Transcript 0:00 [on-hold music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. 0:17 I'm Tudor Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:20 Before we get started on today's big picture interview, just a quick reminder that you can make sure you don't miss a single episode of Trendlines by subscribing to it on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or the podcast app of your choice. 0:36 If the European Union were a country, it would have the second largest GDP in the world, ahead of China and just behind the United States, but it has consistently struggled to leverage its economic heft into geopolitical clout, at times due to internal divisions among member states over strategic priorities, but also because of their reluctance to relinquish control over sensitive questions of foreign and defense policy to Brussels. 1:03 The debate over whether the EU should embrace a global role, how it can do so, and what role it should play if it does, has taken on greater urgency in the context of an international landscape increasingly characterized by strategic competition, particularly between the US and China, but also on Europe's periphery in Ukraine, the Caucasus, Northern Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean. 1:29 In today's big picture Trendlines interview, I'm joined by Dr. Nathalie Tocci to discuss Europe's role in an increasingly multipolar world. Dr. 1:38 Tocci is the director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and honorary professor at the University of Tübingen. 1:47 She is special advisor to the EU's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, and in the same role under former EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, Dr. 1:57 Tocci wrote the European Global Strategy and worked on its implementation. Dr. Tocci, thanks so much for joining us on Trendlines. My pleasure. 2:06 You're known as someone who has advocated for a stronger European Union in terms of foreign policy and security and defense policy. 2:17 Um, and recently over the past months and year or so, there's been this heated debate over, uh, this term European strategic autonomy. 2:28 Uh, and so I thought to start out, we could just, uh, get some definitions straight, and I wanted to ask you, how do you define European strategic autonomy, and why does it matter? 2:39 Well, what I would say is, I mean, to begin with the word autonomy, um, you know, what, what is, what does autonomy mean? 2:47 And, uh, I go back to my, uh, sort of ancient Greek studies and go back to the etymology of, of the word. So autonomy is auto, uh, the self, and nomos, law. 3:01 So it's the ability of the self to live, uh, by its laws, and so sort of elaborating on this, uh, without undue interference from others. 3:12 So I think ultimately when it comes to the European Union, it is about, you know, um, living, having the ability, uh, to live by our domestic, our European, and our international laws, which obviously is as much a question of protection, so protecting those norms and rules and, and values, I would add, uh, from undue interference from, from others. 3:39 Uh, but also, I think, and particularly important for the European Union, ensuring that we promote, uh, those norms, rules, and values internationally, uh, given that the so-called rules-based international order is so crucial to the very existence of the European Union. 3:56 So I think ul- at the end of the day, it really does boil down to this. So it does not mean that the European Union wants to act alone. Uh, it does not even mean that it has a preference, uh, for, for acting, uh, alone. 4:11 What it does mean, uh, it is that it wants to act and it should be acting. Uh, its instinct, its preference will always be that of acting with others because this is simply what the European DNA is, is all about. 4:25 Uh, but of course, um, it may well happen at times that others do not want to act with us. 4:31 Uh, and in those situations, when our domestic, European, and international, uh, norms, rules, and values are at stake, then obviously we need to have the ability and the will to act alone when necessary. 4:45 What is currently lacking, in your opinion, uh, in terms of the tools and platforms and instruments, uh, at the European Union's disposal to achieve, uh, what you're talking about? 4:57 Um, and what are the obstacles to, to filling those gaps right now? Well, I mean, I think there's both a, uh, question of capability, and then there's a question of willingness, hmm? 5:09 I mean, you know, so sort of, uh, to do, uh, equals to can and to want, hmm? So there's the can question, and there's the want question. Now, when it comes to the can, I think it's, um, you know, the capability question. 5:23 I think it's important to, um, sort of unpack this into its various policy dimensions. 5:31 So obviously there is the area of security and defense, which has been attracting a lot of attention because this is really where the can is most lacking, hmm? The capabilities are most lacking. 5:44 Uh, it is clear that this is the area, uh, in which the European Union is not, uh, strategically autonomous yet. It does not have the capacity to act alone when it must and together with others when it can, hmm. 5:59 Uh, and, and, and therefore it's been rightly the, the area where, where most of the attention has been developed. But I don't think that this, uh, is limited to security and defense. 6:09 There are obviously other, uh, key areas, and I would highlight, uh, the, uh, economics and, and so basically both, uh, the trade as well as the financial side, uh, the energy and the climate domain, and the digital domain as being three Uh, equally, uh, in many respects, uh, uh, important, uh, aspects. 6:33 So when it comes to, to the economy, well, obviously we're f-fairly well-equipped when it comes to trade. We know about this. We are able to, uh, negotiate and to sign, uh, deals, huh? 6:45 We have demonstrated this actually quite recently, uh, and we'll probably come back to this later, uh, both, uh, with respect to China but also very significantly with respect to the United Kingdom. 6:57 Uh, so there's the trade aspect, and then there's the finance, uh, aspect, and in particular this, and this gets us into the whole debate over the international role of the euro, which we know how important, uh, it is if we want to be strategically autonomous, uh, particularly when we come, uh, and, you know, sort of we hit the brick wall of, uh, the threat of secondary sanctions, which of course is what has been happening over the last years, uh, with the Trump administration, uh, with respect to, to Iran and the Iran nuclear deal. 7:30 So there's that economics box where the capability, particularly on the, the, the financial side, has had to be, uh, worked on. Uh, then obviously there is the, the energy, uh, and, and climate, uh, box. 7:45 And, uh, here obviously there is the question of, uh, energy security and, and diversification and, and this has been, uh, a debate which has been ongoing for the last, you know, couple of decades, uh, where... 8:00 And, and, you know, quite significant progress has been made. And I think interestingly, uh, we now look at this also through a climate lens. 8:09 So I think an important piece of European strategic autonomy, it will be our ability to move forward on, for instance, a carbon border adjustment, uh, tax, uh, which also then gets us into the broader debate, uh, about, uh, about supply chains, about the risks of trade diversion, et cetera. 8:28 Uh, so there's, there's that set of, uh, aspects. And then sort of last but not least, uh, increasingly important is also, uh, the digital domain. 8:37 And, and here there is, uh, both a story about, uh, regulation, European and, uh, international. Uh, there will also be, uh, increasingly a, a question of, you know, what do we do on the innovation, uh, side. 8:53 Uh, and, you know, we have seen sort of, you know, that this is really the area where we're most lagging, uh, behind both China and the United States. 9:01 So I would say that sort of, you know, thematically to me, those are the sort of four big boxes. Uh, and, but, but then on top of this all, there is this question of, of willingness. 9:12 So let's just assume for the sake of argument that we do have all the capabilities. Does that automatically entail, uh, that we are willing to use them? 9:22 Uh, and unfortunately, the answer to that question is no, which is why I think another important piece of this conversation is also the question of, uh, uh, uh, European strategic culture, um, where obviously a lot of work still has to be done. 9:38 Uh, in, in a continent as big and as diverse as Europe, it's understandable too that, uh, that the strategic priorities vary with geography and, and location. 9:50 Um, is, is that something that can be overcome, for instance, uh, mechanically through things like a qualified majority in terms of s- foreign d- foreign and defense policy, uh, as opposed to consensus, or are these things that are just, uh, will, will, will have to be dealt with, uh, as, as persistent obstacles to European unity over time? 10:13 Well, I mean, I, I, you know, obviously I don't think that simply changing, uh, decision-making rules, uh, is going to do the trick. 10:21 Now, I do think that changing decision-making rules is an important part of the trick, although [chuckles] so it's, it's necessary but not sufficient. Um, so I'm absolutely in favor of moving in this direction. 10:34 Um, but, but obviously I think there's a lot more that, that needs to be done. 10:38 But, but I think it is important to sort of pause and, and reflect on what is it exactly that needs to be done, and, you know, what is it that can be done, what is it that cannot be done, and what is it that is necessary, uh, to, you know, in order to, to, to get, uh, to, to European strategic autonomy. 10:57 Now, I don't think that it's either possible nor necessary to get to a point where, um, everyone, uh, all member states in the European Union share exactly the same threat assessment, uh, and exactly the same inclination as to what should be done about it. 11:18 So inevitably, you know, geography, history, uh, political cultures will continue to play a role, and in many respects I would say that this is part of the beauty of what the European Union is all about. 11:31 So I don't think that we need to sort of, you know, come to a single set of threat assessments in order to get to European strategic autonomy. 11:41 What I do think that needs to be achieved, and what I do think that can be achieved and has to be worked on, uh, is on the concept of solidarity. 11:52 So it doesn't really matter that I may have a different threat assessment to you. Uh, what does matter is that if you feel threatened, I stand up for you, and vice versa. 12:06 So it is about getting to that shared sense of solidarity, which obviously does not only, uh, boil down to, uh, security and defense threats, but again, also plays out in the economic, in the digital, in the energy, in the climate domains. 12:21 I mean, it's, it's part of a, a, a much broader set of issues. 12:25 So it's working on that sense of solidarity which can be worked on politically and what is, I think, ultimately necessary in order to get, uh, to European autonomy. 12:35 I'm really glad that you broadened the, the, the treatment of, uh, strategic autonomy because I think that it, it, it often does get, uh, sort of reduced to the, the, the military and defense aspect of it. 12:51 Um, at the same time, to be guilty of reducing it to the military and defense aspect of it, that is a big part of, of the debate recently. 12:59 Um, and it's been a pretty acrimonious one and, and surprisingly public one in particular between French President Emmanuel Macron and the German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. 13:11 Um, and, and I just wanted to get your feeling on, on the crux of that, uh, debate which, uh, and correct me if I'm wrong, but to my mind it seemed that they were both agreeing that Europe needs to do more in terms of s- defense spending and preparedness. 13:26 Uh, but the logic was different where, uh, uh, Kramp-Karrenbauer was saying US- th- that Europe needs to do more so that, that the US needs Europe more, can rely on Europe more as a defense partner. 13:39 And Macron says, seems to be saying that Europe needs to do more so that Europe needs the US less. 13:45 Um, before we get into broader aspects of the transatlantic ties, uh, where do you come down on, on the s- the logic behind, uh, the European defense piece, um, and, and particularly with regard to NATO versus the EU and where these capabilities should be developed and, and collectivized? 14:05 Well, a couple of, of remarks on, on the sort of Macron-AKK, uh, spat. Uh, when was it? You know, at the end of, uh, last year. Um, I would say that a lot of... Well, two remarks really. 14:20 I mean, you know, the first is that a lot of the disagreement, uh, I think emer- sort of i- is there for the simple reason that we talk about it too lot and we do too little about it. 14:32 Uh, I mean, probably if we spent more time actually developing, uh, the capabilities and the decision-making procedures and the strategic culture, uh, to actually become more strategically autonomous, we would actually realize that there is not such a big disagreement deep down between Macron and AKK. 14:54 Uh, and, and that the reason why these differences seem to be so acute is, is because there is very little concrete action going on behind them. 15:07 Uh, so I think, you know, that's one set of issues that, as Europeans, we should be, uh, more, more wary of. 15:14 Uh, the second remark, which goes to your question of, of where does this fit into the transatlantic, [lips smack] uh, the broader transatlantic debate, I would really say that I, I dis- I, I would agree with your characterization, and I think you, you know, you really capture this, this well. 15:30 Uh, and I think that the problem is precisely the fact that this has been articulated, this debate on autonomy has been articulated both by the French president and by, uh, the German defense minister, uh, as a relational debate. 15:47 So, you know, it is, as you say, either about, uh, uh, sort of, uh, gaining greater autonomy from the United States or with the United States. 15:56 And I think that if framed in this way, inevitably one gets into an u- an unnecessary quarrel. 16:03 I think we should be developing, you know, the, not only the debate, but the practice of autonomy, not in relation to the United States either one way or another. 16:12 We should be doing it because this is what is right for us, period. 16:16 Now, inevitably, this will then have a, uh, a, a set of implications for our relationship with the United States, but I would say that this is a second-order sec- set of issues. 16:27 My personal view is that in the 21st century, uh, European autonomy and a stronger transatlantic bond are two sides of the same coin. 16:38 But we shouldn't be doing it in order to stre- strengthen the transatlantic relationship. We should be doing it because this is what we need to do. 16:45 Uh, and I think as a consequence of this, we will end up being a more capable, uh, partner, and therefore a more useful, in a sense, partner to the United States. But that is not the reason why we're doing it. 16:58 The defense spending issue was obviously, during, uh, the, the past four years, uh, uh, a major topic, uh, of news coverage and, uh, conversations, I imagine, within Europe and between Europe and the US because of Donald Trump's hostility to, uh, the ba- the, the, the fundamental logic of the, the NATO alliance, I would, I would say. 17:21 Um, but at the same time, it wasn't the only, uh, tension between the US and the European Union or Europe, uh, writ large. Uh, there was, uh, the digital tax issue. There's trade issues. 17:34 There's divergence, uh, in strategic priorities and, and foreign policy goals. 17:40 Um, which, which of these recent tensions in the transatlantic partnership and relationship, uh, would you expect to recede under the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden, and which do you suspect are going to be more persistent? 17:57 Well, I would say that what we will see, uh, will be, uh, gre- much greater convergence, if not full convergence, uh, on many of the conflicts and crises, uh, in and around Europe. 18:13 So, whether this is, uh, the relationship with Russia, which will continue to be conflictual, uh, whether it is how do we approach, uh, the Middle East, uh, peace process or lack of it, uh, whether this is, you know, uh, how do we help the United States, uh, ease its way back into the Iran, uh, nuclear deal, or whether this is, you know, how do we, um, sort of work more in unison in, in the Western Balkans. 18:45 I think what we'll see is on all of these issues, there will be far greater coordination and far greater convergence, uh, than what we've seen over the last, uh, years, alongside a joint, uh, recommitment to, to, to NATO. 18:59 I don't think, you know, again, sort of, you know, on the European, uh, security and defense piece, I think that, that there will be, uh, again, here, far greater convergence, um, because unlike... 19:11 You know, the, the 2% debate predates Trump. 19:15 The main difference, in my view, between the Trump administration and The Obama administration that preceded it and the Biden administration that will succeed it, uh, is that for Trump, the two percent was, was not really about defense. 19:31 Uh, it was basically about, uh, sort of, you know, redressing through the backdoor a trade imbalance. So it was kind of viewed through mercantilist, uh, lenses. 19:41 Uh, it was not really a- about, you know, reinforcing the transatlantic security, uh, relationship. Uh, and unlike what it was for Obama and unlike what it will be for Biden. 19:53 So I think, you know, also sort of the question of European security and defense will actually be a far more convergent, uh, question, uh, transatlantically. 20:02 Where is it that we're going to continue to, uh, have our differences? Well, I think, uh, certainly, uh, trade will be an element. 20:11 I mean, I think that we will continue to see a degree of protectionism, uh, in, uh, US, uh, policy. 20:19 Uh, I think obviously that there are going to be, uh, ongoing differences on digital, uh, particularly in terms of, you know, where do we, uh, stand respectively in the, uh, debate on, you know, sort of, uh, privacy versus security, uh, as well as obviously the regulation of big tech. 20:40 Uh, and then obviously China will continue to be an area where there will be, uh, ongoing differences. 20:46 And I think those ongoing differences, uh, ultimately boil down to the fact that, um, there is a, not necessarily a divergent, but there is a different, a somewhat different, um, sort of set of priorities on the two sides of the Atlantic. 21:03 I think that for the United States, the question really is a question of, of rivalry, hmm. Uh, and so let us assume for the sake of argument that China was a shining liberal democracy, but it was rising. 21:17 It had risen, and it was challenging, uh, US hegemony. Would the United States have a problem with it? Yes, it would. Would Europe have a problem with a liberal democratic China on the rise? No, it wouldn't. 21:31 Uh, for Europe, the question is precisely, uh, China's authoritarian nature and the risk that this poses to Europe itself in terms of, again, to go back to the, to the definition of, of autonomy encroaching upon European norms, rules, and values, uh, domestically and at European level. 21:51 Now, you know, the, the rivalry question and this more, in a sense, existential political question are not necessarily divergent, so I think there will continue to be a, a big area of overlap a- across the Atlantic when it comes to China, but they are different, which means that there will be a, a, an area where that overlap will not be perfect. 22:11 Now, you know, sort of to pick those sort of three questions of relative divergence, so trade, digital, and China, uh, as I said, there I think we will continue to s- see some differences. 22:23 Uh, but I think that the most important thing that we will have with a Biden administration and which of course we did not have with the Trump administration, is that there will be dialogue, there will be coordination. 22:35 We will talk about our differences, and therefore we will prevent those differences from, uh, culminating, uh, into i- into a real spat. 22:46 I, I wanna jump ahead then to China since you just, uh, talked so much about it and, um, uh, and, and just sort of get your sense of the European Union's approach to China. 22:58 It recently reformulated, uh, the, the how, how it characterizes China to include, uh, a, a competitor and systemic rival, uh, to potential partner, uh, for cooperation. 23:11 Um, to, to you, what does that mean in practice given what you just said about the, the EU, um, really having a different approach or a different assessment of the, the, the, the, I don't, I don't know if threat is the right word, but the challenge that a rising China poses? 23:30 What d- what does this new EU approach, uh, mean in practice? Well, I mean, I think it is, um, e- essentially based on, on, on these two pillars. So given that our quest... 23:42 I mean, our, our problem, if you like, is not a problem of, uh, of rivalry, hmm, um, but it is a sy- uh, a systemic problem in a different sense of the term. Uh, we do not have a problem with... 23:56 In fact, we want to engage economically, uh, with China. Uh, we don't have an issue with our economic engagement with China, um, strengthening China economically or perhaps even politically. 24:10 That is n- not the way in which we approach the China question. Uh, and so, you know, that, that economic engagement, uh, I think will continue, uh, to be there, and of course it will be there. 24:22 I mean, it will probably, uh, come back to the, the, the question of the comprehensive, uh, agreement, uh, on investment with China. 24:30 Uh, so that engagement will be there because we, we, we, A, we believe in interdependence in general, and B, we think that this is in our interest when it comes to China specifically. 24:41 Which of course does not mean to say that we necessarily think that through that interdependence, we're gonna transform China into a liberal democracy. 24:49 Uh, what I think that the systemic rivalry, uh, bit, uh, highlights when it, when looked at through a European lens is that we want to make sure that that engagement with China, um, so, m- you know, will not necessarily change China, but has, we have to make sure that it does not change us. 25:11 Uh, so again, I come back to this question of, uh, of autonomy. 25:15 And we need to ensure that we have the safeguards in place, uh, the protection mechanisms in place, uh, political, uh, through media, uh, obviously as far as, uh, as investment, uh, is concerned, uh, to ensure that it's not China's norms, rules, and values, uh, that filter into our own system, a- and therefore threaten The premises, uh, and the practice of our liberal democracies. 25:43 I think that is the sort of fundamental interpretation of, of where the systemic rivalry and, uh, the, the, the, the partner come, come in. 25:53 Uh, I think one of the, uh, explanations for the, the different, uh, prism, uh, that a lot of American observers and analysts right now, uh, use is that America is an Asian power in the sense of a security partner to, uh, various countries in Asia and a presence in a way that Europe isn't. 26:14 At the same time, there's a sense among, uh, American, uh... 26:19 The, the consensus that seems to be gathering in the United States, rightly or wrongly, is that China also poses a, a threat to the international order in terms of, uh, uh, the potential for, as it grows more powerful, to shift and shape and, and res-re, uh, reorient the rules of the road in terms of international relations. 26:41 Is that a threat or a risk that you feel is, is, is being exaggerated? Or that the EU, uh, even with its engagement with China, uh, can defend against? No, I, I don't think it's exaggerated. 26:56 I mean, I, I do think that we are entering, uh, an era, um, in which there will be, in a sense, a different kind of bipolarity than the one that we had during the Cold War. 27:09 Um, not only because it won't be as clear-cut a bipolarity as it was, because there will obviously be other, uh, multiple power centers. 27:18 Uh, but, but also and more fundamentally because, you know, at the end of the day, during the Cold War, there was never a real question as to which was the political system in which one could lead the better life. 27:34 Uh, or perhaps there may have been in the very first few years, but at the, you know, sort of throughout the decades of the Cold War, this was a real confrontation, obviously on the nuclear, uh, sort of sphere. 27:47 Uh, but, but not really as far as, as, as the political, ideological, uh, dimension of, of the confrontation. 27:55 I think, you know, we're moving into or we are already in a century in which, um, the confrontation with China, uh, is going to be a real normative, uh, confrontation. Um, because, uh, 28:12 you know, we will not be, and we are already no longer in the position to say as comfortably as we thought we could, uh, you know, only a few decades ago, um, that economic prosperity and political freedoms can only go hand in hand. 28:26 Uh, China demonstrates otherwise. 28:29 Uh, we cannot say, uh, as comfortably as we hoped we could have done, uh, that liberal democracies are more effective in addressing, uh, key global challenges like a pandemic, for instance. 28:43 Uh, so there is going to be that, that normative conste- contestation in a manner that did not exist, uh, during the Cold War, which inevitably means that other countries or other power centers, uh, may be attracted in a sense more to one side or more to another side. 29:02 Uh, but there is going to be a real competition out there. So I think it is fundamentally important to bear this in mind. 29:10 But I think that the way to address this concern, uh, is not by saying and therefore we disengage, uh, but rather to say we have to work on ensuring that our own systems are not only resilient, but they continue to be attractive, and in fact, they are more attractive, uh, than the alternative models that, that non-liberal, uh, non-democratic and authoritarian powers may represent. 29:38 Turning, uh, to the, the recently finalized, uh, comprehensive agreement on investment between the EU and China, um, and it's yet to be ratified by the European Parliament, so, uh, there, there are still some hurdles before it, it would go into force. 29:54 Um, it was an agreement that's been negotiated for seven years, I think. Um, it was on the rocks even earlier this year. There were still some pretty wide gaps. 30:05 Um, my, my, my best understanding of the, of the technical aspects of the deal is that Europe, the, the EU did make some significant gains in terms of access, uh, to China's market, um, and, and securing a more level playing field, um, even if some of the implementation, uh, might not be guaranteed on China's part, which is always a, a, a big caveat. 30:30 The, the main criticisms that I've seen of the deal have to do with the way in which it was rushed, uh, at this, at the very end of, uh, uh, Germany's, uh, EU presidency and just before the Biden administration comes into office promising more cooperation and, and a more coordinated approach to China. 30:53 Um, where do you come down on that, and what lessons do you draw from that, both with regard to this question of the European Union's different approach to China and, and also the, the degree to which the US and Europe can coordinate their positions on China? 31:09 Well, I, I think I've been, [laughs] um, I've been struggling with this question quite a bit my- myself really. Um, so indeed my own... 31:18 I mean, as a sort of committed, uh, trans-Atlanticist, my own knee-jerk reaction was, "Hey, this is not exactly great timing really, is it? You know, we could have waited. 31:28 We could have talked more, uh, to the Biden team. You know, we could have coordinated more." 31:34 Um, but then I kind of stopped and, and paused a little bit and said, "Well, hey, Natalie, aren't you also the one that talks about autonomy?" 31:42 And At the end of the day, uh, isn't this a decision that has to be taken on its own merits? 31:52 So, you know, if, uh, we did in December, and of course China had reasons to do it in December, uh, gain concessions that we had not, uh, gained over the course of a seven-year negotiation, uh, so if we, if it happened then, uh, and if we actually, uh, do think that this is a good deal for us, um, why is it that we have to wait? 32:18 Would the United States have waited for us if it, it had negotiated, uh, a deal that it considered to be in its national interest? 32:26 Probably it would not have done, and we would not have accused the United States, uh, for not being sufficiently transatlanticist, uh, for, for not doing it. 32:36 Uh, so, you know, I, I do think that, um, at the end of the day, this is, uh, an agreement that has to be assessed, uh, and, and judged on its own merits. 32:47 So, you know, did we actually manage to seal a good enough deal for ourselves, both in economic terms and in political terms? 32:53 Um, you know, is, was the economic gain, uh, sufficient to outweigh the political cost of handing Xi a diplomatic win? So I think, you know, there is... And one can come down on, on different sides of that argument. 33:09 There are-- But I think those are the terms of the debate that we should, should be having, uh, rather than one which is focused on, you know, um, we should or should not have done it because of, uh, what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic. 33:25 What about the optics for, uh, countries in Asia? 33:29 Uh, I, I mentioned that, that Europe isn't really considered an Asian power in the security sense, but clearly there's been a lot of, uh, outreach and engagement, um, with Southeast Asia, with India, uh, even Australia, um, on the part of member states, uh, as well as the EU. 33:47 Do you think that it could damage the, the perception of how reliable a partner Europe can be to countries in Asia that are as economically dependent or inter-interdependent with China, but very wary of the, the kind of coercion and, uh, and bullying that China seems to be engaging in? 34:06 No, I don't think so because these are countries that obviously reach their own, uh, regional economic agreement with, uh, with China. 34:13 So in a sense, I actually think that, uh, Europeans and East Asians are very much aligned, uh, when it comes to China in both refuting the idea of an economic decoupling, uh, and at the same time wanting to ensure, uh, that the economic engagement with China is, uh, rules-based, uh, and that it is conducted in a way which is amongst us, and by us, I mean not only on the other side of the Atlantic, uh, but also, uh, and in this respect, in particular, uh, with countries in East, in East Asia in a regional manner, in a coordinated manner, in a multilateral manner. 34:57 So I think actually that when it comes to, to, to East Asia, Europeans and, uh, uh, and East Asians are very much aligned in their broader approach to, to China. 35:07 So in some ways, i-if I, if, what I'm hearing from you is that, uh, Europe seems to be being judged with a double standard. Well, I would say that, you know, Europe is judged from the, um, [lip smacks] 35:22 premise of having been... You know, the transatlantic relationship has been an asymmetric, uh, relationship for decades. 35:31 And yes, it is true that the whole debate of autonomy implies a rebalancing of a relationship, which will probably continue to be asymmetric in some respects, but that will probably be slightly less asymmetric if autonomy is actually achieved. 35:48 Uh, and, and I think it would be unfair to automatically, uh, question whether that rebalancing towards a more equal partnership entails a loosening of the transatlantic relationship and therefore should be criticized for it. 36:03 And I would strongly disagree with that. You know, I, I think that actually it is the premise for a strengthened, uh, transatlantic relationship. Uh, and that, yes, so to, you know, to the extent that one 36:15 sort of, uh, uh, judges negatively what the European Union ha-ha-has done through that lens, I would, uh, disagree. 36:24 As I said, I think, you know, then there is a fair argument, uh, to be made in terms of saying, "Hey, you know, this agreement with China does not do enough in terms of securing, uh, labor standards, uh, or was a bad idea for Europe, given the diplomatic win that it handed over, uh, to President Xi." 36:42 I think, you know, those are fair arguments. I don't-- I think it's an unfair argument to say we should have, you know, not done it because of the United States. 36:51 If we thought that this was in our interest, we should have done it. 36:55 T-turning to, uh, uh, a couple countries, uh, closer to the European neighborhood, Russia and Turkey, um, that have been particularly problematic, uh, for the EU and for European member states to deal with because they, they seem both to me, and correct me if, if, if I'm wrong or if you disagree, to simultaneously be equal parts, uh, threat, rival, competitor, and partner and potential partner, um, with regard to, to Russia. 37:25 Uh, for instance, in the energy domain, there's a, a energy dependence on, on Russian gas exports. 37:31 Um, Turkey obviously has been a, a partner, if a problematic one, with regard to the, uh, migration issue, uh, among other things. 37:41 So I guess starting with, with Russia, um, the, it, it seems to me that, uh, given that, uh, the, the, the, the, the, the sort of coexistence of, um, destabilizing factors and potential partnerships, uh, that... 37:57 that a dialogue with Russia is absolutely necessary, and yet because of Russian behavior, whether internal to Russia or in, uh, the, the former Soviet space, it becomes very politically problematic, if not impossible. 38:13 So how in your, to, to your mind, how can the EU get past that impasse absent a dramatic change in Russian behavior? Yeah. 38:21 The Russia question, I have slightly different views, uh, on, on, on Russia as opposed to Turkey, although obviously I do see many similarities. 38:29 Um, but on, on Russia, I think it's a particularly difficult question because, um, there is, in truth, very, very, very little left that we agree with, uh [chuckles] when it, you know, we, we, you know, on, on, with Russia. 38:45 Um, so you know, yes, we are still, I would say broadly speaking, on the same page when it comes to, say, the Iran nuclear deal, uh, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Um, but there is not a lot else left, mm? 39:02 So it's not only that we disagree with, um, the sort of direction that the Russian political system has been going down for the last decades, um, but there are very few foreign policy questions on which we're actually on the same, uh, page. 39:22 Um, so y- does that mean that dialogue is not, uh, necessary? No. I mean, uh, I think in general, dialogue becomes even more necessary when there is disagreement rather than agreement. 39:35 Uh, I think that this is, you know, diplomacy is there precisely, um, to, to manage disagreements more so than to manage agreements. 39:44 Um, so I think that that does not make dialogue less of a necessity, uh, if anything, the, the reverse. Um, but, but it, but in all honesty, there is, there, there is little that, that can be worked on with, with Russia. 39:56 I don't think we should be starry-eyed a- about this. 40:00 I have, as I said, a slightly different view on, on Turkey because I think when it comes to Turkey, whereas, uh, the direction that Turkey has been taking domestically, uh, has been extremely problematic, uh, and I've got no, 40:16 y- you know, nothing positive at all to say about this. Um, but I think that when it comes to foreign policy, um, there is 40:26 l- less disagreement than, uh, what we're prepared to, to recognize precisely because we do tend to look at this, um, you know, from the lens of we don't like the Turkish president and we don't like the direction that, uh, Turkish democracy has been taking. 40:44 But i- if we kind of, you know, sort of bracket that to one side for a, for a moment, um, and we take different foreign policy dossiers, uh, like, uh, you know, from, from Libya to the Caucasus to, I mean, you know, one can sort of take a number of issues, um, there are obviously differences there, mm? 41:06 Uh, but are those differences completely incompatible? No, I don't think they are. 41:13 Uh, I think that there could be a lot more foreign policy cooperation with Turkey than what we actually have at the moment, and the reason why we don't have it is because we are, um, 41:25 i- i- in a sense, you know, sort of, uh, single-handedly focused with our, um, sort of disagreement and despise, uh, of, uh, of the Turkish leadership. 41:39 What about the territorial disputes, uh, the maritime and territorial disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean? Do you feel that, uh, 41:47 especially the southern Mediterra- Mediterranean European member states have been too quick to dismiss Turkey's position or, or, or claims or their perspective on those disputes? 41:58 Or do you feel like, um, that the, the solidarity and even some of the prickly and pr- the tensions that, that emerged over the past summer, uh, were justified? 42:09 I, you know, I think that the, uh, sort of maritime, uh, issues and everything that surrounds them, you know, sort of both the maritime demarcation, the airspace, the islands, et cetera, I mean, you know, the, these, and of course, the Cyprus conflict, these are old disputes. 42:29 Uh, and I don't think they're disputes in which there is a clear-cut right and a wrong. Uh, I think that there are sort of fair claims on, on, on both sides, uh, which is why I think that direct talks are so necessary. 42:45 Uh, the reason why I think that the situation escalated the way it did, um, in, i- in, in the summer was because of a set of actions which had taken place in the years preceding, uh, the summer, which had made Turkey increasingly feel that it had its back to the wall. 43:06 So be it on Syria, on, uh, Libya, on energy questions in particular, I think Turkey increasingly felt cornered. 43:16 Uh, and I think that we do have our share of responsibility, uh, in this, uh, as I think we have our share of responsibility in, uh, the Cyprus conflict, um, which of course does not then justify, uh, Turkey lashing out the way it did. 43:33 I think obviously that many of its actions are, uh, sort of, you know, to be, to, to, to be condemned. 43:40 But I think that, you know, as with, you know, as always, if one wants to sort of solve a problem, one needs to look at what caused it. 43:47 Uh, and I think that ultimately those causes need to be addressed, and if as Europeans we want to play a constructive role, uh, we need to be doing this. And I think that some member states have been doing exactly this. 43:59 I think Germany has been doing exactly this. 44:02 Now, I think as European Union, uh, there are some limits to what we can and cannot do when it comes to the Eastern Mediterranean for the simple reason that we are not a neutral actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. 44:14 We are a one-sided actor, uh, in the Eastern Mediterranean because two member states are part of the union and one is not. Uh, and that is a structural imbalance that we have to factor in 44:26 Looking now at some of the internal, uh, challenges or obstacles to, uh, 44:33 Europe's role in the world and strategic autonomy, uh, what, what do you think are the implications, uh, to the EU's global role of the challenges it's now experiencing, uh, to rule of law and European values, particularly in Eastern European states like Poland and Hungary? 44:50 Well, I think this is absolutely crucial. Uh, and again, I come back to this question of autonomy, which is about, um, respecting living by our laws, our norms, our rules, our values. 45:02 Now obviously, if those norms, rules, and values are, uh, challenged from the inside, it is even more of a threat than if they're challenged from the outside. 45:12 So I think it is absolutely essential, uh, for the European Union as a union, uh, to, to address these, uh, these problems. 45:21 Uh, which is why I think that, you know, sort of first and tentative as they may be, the sort of first steps that were done in terms of rule of law conditionality are, are essential. 45:33 And I think they're also essential for a second reason, which is more, uh, external in nature. 45:39 Uh, and, and it really has to do with the fact that the real power of, uh, norms and rules and values, uh, is not when you can, um, uh, sort of impose them, uh, through coercion, but when they are, uh, and they become a model of attraction. 45:58 So this gets us into the sort of, you know, old soft power debate. Now obviously there is not much soft power to be conveyed, uh, when you violate, uh, those norms and values internally, you know? 46:11 I mean, you know, to take an example, uh, on the other side of the Atlantic, uh, you know, when you see sort of, um, uh, uh, protesters, um, 46:24 you know, sort of entering, uh, Capitol, uh, Hill the way they did on the sixth of January, um, you know, this is, uh, not only a low point for US democracy, but it is a low point for the ability of the United States to talk about democracy, uh, outside. 46:42 So I think, you know, the same, uh, argument can be made, uh, for, for the European Union for the violation of, of democratic norms within, within the European Union. 46:52 So I think it's crucial in this respect, and then it's also, I think, crucial in a, in a, in a third, in a sense, more l- liminal space, which is what happens when you make the transition from the outside to the, to the in, which gets us into the enlargement, uh, question. 47:09 You know, I think, you know, what the, the Poland and, and Hungary story teaches us is that we cannot, uh, simply assume that democratization is something that has a very clear beginning and an end. 47:23 Uh, that democracy, uh, is, um, you know, is, is an ongoing process and it can make steps forward, it can make steps backwards. A- and this can happen at dif- different points in time in the democratic experiment. 47:38 Uh, and that therefore, as, as a union, we need to make sure that mechanisms to protect democracy, uh, in different ways, which obviously also include mechanisms of conditionality, are, are in place not only when you are in the process of entering the union, but also as you remain within the union itself. 47:57 My, my last question. Uh, you've, you've mentioned that some of these issues and obstacles to European strategic autonomy date back 10, 20 years, energy dependence, for instance, uh, the, the military spending question. 48:10 Some are more recent in terms of the, the digital sector. Um, it's clearly been a generational transition or shift or emergence of this, this, uh, advocacy and call to strategic autonomy. Are you optimistic? 48:26 Do you feel like, uh, enough ground has been covered and that, uh, that, uh, the future is, is, is rosy for European strategic, uh, autonomy? Are you a little tired of fighting the same battle over and over? 48:39 What, uh, what... How do you see the, the coming five, 10 years? I mean, I think that there was, uh, a real acceleration in the, you know, particularly 2015, '16 through to 2000, you know, '18, '19 period. 48:56 Uh, and this was a time in which not only things were talked about, but the beginning of things started to be done, you know. 49:03 To stick to the defense, uh, field, you know, um, the, the sort of building blocks, uh, of, of a European defense union were, were put in place. So it wasn't just talk, it was the beginning of some action. 49:16 I think that now we are living through a, a moment in which there's been, uh, a sort of temporary pause, uh, in which there is too much talk and too little action, uh, particularly on the defense field. 49:29 I think in other, uh, areas, I think on, on, on digital, on climate, I think there, there are real steps forward which are being made. 49:36 But on defense and foreign policy in general, in the traditional sense of the term, uh, we, uh, this is not a good moment. 49:44 Uh, and I think it is not a good moment which risks being exacerbated paradoxically by the fact that we have a friend in the White House. 49:51 We will have a friend in the White House, uh, on, on the 20th, uh, of January onwards, uh, which would give us, uh, the sort of... 50:00 It would be a terrible shame if it gave us the quote unquote "excuse" to, to do little, uh, on, on security and defense. 50:07 Um, but I do think that with all its, um, sort of ebbs and flows, this debate and this practice, uh, of, of autonomy, uh, is inevitably going to continue, and it's inevitably going to continue because it's ultimately being driven by very profound shifts within the international system which are structural in nature. 50:30 And we may like or not like them, but we don't have a choice. This is simply the world that we do and we will continue to live in in this century. Dr. Tocci, thank you so much. It's been a great pleasure. 50:40 Lovely talking to you. [upbeat music] If you like what you hear on Trendlines, you can subscribe to it on the podcast platform of your choice, and you can also find links to do so at worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast. 50:57 Trendlines is edited by Peter Dury. You can follow him, myself, and World Politics Review on Twitter. Thanks for listening, and tune in again next week. 51:06 [upbeat music]
