Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:14 During the US presidential campaign, Donald Trump questioned US alliances, criticized international institutions, and attacked free trade deals while promising to put America first as president. 0:25 His election victory, combined with the Brexit referendum and the rise of populist nationalism in Europe and elsewhere, has many observers wondering whether the liberal world order can survive. 0:36 But if Trump does decide to radically alter America's historical role, what will take liberal internationalism's place? Stuart Patrick will join Peter Dury a little later to sketch out the range of possible scenarios. 0:48 But first, I'll be talking with WPR senior editor Freddy Deknatel about this week's top stories in international affairs. Hi, Freddy. How you doing today? Hey, Judah. I'm doing well. How are you? I'm doing great. 1:00 Obviously, a lot of attention this week is being given to Donald Trump, uh, in the context of allegations of Russian meddling in the US election. 1:10 But, uh, since we'll be talking about Trump and, uh, the possibilities for his foreign policy n-in next week's podcast, which will coincide with the presidential inauguration, I thought that instead this week what we could do is take a look at, uh, Barack Obama's foreign policy legacy as we enter essentially the last week of his presidency. 1:32 Yeah, I think it's a great opportunity to... Obviously, there'll be plenty of time to look ahead, uh, and now is the time to look back. 1:40 What's fascinating to me, uh, about, uh, the Obama presidency when it comes to foreign policy and international affairs is how many different phases, how many different foreign policies, uh, we, we can actually point to over the years. 1:58 Uh, when he took office in two thousand and nine, it's in the context of the global financial crisis, uh, the, the aftermath of the Iraq invasion and the continuing wars in Iraq and, uh, and Afghanistan. 2:15 Um, and this, th-these priorities that very quickly, uh, emerge w-with regard to his foreign policy, which are essentially winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and sort of healing some of the wounds and, and repairing some of the damage that had been done to, uh, America's reputation and global standing because of the wars, uh, it seems like, uh, it seems almost like a, a time that's hard to remember, a context that's hard to remember. 2:49 And so it, it often seems like the logic behind, uh, his initial foreign policy initiatives, um, gets lost. 2:58 Yeah, I think i-in the same way that, you know, the domestic situation when he took office, um, is sometimes overlooked, uh, you know, it, it was really in-initially a foreign policy of part-partly damage control, um, and then also, like you said, rebuilding credibility and rebuilding partnerships with allies, uh, and trying to wind down these long, costly wars. 3:23 Um, he wasn't obviously successful completely in doing that given the ongoing US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. 3:30 Um, but I, I think that, you know, I, I agree there isn't one Obama foreign policy, um, despite references to an Obama doctrine. I think there might be several Obama doctrines. 3:42 Um, but it is, uh, key to remember that in, in his first term, largely a lot of his foreign policy was responsive, um, reactive, I guess. 3:51 Um, it, it obviously had an overarching idea behind it, uh, largely around the US, uh, working with the world rather than, um, working despite the world as, you know, some of the neocon view might have been. 4:06 Um, and I think that going into his second term, you saw more of the ideals of Obama's foreign policy sort of free a little bit from purely having to, you know, pick up the mess left by George W. Bush's administration. 4:21 And I think particularly, I look at the Paris Climate Agreement 4:25 and other US efforts, uh, on climate change, that's sort of the underlying idea of at least one part of Obama's foreign policy, which is looking at global solutions to global problems, and I think climate change most of all there. 4:39 The-there's also the multilateral diplomacy, uh, to reach the Iran nuclear deal, uh, which was obviously very controversial. 4:48 Um, to me, that really draw, uh, puts into, to really high contrast, uh, one of the initiatives of his first term, which was less successful, uh, th-this idea of extending the open hand, uh, the idea that the US has more to gain from offering diplomacy and diplomatic solutions to rivals and adversaries, so the Russia reset, for instance, and trying to open diplomatic channels with Iran for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff. 5:19 Um, and while he's often been criticized for, uh, perhaps, uh, or, or for what's been portrayed as showing weakness, um, a lot of the, the, 5:32 say, less than satisfying outcomes of some of those initiatives have to do with the responses of the, the people on the, on the other end of those offers in the sense that, uh, the logic behind, uh, those initiatives make sense. 5:47 They do depend on the other side actually be willing, being willing to compromise. With Iran, it took four years to get to that point, uh, but it was actually ultimately successful. 5:58 With China, as you, as you mentioned, the, the contrast between, for instance, the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in Obama's first year of his previ- presidency and then the Paris Summit, uh, last year, uh, is obviously, uh, dramatic in terms of China's 6:16 cooperation. Uh, uh, uh, Russia is obviously a different case, where the reset very quickly, uh, fails and goes back into a, a very adversarial and now highly tense relationship. 6:29 Uh, but I f- I feel like that, that, that aspect that, um, in, in diplomacy as in war, the, the, the enemy gets a say, um, that people criticize Obama, but he didn't really have very many partners to work with on the negotiating table and, and that extends to, for instance, in the Arab Spring, uh, in the Middle East, some of America's traditional allies in the Persian Gulf, for instance, pursuing very radically different agendas than the United States for how to respond to that, that sort of regional upheaval. 7:00 Yeah, I think that's a key point, and, uh, the administration's Syria policy over the last 7:07 two years, uh, roughly, let's say, uh, I think captures that very well because there was a concerted effort to try to work with Russia, um, in the belief either out of good faith or, as critics would say, because it was naive, that Russia wanted a political solution on similar enough terms that the US did, and that, that they could at least see eye to eye on the value of winding down the war there. 7:31 Um, and obviously, that hasn't been the case. Russia's escalated the war in Syria. 7:36 Um, there have been, you know, over the past year, John Kerry was shuttling back and forth, and there were several, you know, attempts at diplomacy, and all the while, um, Russia would either violate ceasefires that they negotiated or they would look the other way when Syrian forces of Bashar al Assad's regime or other proxies would violate the ceasefire. 7:57 Um, and so I think that's a very key case of, uh, you know, it, it, it's, it's good and well to want partners on the ground and to want to have diplomacy be the solution rather than war, but when your main diplomatic partner is fighting on one side of that war, it doesn't make for much of a policy. 8:13 It, it limits your options, and even worse still, uh, you look at America's partners in the Gulf who are pursuing very dramatically different agendas on the ground in Syria. 8:25 Uh, Saudi Arabia pursuing a different agenda, for example, in the immediate aftermath, uh, uh, in Egypt of the, the, the fall of Hosni Mu- Mubarak, uh, and elsewhere in Bahrain. 8:37 Um, and so it, it opens up this other, this sort of parallel critique of Obama, uh, that, uh, he, he, he hasn't managed American allies, uh, very well. 8:51 Uh, Israel very critical of the Iran deal and, and essentially at one point, uh, actively trying to undermine it. 8:59 Um, and I, I at the same time, uh, one of the, the, the real key assumptions, I think, of the Obama pre- presidency, when it, whether it comes to how to manage allies or how to manage rivals, um, is this idea that, uh, because of globalization, because of the, the shift in, in power from the West to the global South and East, that America just simply can no longer dictate outcomes, uh, to the extent that it ever really could. 9:32 Uh, but that, uh, that at this point, America doesn't have the wherewithal, uh, to fight every battle, to dictate every outcome, uh, and that instead of trying to do so, it needs to really shepherd and, and husband its resources in a way that it can deploy them when it's absolutely necessary for, for vital interests. 9:52 Yeah, I think that one of the lessons people will learn later after Obama's left, and who knows what the future will hold, that, uh, it was the right instinct to work with allies, to realize America's limits, um, that that isn't a, a projection of weakness, that that's pragmatic and that's realistic, um, and not least, it avoids the kind of disasters that were, you know, that preceded Obama coming into office. 10:20 One, I think, major question mark obviously, uh, has to do with the relationship with China. 10:26 Uh, it's obviously a vast topic, uh, in terms of the, the sort of parallel US, uh, objectives of trying to integrate China into the world order. 10:37 At the same time, hedging bets to, in order to contain China in the event that the evolutions in China lead it, uh, toward challenging the world order, uh, throwing its weight around in Asia in particular. 10:49 That's obviously gonna be one of the big question marks, something we'll be following, uh, when it comes to the Trump presidency, but that, uh, in, in the context of, of our discussion today might be a, a little bit too much to, to jump into right now. 11:04 Um, I think that pretty much covers most of the major themes, uh, even if we've had to paint with a broad stroke, uh, and I think it's about time for us to turn it over to Peter. 11:14 Before we do, are there any other articles that, uh, that we ran this week that you wanted to call people's attention to? Yeah. 11:20 Um, a great briefing by, um, Alex Thurston, who writes about Africa, about West Africa generally for us regularly, and he wrote a piece on Ghana's new president, um, and the democratic model there. 11:33 And I wanted to flag Ellen Lapson's column this week, uh, on the National Intelligence Council's latest global trends report, which I thought was a, a, a real informative, uh, piece in terms of how to read it and how not to read it, um, in terms of what to, uh, what to get from that report. 11:52 Okay. I think that just about does it. Thanks a lot, Freddy. Thanks, Judah. And now we'll turn it over to Peter for the report. [upbeat music] The Soviet Union collapsed twenty-five years ago, and the world celebrated. 12:06 The world announced that there was only one way forward for everywhere in the world now: liberal democracy and free market capitalism. I believe in a liberal political order 12:21 An order built not just through elections and representative government, but also through respect for human rights and civil society. The sun has risen on a completely different UK and a completely different EU. 12:34 This marks a victory for the kind of economic nationalism, to quote this article here, for the kind of xenophobia that will imperil the liberal world order that has guaranteed Western prosperity and stability since World War II. 12:53 Since the end of the Second World War, a liberal world order has been the aspirational goal of US foreign policy. 13:02 But the election of Donald Trump and the successes of populist movements in Western democracies in general have thrown the dedication of the US and its allies to a liberal world order in serious doubt. 13:16 I am now joined by Stuart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations to discuss the position that a Trump administration might take on the concept of a liberal world order, as well as likely scenarios for the fundamental approach the incoming president will take to foreign relations. 13:34 A lot of people take the liberal world order for granted, but in fact, it's a historical anomaly that's really existed, at least within the free world, since the end of the Second World War. 13:46 The liberal world order is basically an open world. It's based on the principle of open societies, particularly free societies. 13:55 It's based on the notion that countries cooperate with one another and trade harmoniously and peaceful with one another. 14:04 And it's also premised on a number of rules of the road in terms of dealing with major conflict among nations. 14:12 And the contours of the liberal world order were set down at the end of the Second World War, particularly by the United States, but to some degree with its wartime allies. 14:23 Now, the liberal world order only became a global one at the end of the Cold War, where there was this sense that the rules of the game would expand to incorporate those countries that had been left out of it. 14:37 But what we've seen over the last 25 or more years since the end of the Cold War is actually less of a consolidation of this liberal world order than its, particularly recently, its erosion and its being challenged both from outside and also from inside. 14:55 At the end of the Cold War, there was a great deal of optimism that this 15:01 community of market democracies that traded well together and played well together, if you will, would gradually expand to encompass the entire world and that all great powers and all great power centers would, in a sense, embrace the notion of 15:19 an open political order, both domestically and internationally. And this was accentuated during the beginning of the Obama administration with the President Obama's notion that power was no longer a zero-sum game. 15:38 In an era when our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero-sum game. No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation. In a sense, old geopolitical rivalries had been replaced by 15:54 the pursuit of shared solutions to common problems, such as climate change, for instance, or infectious disease or terrorism that all countries were vulnerable to. 16:06 In fact, what we've seen is over the past several years is a quite dramatic return of geopolitics. 16:13 And the return of geopolitics is not simply the fact that some that the power distribution is changing and that some countries are getting more powerful and others are getting weaker, although that certainly is happening. 16:25 And there's been a dramatic shift of power, particularly east and to the global south. But what's also accompanied that power shift is a growing divergence of international norms and beliefs about 16:38 quite fundamental issues, such as whether or not the trend should be in the direction of democracy and open societies, whether or not there should be territorial integrity and nonintervention should be cornerstones of international order. 16:54 What we've seen in recent years is particularly a challenge to the liberal world order from Russia, which is exemplified in terms of its foreign behavior by its intervention into Ukraine and its seizure of the Crimea. 17:09 And in China, some sense that the Chinese government is pursuing a far more assertive, some would say aggressive policy on its periphery, not least with respect to the South China Sea. 17:21 So these areas have emerged as flashpoints. The fact that the liberal order is fraying has also been demonstrated in Syria, where great power collision has prevented any sort of a strong response united 17:38 within the Security Council. 17:40 And other rising powers have also been challenging or at least knocking at the door, demanding greater voice and weight within international institutions, ranging from the UN Security Council, which, for instance, does not have India or Brazil as a member, but also from 17:57 in the international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, which are still stacked quite heavily in favor of the United States and particularly the European countries. So there's been a dissatisfaction 18:10 with the state of international institutions, many of which were created in the wake of the Second World War, but have not been effectively reformed to deal with 21st century challenges. 18:24 Now suddenly, this, uh, international order, which has already been, uh, been battered from outside, uh, by a lot, by countries that would like to revise the terms of that order and some of the rules by which countries should play by, is now being challenged internally Fox News [crowd cheering] decision desk has called Pennsylvania for Donald Trump. 18:48 This means that Donald Trump will be the 45th president of the United States. The British people have spoken, and the answer is we're out. 18:57 A new poll suggests Germany's anti-immigrant alternative for Germany party, or AFD, is winning more support than ever before. 19:06 One candidate almost certain to make it into this runoff is Marine Le Pen, leader of far-right party, the National Front. 19:13 This trend is particularly worrisome with respect to the United States because Donald Trump, in terms of his campaign rhetoric and in some of his statements since his election, has, uh, really departed from many of the orthodoxies that we have come to see and count on with respect to the leaders of the United States. 19:33 Almost uniformly, American presidents since the end of the Second World War have couched US foreign policy and national security objectives not simply in, uh, the pursuit of material wealth and power, but in fact as embodying some higher purpose. 19:52 Now, sometimes, uh, that higher purpose, uh, one could be a bit cynical of it, but there's no question that, there's no question that out of enlightened self-interest, a major, uh, attribute of US foreign policy since 1945 has been trying to create an institutional environment in which other countries can feel secure and prosper, and in which people can live in dignity. 20:14 That has been the general trend. What's striking about Donald Trump is the degree to which he views diplomacy and US foreign policy in an almost purely transactional, uh, manner. He... 20:26 There is virtually no discussion of any higher purposes of American f- uh, power or of human rights or of the promotion of democracy, for instance. 20:36 Donald Trump has called into question many of the orthodoxies that his predecessors took for granted, uh, particularly when it comes to international institutions. 20:45 Uh, he has, uh, questioned, uh, bedrock US alliances like NATO. America needs to be the leader of NATO, that that's an important role. Do you agree? Hey- America should be the leader of NATO... 20:55 well, we're paying a very disproportionate share. We're paying for a lot of NATO, and it's helping them more than it's helping us. He's, uh, criticized international institutions, uh, like the United Nations. 21:07 He's, uh, promised to, uh, rip up major, uh, international trade a- agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement and, and he's repudiated the, uh, mega trade deal that was supposed to p- span the Pacific, the Trans-Pacific, uh, Partnership. 21:25 He's also, uh, thrown international arms control into disarray even before taking office by suggesting that he would rip up, uh, the joint plan of action, uh, with Iran to control that country's nuclear weapons program, and even suggested that some US allies should get nuclear weapons to be able to defend themselves, something that, uh, would make, uh, the world a far more tense place. 21:51 He's also questioned, uh, some fundamental aspects of US policy with respect to the war on terror. Uh, he believes that, uh, the United States should reinstitute torture. 22:03 And we're worried about laws, and we, we can't waterboard, and yet they're chopping off heads and drowning people in steel cages. 22:11 Uh, in, in going after terrorists, even, uh, violating hum- international humanitarian law when it comes to going after the families of terrorists, regardless of whether or not they're guilty of any crime themselves. Mr. 22:23 President. But we're fighting a very politically correct war. Yeah. Well, we see that happening in the Middle East. And the other thing is with the terrorists, you have to take out their families. 22:30 When you get these terrorists, you have to take out their families. They, they care about their lives, don't kid yourself. Mr. Trump- But they say they don't care about their lives. You have to take out their families. 22:40 So all of these statements, quite pr- many of them are quite provocative, have thrown into doubt, uh, whether or not the United States will, uh, exercise the sort of enlightened leadership that it has, uh, exercised globally at the, uh, during its best periods. 22:55 At this point, it's impossible to say what precise grand strategy or even combination of strategies, uh, the Trump administration will pursue when it comes to foreign policy and national security policy. 23:08 There are a number of potential models out there, uh, and it's can be worthwhile, uh, working through them t- uh, just as, as, as sort of a heuristic exercise. 23:19 It, it could be worthwhile working through these, uh, to sort of get a, a better sense of the different trade-offs and pluses and minuses of alternatives to the current liberal world order, as imperfect as it is. 23:34 One approach to world order, which, uh, would definitely, uh, seem to be consistent with growing, uh, 23:42 animosity or at least growing frictions amongst major centers of world power, would be to try to back off, in a sense, for, for the United States to back off of a, a highly institutionalized version of world order, which has been what's developed, uh, since 1945. 23:59 And this would be something a- akin to, uh, a, a recreation of the Concert of Europe, uh, in the early, uh, and mid 19th century. The question is, can you agree on a few simple rules of the road? 24:12 And I would call this sort of Concert Redux. Uh, there would be, under this approach to world order, there would be much less of an emphasis on, uh, on human rights, for instance. 24:23 There would be an agreement to, uh, an agreement to disagree as to, uh, how countries should actually organize themselves domestically, and the premium here would be placed on, uh, either, uh, a concert mechanism, uh, some subset of the G20, group of 20 countries, for instance, just the most important ones, uh, or really focusing on the UN Security Council. 24:45 Uh, this sort of a concert, uh, mechanism would probably reduce great power frictions. On the other hand, it would pay much less attention to, uh, atrocities, for instance, being committed in other countries. 24:57 It would probably place the emphasis on order over justice. 25:02 A second approach to world order, which could conceivably be complementary to the notion of a, of a concert, is to adopt a policy based on spheres of influence, and this would be a regionally based order. 25:16 Uh, the idea here is that when it comes to international stability and international commerce, international trade and finance, that those things could in a sense be organized on a regional basis. 25:28 If one were to go in this direction, one could imagine that, uh, that Russia would in a sense have a sphere of influence that was, uh, if not explicit, at least implicitly acknowledged by the United States. 25:41 Uh, China would have one, uh, in East Asia, and the United States would have its own in the Western Hemisphere, uh, perhaps with some offshoots. 25:49 The idea would be that, uh, each country would in a sense be the custodian of order within its own backyard, uh, as in the Remo- Monroe Doctrine. And the, the gravitational... 26:00 The center of gravity economically, uh, would be, uh, the big, uh, power in each of those, uh, areas. 26:07 I- if this were to be pursued, it would suggest that, uh, US alliances around the world, uh, would continue to exist for a little while, but they undoubtedly would atrophy over time as, uh, for instance, uh, countries around China felt its economic gravitational pull and US, uh, alliance commitments cease to be as credible as they were in the past. 26:29 A third model of international order, uh, under a Trump administration would really be one in which the United States, uh, not only focuses on its region but really draws back, uh, into, in a sense, a fortress America. 26:43 This theme of a self-sufficient America is one that's quite strong in much of the rhetoric of Donald Trump. We don't make our products anymore in the United States, but we will again like never before. Mark my words. 26:57 [cheering] American cars will travel the roads, American planes will soar the skies, and American ships will patrol beautifully the sea. 27:12 [cheering] American steel 27:18 will send new skyscrapers high into the clouds, American hands will rebuild this nation, and American energy mined from American sources will power our nation. 27:34 To some degree, this, this would be quite, uh, extreme, but it would be, uh, in a, in a way a back to the future choice, which would return the United States to, uh, the posture it had had, uh, for much of its history, where it really focused, uh, on continental expansion and, uh, and then o- only in its immediate, immediate region, uh, while maintaining, uh, more of an isolationist posture with respect to the rest of the world. 28:00 This would be a dramatic break, obviously, with, uh, the, uh, the tradition that the United States has... The traditional role it's played since 1945. 28:11 Uh, it would even go beyond, uh, the retrenchment to simply an offshore balancer. 28:17 In this, uh, situation, you would actually, uh, see the United States regarding the world and all of its troubles, in a sense, as someone else's responsibility, uh, to take care of. Uh, it would be... 28:30 The emphasis would be on making America itself great again, um, building up domestic prod- production and productivity, and building walls to keep the country safe, uh, from enemies. 28:41 Uh, in this, uh, model, national security and foreign policy a- in a sense becomes a subset of homeland security, and the United States, uh, really is focusing on matters at home, uh, almost entirely. 28:56 So fourth potential option, uh, would be for the United States to, uh, actually focus on a community of democracies, uh, or a league of democracies. 29:07 Now, this is something that, uh, would be very counterintuitive, uh, for Donald Trump, of course, because he's vir- he's said virtually nothing about, uh, democracy or human rights. 29:18 But in a sense, uh, it would be, uh, a US policy that focuses, uh, really on doubling down on the liberal order. 29:27 But the way you double down on the liberal order is only by including or focusing on those countries that are actually liberal democracies or market democracies. 29:36 And perhaps trying to expand that community of market democracies to include some of the major emerging country democracies that, that could be seen as swing states. 29:45 So for instance, the Brazils, Indias, perhaps South Africas and Indonesias of the world. 29:52 To get to this world order under Trump, uh, there would have to be, uh, a, a, a sudden realization, um, uh, the, the, the shock perhaps of a major confrontation not only with China but particularly with Russia, which Donald Trump has wanted to cozy up to. 30:09 If there were a, a, a sense that actually at, at the end of the day our, at, our desires and our interests are fundamentally incompatible with authoritarian countries, the idea would be here you'd pursue a policy in a sense of containment light, where you'd, uh, uh, circle the wagons, uh, within the, uh, advanced market democracies and, and, and other emerging country democracies and try to pursue world order in a sense, uh, through mechanisms like the community of democracies and certainly the Group of Seven advanced industrialized, uh, democracies. 30:44 A fifth and final possibility is really, uh, an ad hoc or a la carte world. And this is an improvisational approach to world order that I think probably fits, uh, Donald Trump's temperament quite a bit. 30:59 Uh, the president-elect, uh, has described himself or has expressed major doubts or skepticism about existing international institutions. And he's a deal maker. 31:11 So what an a la carte or an ad hoc world means is that you create different coalitions or short-term alliances or partnerships with countries that can help you in a specific instance. 31:26 And so an ad hoc world implies you're not always going to be working through a concert of the same handful of powers. You're not always going to be working with like-minded countries like a league of democracies. 31:41 But in a sense, you're going to try to create a solution set for any particular problem, be it the latest global health pandemic or financial stability or nuclear nonproliferation. This has a lot of advantages. 31:56 And to some degree, there are elements of this that have already been pursued, particularly by both George W. Bush and Barack Obama for all their differences. But this would really take it to the next level. 32:08 And you'd see basically a marginalization of existing major international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, for instance, or the United Nations. 32:21 The danger is that for all the flexibility and speed that this sort of an approach brings, you actually run the risk of weakening those very institutions that for all their weaknesses still remain the bedrock of international order and possess just incredible technical expertise and standing resources. 32:45 Many thanks to Stuart Patrick for joining us this week. If you'd like to read more about the future of the liberal world order, you can find his in-depth article on worldpoliticsreview.com. 32:55 If you like what you hear on Trendlines, go ahead and subscribe to it in the podcast app of your choice. That will save you the trouble of downloading each new episode. 33:04 Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Dury, who also conducts the report interviews. 33:09 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 33:18 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines.
