern provinces in 2011, the Islamists first cooperated with them, but later forced out the secular rebels and took control of large areas of land and some of Mali's most important towns. 15:18 With Mali and the region unable to deal with the specter of an Islamist proto-state, France launched a military intervention in early 2013. 15:32 That intervention, it was, for the most part, welcomed in most of the continent, in most of Africa. 15:40 By early 2013, the fear was that Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb and its associates, they might decide to go all the way to the capital. So the French intervened in January 2013. 15:55 That intervention was quite successful because AQIM and its allies were dislodged from their strongholds in, again, Timbuktu and Gao. So militarily, the operation was quite successful. 16:10 But as we know from other interventions, is that these groups, they just disperse into local communities and some of them, they move into other territories, like what happened moving into Libya and elsewhere. 16:26 So at a certain point of time, you know, for a short period of time, say 2013, 2014, these violent extremist groups, especially these three main ones, AQIM, Mujah and Ansardi, I mean, they were reduced to roving bands that harassed French forces and the African-led international support mission to Mali, which later became MINUSMA, 16:53 which is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. So the intervention was quite successful, but unfortunately, again, you know, it has not addressed the root causes of the conflict. 17:09 It did not address how these violent militant groups, you know, they ride on the backs of disillusion, of anger at state neglect on local conflict. So none of these have been addressed. 17:24 And that's why northern Mali today, you know, is still not being stabilized. In fact, Mali now, the danger, you can argue, has been amplified because the militancy is moving towards the center of Mali. 17:41 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb reorganized and adapted to the international presence in Mali. 17:47 It used the military pressure against it to mend fences with some of the commanders that had split from its command structures in the years since the exodus from Algeria, and it struck new alliances with other militant groups opposing France and the Malian state. 18:02 And with the Islamic State increasingly making its presence known, it also looked for new ways to expand its reach and presence beyond Mali. Before the French intervention, there were fractures within the organization. 18:19 AQIM, you know, there is a, the central leadership is still based in, in, in Algeria, and then there are those brigades, you know, katibas in the Sahara. 18:31 So what happened is that when AQIM was rising in prominence in 2000, you know, 8, 9 and 10, there were simmering tensions between the group's central leadership, as I said, in northern Algeria, and the brigades in the south. 18:48 There were disputes over authority, over strategy, over tactics, over what do you do with the money that you get from ransoms and, and racketeering? There were splits within AQIM. 19:00 For example, the Algerian, the, the renegade commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, he parted ways with AQIM December 2012. 19:10 So when the French intervened in 2013, they furthered that disequilibrium because they managed to pulverize the organization chain of command. 19:21 They have killed, I mean, they have neutralized and eliminated a number of its field commanders and operative. 19:27 So for about two years, the organization was under immense pressure, and it had to do something to demonstrate that it's still there. The problem for AQIM was compounded by the introduction of the Islamic State 19:43 into Libya in early 2014. The Islamic State grow in influence in Nigeria, northeastern Nigeria over Boko Haram. 19:54 So the organization was faced with irrelevance in a fast-changing landscape of militancy. 20:02 So what AQIM did, and it had done this before when it was defeated in Algeria, is that it first established a connection with its breakaway faction, especially with, uh, uh, Belmokhtar's group. 20:21 So when they were faced with competition for recruits, competition for influence over an assortment of armed group over trafficking networks, Al-Qaeda had to do something to demonstrate its relevance against ISIS and to show that it still has the ability to attack, and hence the spectacular attacks in Ivory Coast, uh, and Burkina Faso. 20:48 And we begin with breaking news. An Al-Qaeda group stormed a luxury hotel in Burkina Faso. The chaos started early Friday night. 20:57 Vehicles were torched in an upscale hotel and nearby cafe were taken over by armed militants. Leaving at least 28 dead. At least 16 people killed at three beach resorts popular with tourists on Africa's Ivory Coast. 21:12 Al-Qaeda is claiming responsibility for the massacre. Another brazen attack on innocent tourists. Sunday's attack hit one of Ivory Coast's most popular holiday spots. 21:22 So the attacks in Ivory Coast and in Burkina Faso, they show a shift in tactics and in strategies. AQIM's, uh, now is targeting countries that are trying to normalize after conflict. 21:40 Burkina Faso, as we all know, is facing, uh, uh, immense challenges. There was a, its leader was ousted in 2014 by its popular uprising. Burkina Faso has always been known for religious coexistence. 21:55 In fact, Burkina Faso has stood out in a region beset, as you know, with social antagonism, with ethno-racial tension, you know, and sometimes with religious fervor. 22:08 So what's happening in Burkina Faso, and this is very, very concerning, is that cracks have started to emerge in this model of tolerance between communities. 22:20 Muslims who represent over 60% of the population, you know, they increasingly complain that they are underrepresented in the civil service, that they are underrepresented in leadership positions. 22:35 They complain that the state is not neutral in its treatment of different religions. They complain that the Christian elite that rules the country 22:47 are unwilling to rectify the institutional barriers, the educational barriers that were inherited from colonization. So again, there is resentment out there. 23:00 It's still contained, but the potential for it to flare up and to escalate is there, hence AQIM, you know, targeting of Burkina Faso. It want to exploit these local conflicts to its advantage. 23:16 The problem is compounded by, by the growth of radical interpretation of religion in the Sahel Sahara. 23:26 So the risk we are faced with today is that angry, uh, disenchanted citizens, they might, they might pledge allegiance to these malevolent non-state actors, AQIM or frankly, other groups bec- because the state cannot deliver, and this is exactly what happened in, in, in Mali. 23:49 Same thing for Côte d'Ivoire, Ivory Coast. You know, the country is struggling to emerge from a decade of civil war. 23:57 Since 2012, the country has made progress in growing the economy, in reunifying the country, but there are still problems. Côte d'Ivoire remains deeply divided today along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines. 24:12 So when AQIM targets Côte d'Ivoire. The goal here is to undermine West Africa's largest economy and two, to sabotage the efforts to heal itself. 24:28 So that's why AQIM sees opportunities to expand into West Africa. 24:35 Uh, Senegal is threatened, Ghana is, is threatened, and these are all democracies, but they are fragile democracies, but they have massive targets that the terrorist groups obviously prize. 24:51 So again, there is an opportunity and AQIM is jumping in it first to demonstrate that it's still relevant, to demonstrate that, uh, the French intervention and the US obviously presence there have not undermined the group, and also to outbid ISIS, the, the Islamic State, because now there is competition, as I said, between these violent extremist groups over recruits, over resources. 25:21 The outlook, Anour says, is not pretty. The French intervention and international presence in Mali cannot substitute for the need of political and social reforms in the region. 25:33 Governments need to step up their game if they want to limit the appeal of militant groups. The outlook can be bleak. I mean, there are several scenarios that runs from the pessimistic to the mildly optimistic. 25:48 Uh, I think what, uh, West Africa is very worried and so are the, uh, Europeans and even the United States. 25:57 It, it, the key here is, is we have to see how the rivalry between AQIM and, and the Islamic State franchises will play out. The militant landscape, as I said, has shifted. 26:10 So as the Islam, so-called Islamic State is squeezed out of Iraq and Syria, what we will see in the next few months, uh, and year is that the, the battle over the future leadership and character of militancy is slated to expand, unfortunately, into, into West Africa. 26:34 What we have is a zone that is characterized by crises from Libya in the north to Lake Chad Basin in the south, and between these, there is an interplay of political grievances, socio-ethnic marginalization, unincorporated hinterlands, the decline in authority of traditional elites. 26:58 So all of this represents an enormous boon for militant groups like AQIM, like ISIS affiliate groups, for militias, for armed predators, and for criminal networks, you know, to, to expand. 27:15 So it's unclear how the transformations within the landscape of militancy will affect the fragile stability of, of, of the Sahel. 27:25 But what we know is that the degrees of vulnerability and resilience, they vary from one country to the next, from one region to the next, but all countries of the region share the same sources of structural fragility, weakness of public institutions, growing demographic challenges, youth unemployment, dysfunction in the agricultural sector, rural poverty, tensions over access to and management of shrinking resources, exacerbation of ethno-racial fractures, proliferation of small arms, proliferation of mafia-like networks. 28:11 So these factors, you know, when they're compounded by the weakness of the state in rural context by a crisis-riven region, as I said, that stretches from Libya to Lake Chad Basin. 28:25 So there is, there is a fertile ground for recruitment for these groups. 28:30 So unless the international community and national governments reevaluate, unless they reorient their policies, then, then the outlook is, is, is bleak. Many thanks to Anour Boukhars for joining us this week. 28:47 If you'd like to read more about the shifting landscape of terrorist groups in West Africa, you can find his in-depth article on worldpoliticsreview.com. 28:56 If you like what you hear on Trendlines, go ahead and subscribe to it in the podcast app of your choice. That will save you the trouble of downloading each new episode. 29:04 Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Dury, who also conducts the report interviews. 29:09 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 29:18 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines [upbeat music]
