Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:13 Peter Dury is on vacation until next week, so instead of the normal podcast format, I'll be joined by WPR senior editor Freddy Deknatel for the second of two special editions to take a more detailed look at the foreign policy legacy of former President Barack Obama. 0:29 Last week, we looked at some of the particular successes and failures of Obama's foreign policy over the eight years he was in office. 0:36 This week, we'll look at the various ways of trying to assess his overall performance in the international arena and how the prism that is used influences the conclusions that are drawn. 0:46 Both discussions supplement this month's special report, which collects a sample of WPR coverage of Obama's foreign policy from over the course of his presidency. Hi, Freddy. How you doing today? Hey, Judah. 0:57 I'm doing well. How are you? I'm feeling great. 1:00 So I thought a good place to start, uh, in looking at how to judge Obama's, uh, foreign policy legacy is to sort of go back in time and start at the beginning of his presidency, uh, which obviously follows the, the George W. 1:15 Bush presidency, uh, the invasion of Iraq, uh, some of the damage done to America's global standing, uh, and reputation. Um, and you mentioned last week, uh, that 1:31 Obama really started out, uh, his presidency with this overarching goal of s- repairing that damage and restoring America's reputation and standing. 1:43 So I guess the, the, the first question that comes to mind in, in assessing, uh, Obama's foreign policy approach, and especially in the initial period of his presidency, is did he really have a choice? 1:56 Was there, was there something else he could have pursued besides this, uh, this policy of diplomatic engagement? I don't think so. 2:04 I, and I think in part because of, uh, the campaign he'd run, the reason that he, he, he won the primary against Hillary Clinton and then won, um, convincingly against, um, John McCain was, you know, the, the, the message that, that he was running on in part was an anti-war message. 2:22 He was one of the few Democrats, um, who could, you know, k- you know, who could reasonably claim that he had been opposed to the war from the very beginning. 2:30 Um, and so that was a huge part of his candidacy and his appeal, and I think that Obama the anti-war candidate, um, is forgotten now, you know, after eight years of, um, 2:41 many things that we'll get into, not least of them drone warfare. 2:44 But I think, A, be, you know, given the appeal that he had not only to his base but to all the other people who voted for him, that was a key promise, um, restoring America's relationships around the world, which had been damaged so badly by the Bush administration and especially the war in Iraq. 3:02 Um, and so I, I really don't think, uh, in thinking of alternatives that either there was a, a, a better, um, or d- or different tack he could have taken and, and also that he, he, he wouldn't have either because that was... 3:15 He made it very clear, I think, that if he were elected, that was the first thing he was gonna do when he came into office. Uh, there's also the question of his, his personal identity, right? 3:25 He's the first African American president. 3:27 Uh, his name, his biography, his background, his, uh, family lineage, uh, in, in a lot of ways, and I, I witnessed that firsthand, uh, here in France, uh, he was an, the American president, uh, but he was in some ways the world's president. 3:44 People really identified with him around the world, and he seemed uniquely qualified, not just because of his temperament and his obviously, uh, just exceptional skills and talent, uh, but also because of who he, who he is. 4:00 Um, a- and in those early months, uh, really the first year, he goes around the world and he makes these speeches. 4:06 I remember personally being almost at a certain point, uh, uh, almost tired of the coverage of his speeches. They were great speeches. 4:15 Um, the, there's one in Cairo, there's one in Ghana, if I'm not mistaken, um, in which he really, uh, shows a real mastery of the issues that, uh, that people in those parts of the world, uh, uh, take, take seriously and, and what's important to them, especially, uh, what's important to them about how America will wield its power in the global arena. 4:39 Um, and so he also sets out, uh, he, he, he engages with Russia, with, with, with, uh, which, uh, relations had really deteriorated toward the end of the Bush administration. 4:51 Um, gets quite a bit actually over the p- first period of time with the Russia reset. 4:56 Uh, with Iran, uh, engages, tries to engage with Iran but is met immediately with a, a crisis in terms of Iran's presidential election and the post-election, uh, violence and crackdown by the regime against the Green Movement. 5:12 Um, and in other parts of the world, it, it has more or less success. 5:17 Looking back at that period of time, were we all a little bit naive about how, uh, h- what the world's response would be to an American president that, uh, in the words of the administration was offering an outstretched hand instead of a fist? 5:32 Um, I think, I don't know if it's, if it's naive. Um, I think it's perhaps, um, 5:39 rightfully but obviously, um, in, you know, rightfully optimistic but also, um, inevitably the world was not going to go along, um, with all of Obama's best laid plans, um, especially in 5:54 places like the Middle East, um, where he inherited a war in Iraq and he inherited, you know, a whole host of other issues that were, uh, unresolved and that were still developing and then of course, you know, the, the instability and the protests of the Arab uprisings in twenty eleven. 6:12 Um, I don't think naive, uh, I just think that, you know, the, the, the, these were some of the criticisms, criticisms of Obama that for all of his, his rhetoric and appeal as a, as a statesman and as a sort of symbol, um, for sort of the, 6:29 you know, highest American ideals in terms of reaching out and working with other countries and, and sort of being a, a, a partner to the world, um, that is good, but the world is, is messier than that. 6:42 So I think that, uh, and I think that Obama came around to understanding that if you, if you read, you know, the in-depth interviews that he gave later in his presidency. 6:52 Um, I also think that there is this tension with him where his speeches and his rhetoric and the, and the, the persona that he had in public was one thing, but then all of the closest political reporting, and some of this has more to do with U.S. 7:06 domestic politics, but I still think it, it, it impacts his foreign policy, that he was very pragmatic on many policy platforms, and he wasn't, you know, a, a left Democrat on a lot of issues. 7:17 He was actually very, uh, middle of the road on a lot of things. He was just able to package and sell things very effectively. 7:24 He also made it clear that for a lot of people, not just Americans, but Europeans and, and others, it mattered what the American president said and how he said it, uh, as much as what he, what he did. 7:36 Um, Obama had unpopular policies. He didn't interf- in, you know... They didn't defend more forcefully, for example, the rights of Iranians to protest in the Green Movement. Obviously, though, how much was the U.S. 7:47 really going to do? But I think that in those instances, they still tried to establish a sort of moral authority, um, in terms of saying that they were, they were supporting de- demonstrators. 7:58 Um, I think I, I remember even there were, these were sort of early days of Twitter, but, um, the State Department directed Twitter to, uh, you know, basically make it easier for Iranians to continue to, to use the social network in Iran despite government crackdowns. 8:14 So I think there's this tension of, of, um, the things Obama says and then, and then what his policies actually were, and that there was increasingly a, a, a sort of disconnect there. 8:24 And I, I think, uh, I think for, for me, you put your finger on a real turning point, uh, for Obama's foreign policy and the outcomes in some ways, which is the Arab uprisings of two thousand eleven. 8:37 Before we get to that, though, I want to sort of go back again to the beginning, um, because again, he takes office, it's, it's not even the aftermath really yet of the global financial crisis. 8:49 Uh, literally as, uh, as he gets handed the keys to the car, uh, he's told that it's missing three wheels and the engine's about to fall out. 8:57 Um, there's also, uh, it seems, uh, like a while since we've, uh, read about this, uh, sort of theme in global affairs, but, uh, at the time he takes office, uh, it's the time of the rise of the rest, right? 9:10 America's decline and Asia's, uh, Asia, the Asian century, um, China's rise, uh, even the Global South, Brazil. 9:20 Uh, Africa is now no longer a, a story of, uh, of quagmire and, and political crisis, but it's actually an economic opportunity. 9:29 Um, and so he, he, he takes office at this time, uh, where it becomes clear f- uh, again, from the war in Iraq, uh, that American military power isn't the only solution to solving crises, uh, that America not only needs the world to manage something as big as stabilizing a single country, but actually just can no longer actually impose its will to whatever extent it ever could on the world, and now needs to 9:58 not only, uh, downsize its role, but in-invite other countries, uh, developing, emerging economies, uh, as well as European allies, for instance, to take a greater role in stabilizing the Mediterranean basin and North Africa, for instance, play a bigger role in Afghanistan for the NATO allies, things like that. 10:17 But also, uh, reforming, uh, the institutions of global governance, whether it's the UN Security Council or the World Bank and the IMF. Uh, so again, getting back to this moment where he takes office, uh, the U.S. 10:30 economy is, is, uh, is, uh, about to... Uh, the U.S. economy is, is really at, at existential risk. There's a, uh, the rest of the world that's rising. 10:40 Does he have another choice besides trying to, uh, sort of embrace these global shifts head-on and make room for these other countries, uh, or could he have realistically tried to assert American primacy and hold on to America's advantage? 10:56 I think that he couldn't have because there were too many problems to deal with immediately, especially at home with the, the economy, and that didn't just impact the United States, obviously. Um, 11:10 and I, I, I think, you know, in the... It's easy for all of us to not necessarily forget, but, you know, the, the, the, you know, 11:20 staring into the abyss basically of, of what was going to happen if the economy, um, continued to go the way it, it, it, it was going. 11:27 And, and, you know, there were mistakes or things that Obama could have done in terms of the U.S., um, domestically in terms of dealing with a financial crisis. But I think that he... 11:37 It was basically full-on damage control from day one, and that that sort of precludes, um, other steps he could have made. 11:46 I mean, I think that just the fact alone that, that he, that they aggressively did all the things they did in terms of the stimulus package and, you know, all the things with troubled assets and b- and the, and the massive bailouts, that, uh, 12:00 that was on top of the agenda, and there, and there wasn't really at the time, um, I don't think, you know- m- a, a moment to think of, of an alternative strategy in terms of foreign policy. 12:12 I mean, and, uh, I think that once that was dealt with, um, Obama obviously then turned to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and tried to follow through on 12:22 what he had campaigned on in terms of winding down those wars, in terms of treating, um, you know, working with the Iraqi government in a way that the Bush administration hadn't. 12:31 But also in, in both of those situations, y- you know, the outcome was a little bit predetermined because the Bush administration had sort of set the terms of, um, US forces in Iraq right before they left. 12:41 And, and same with Afghanistan, you know, Obama ended up going through this back and forth about 12:47 how much of a troop surge to actually have there, and it was a, you know, contest with the Pentagon over, over, you know, the shape of the war there. 12:56 And so I think that, um, it's hard for me to, to think of alternative ways that he could have or should have gone, just given all of the challenges he had to deal with from day one. 13:06 In the early part of his administration, there's a... It's sort of a mixed bag in terms of the results. 13:10 As I mentioned, I think the Russia reset, at least for his first term, is really, uh, underappreciated in terms of how much he got out of Russia in terms of, uh, supply route access to Afghanistan, uh, the nuclear arms control deal, uh, diplomatic support on, uh, negotiating with Iran, uh, f- over Iran's nuclear program. 13:33 Uh, so there's that as a, a success. 13:36 Uh, on other chapters, the, the, the outcomes are a little less, uh, satisfying, whether it's the Copenhagen deal, uh, the, again, the, the, the long delay in actually opening diplomatic channels with Iran. Um, and 13:54 over the course of the first term, and more pronounced in the second term, we see what, uh, what a number of, uh, analysts and commentators have talked about, the, the, the return of geopolitics, so that 14:09 while Obama's using this rhetoric of a multipolar world that's, that's working cooperatively, uh, and that is, uh, reinforcing a rules-based system, uh, with norms, uh, of economic liberalism and hopefully political liberalism. 14:27 Uh, at the same time, you have China flexing its muscles a little more in, in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. 14:33 Russia, over the course of the second term, becomes a lot more of an adversary, uh, and, uh, relations become a little more tense. And yet, at the same time, there's the success of the Iran deal. 14:44 There's the success of the climate change agreement in Paris. There's the success, uh, i- to my lights, of the, uh, of the process of normalization with Cuba and relations with Latin America more generally. 14:58 Um, so again, this question, was he, uh, was he a sort of weak multilateralist who got, uh, uh, who got, uh, outfoxed and outplayed by the, the sort of hard strategy of, of Moscow and Beijing, or is it more of a mixed bag? 15:14 Is it, uh, uh, is, is M- are Moscow and Beijing perhaps, uh, in a shortsighted and, uh, and self-destructive, uh, policy course? 15:24 Uh, again, the question of how you judge the outcomes, uh, the, the, really depends on, uh, on what lens you're looking at. Yeah. 15:35 I, I, I would say it's more of a mixed bag and also that the, the return of geopolitics and, and a lot of the challenges that were, 15:44 you know, filling up Obama's second term, um, in a lot of ways sort of prove the point of his foreign policy, which is that the world will act outside of American dictates and American interests. 15:57 Um, the wo- the, the US can no longer, you know, police everything, nor can they, um, you know, set the terms of every debate and every conflict, um, especially after eight years of the Bush administration. 16:10 And I think that, uh, you know, Russia's, you know, em- reemergence as a, as a power, especially in Europe and now more so in the Middle East and Syria, um, Obama had little... 16:24 I think that had little to do with Obama's foreign policy one way or, or another. 16:27 Um, Obama could've s- could've changed tact and, and, you know, privileged a more US-led, um, international system, and I think Russia would've responded even, even more harshly. 16:38 Um, I mean, there's, there's one view obviously that Putin is, is, is responding, um, Putin's various policies, whether it's Ukraine, um, or, or, or other actions, um, are partly a response to NATO expansion. 16:49 Um, and again, you know, that NATO expansion has, has continued, y- you know, despite Obama's, um, rhetoric about wanting to work more closely with Russia or, or wanna have a reset. So I... 17:02 The picture is, is a little, uh, mixed as well. Um, and, and I, I would say the same with China. You know, the, 17:09 a lot of the Chinese foreign policy moves that we're seeing are, uh, if, you know, according to lots of observers, including contributors to WPR, you know, this is partly a domestic story for China. 17:20 It's, it's responding to a slowing down economy. Um, there's not much of... 17:25 You know, there's, there's very little space for dissent within China, but when the economy slows down, the, you know, the, the Communist Party's, uh, legitimacy, there's questions about, um, their, their standing with, with their own people and, and so, you know, 17:39 lashing out abroad or, maybe lashing out is too har- too harsh of a term, but acting out abroad, preserving their interests abroad, um, is a, uh, many countries have done that in the past when, um, faced with problems at home. 17:51 And I think that that was, th- tho- that again is independent of whatever Obama's foreign policy could have been. 17:57 Um, the only other thing I'd add, you know, uh, since we're sort of transitioning to the second term now, is that I th- I, I forgot to mention that, that, you know, a lot of his first term in the Middle East as well was really taken up by trying to, um, resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, and there was a lot of political capital and a lot of time spent 18:16 On trying to s-, you know, set a new agenda in terms of how the US dealt with Israel. 18:21 Obama's administration was more critical than administrations had been in, in the past, although not that different if you go back far enough, farther enough to, you know, the George H.W. Bush administration. 18:33 Um, things they said were very similar to things that Obama said in terms of criticizing settlements. 18:38 But, uh, I was just remembering how much o- how much oxygen that seemed to take up foreign policy-wise, um, Obama's sort of long-running feud with Netanyahu and really they had, they, at the end of the day, Washington had nothing to show for it except a bruised relationship. 18:54 Right. Which sort of reinforces the image in the broader Middle East of, uh, of, uh, the United States unable really to, to, uh, to face down Israel in terms of, uh, the Israel-Palestine peace process. 19:09 Um, I, I think, uh, before jumping fully into that, I wanna backtrack just a bit to the, to the, the Arab uprisings. 19:18 Um, because for me that is a turning point in the sense of, uh, this question of did Obama overlearn the lessons of Iraq? 19:28 Uh, did he overlearn the lessons of the kind of situation the US was in when he entered office so that three years later, uh, with the, the, the troop presence in Iraq wound down, uh, Afghanistan on the way down, um, uh, and this wave of uprisings across the Arab world, and he's still somewhat reluctant to take a more active interventionist approach, for instance, in Libya, uh, the famous lead from behind even if the US was very much a part of the coalition and s- and provided critical military capabilities, uh, that intervened in Libya to bring down Muammar Gaddafi. 20:10 Um, in terms of the aftermath, there's a real reluctance to get involved in terms of nation building. 20:17 Uh, again, it's important to remember that the Libyan factions on the ground did not welcome that and actually did not want it. Um, but at the same time, 20:26 there's this possibility that Obama, uh, overlearned the initial lessons of his presidency. 20:32 Uh, there's also this very clear, uh, escalation adverse approach, uh, to confrontation, whether it's with, uh, Russia over Ukraine or in Syria. 20:45 Not necessarily criticizing that because, uh, as I mentioned last week, I tended to support the resistance or the opposition to escalation in each case. 20:54 Um, but on the one hand, uh, you have this take on Obama that he was, he showed a sort of inaction or a, a too much of a hesitance to act. 21:07 At the same time, uh, when I wrote that particular criticism in a column, I was taken to task by Daniel Larison, who's a very sharp and astute, uh, observer and critic, um, and much more a, a classical conservative in terms of, uh, in terms of, uh, non-interventionism. 21:26 And, and he said that, uh, he said it's, it's hard to, to, to perceive Obama as an inactive president given the amount of, uh, wars that he entered, whether it was Libya, uh, drone warfare, uh, things of that nature. 21:43 There's also the whole, uh, NSA issue in terms of, uh, some of the, the surveillance, uh, activities. 21:50 Uh, so is this image of Obama as a, an inactive president or a hands-off president or a president reluctant to inter-intervene, is that accurate? Is it inaccurate? 22:01 Uh, you mentioned that he did one thing and said another, uh, as all presidents will do, but where, where do you come down in terms of assessing, uh, the kind of presidency Obama h-had? 22:14 Was it an interventionist presidency or a non-interventionist? Uh, I think it was, it was both at different times and, and, um, and sometimes it was a gray area in between. 22:25 Um, I mean, they obviously interv- interventionist in crises like Libya, but, um, they didn't wanna give the appearance that the United States was, was leading this even though, you know, the military, uh, operation was almost exclusively, um, United States. 22:42 I mean, there was some token involvement of Arab League countries, um, and, and some, and you have, uh, France and, and Britain, which were really the main forces pushing the NATO intervention. Um, 22:53 and, and, you know, in, in Syria, which we'll, I'm sure, get to in some more detail, you know, Obama did not directly intervene, but there's been various levels of training programs for Syrian rebel groups. 23:06 Um, there's been, you know, intervention behind the, not behind the scenes, but, but below the surface. 23:11 Um, the kind of intervention that I think is designed to still try to in, in some way shape the outcome there, but also avoid the direct risks of, um, being fully responsible for, you know, fixing Syria in, in, in the way that, that, that they were always worried that they were gonna get drawn into another war in Iraq. 23:31 Um, and then more recently, avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. Um, I, and I think that that, you could apply that to lots of places. I mean, I, when I think about the Arab, Arab uprisings 23:43 in Egypt, arguably Obama's sort of strongest, um, intervention in some ways, although it was not a military intervention, was calling for Hosni Mubarak to go and that, you know, 23:55 from the Saudi perspective, the US, that was the US abandoning a longstanding ally. Um, and I don't think that was the only factor that forced Mubarak to go. 24:04 There were lots of domestic forces in Egypt that made it very clear that, you know, Mubarak had to resign. Um, but that was h- that was hugely important when Obama did that. 24:14 Um, the US then didn't Try to shape the political outcome in, in Egypt very much. 24:19 Um, and I think that that's part of the, part of the sort of contradiction and challenge, uh, of assessing Obama's legacy, that he would do certain things that fit hi- that fit, you know, the, the doctrine such as it existed. 24:32 Um, and then at the risk of want- not wanting to appear too meddlesome or too interventionist, they then would step back. 24:39 Um, and Egypt's a different situation obviously, 'cause this, this wasn't a war, it wasn't a, a, a conflict where the US was gonna shape the outcome, um, m- through, you know, hard f- forces. 24:50 The, the, you know, this was... This could've been more direct civil society engagement. 24:53 This could've been more pressure on the Egyptian military and the, and the government, um, in terms of pressuring, um, the tr- you know, to, to respond to certain, uh, demands during the various stages of Egypt's transition. 25:06 But I think that that's, that to me sort of illustrates the, the dichotomy of, of Obama's policy, that they did in fact do something very consequential, but then they didn't really follow up. 25:16 Um, and I think Syria as well, they called for Assad to go, and they said he was illegitimate, but they didn't do enough to then follow up on that. 25:24 And there's some claims also, uh, I'm not sure I share this, uh, this criticism, but that the, the pivot to Asia, for instance, underwhelmed as well, um, in the sense of, uh, not necessarily reassuring American allies to the degree necessary that America was really willing to stand up to China in the event that push came to shove. 25:47 Um, now, uh, I think we're very clearly moving into the second administration now. Um, and it seems to me that again, uh, we have these turning points. 25:57 Uh, y- we have the killing of Osama Bin Laden, which seems to be, um, a sort of mission accomplished moment in the fight against terrorism. 26:04 You have the Arab uprisings, which at the beginning seem like a very hopeful moment. Um, and then before long, uh, 26:13 th- there are new developments, uh, that just keep seeming to catch up to any kind of victory lap that O- Obama might take, whether it's the emergence of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, um, the, the, the real disappointments from the Arab uprisings, the, the move towards strongman rule in Egypt, for instance, the bloody civil war in Syria. 26:36 And for me, I think that the, the impression that I get of Obama in the second term is that it's almost this disgust with the world, this sense of, "Wait, I, I was, I was taking everyone seriously, uh, and expecting that people would have the same sense of self-interest, uh, that to avoid this ki- these kinds of conflicts, to avoid these kind of zero-sum games," uh, and yet the, the response seems to be consistently, uh, although not exclusively, uh, that, uh, people are pushing the limits of what they can get. 27:09 They're, they're engaging in these geo- geopolitical rivalries and standoffs. 27:14 Um, and, and this sense of a, a real sort of disappointment with American allies, whether it be Saudi Arabia, uh, Israel, uh, Europe seems disappointing in some ways because of, uh, some of the economic policies and their inability, the European powers, to, to really pull their weight in terms of, uh, helping to stabilize the Mediterranean region. 27:37 Um, and there's almost this sense of, uh, of Obama s- um, not necessarily throwing in the towel, but being really disgusted with, with the response to what he's offered. 27:48 Um, and that sort of raises the criticism, uh, that I've seen as well, that he really just expected everyone to see the world the way he did, and that it's not realistic to expect, for instance, the Russian president, uh, to, to see the world from an American president's point of view. 28:07 That for a Russian president, uh, securing the, the near abroad and, uh, and reestablishing Russian influence in the world is the primary priority. Uh, and, and that he'll do it in whatever way he can. 28:21 And for, for China as well, this sense of being, feeling contained by the, the pivot to Asia, uh, will lead to, uh, pushing back against it and really trying to test the limits. 28:32 Um, so there is, similar to what you mentioned last week, this sense that, you know, the world gets a say, and the world's say on what Obama was offering was not necessarily, uh, enthusiastic. Uh, in some cases it was. 28:46 The, the climate change agreement, there was su- the successful diplomacy on Iran. 28:50 But in other cases, uh, it seems like Obama leaves office, uh, with the world in a, in a state of flux and, uh, not necessarily, uh, conflict or crisis, uh, although obviously there's Syria, but a sense of uncertainty that, that has a, a lot to do with his successor, but also has to do with some of these, uh, unresolved issues when he leaves off- office. 29:12 Yeah, the world, uh, definitely pushed back, and I think that a, a, a large, um, central element of Obama's thinking about the world and the foreign policy that he tried to, uh, pursue, um... 29:27 You know, there's a lot of talk about, like, ab- about the United States acting historically, you know, since World War II, uh, with enlightened self-interest, um, that it was in the US's interest to support things like the United Nations. 29:38 Um, and I think that Obama had, in some ways, sort of projected that on other countries, that, that whether it was Russia or Saudi Arabia or, or whomever, or I- Iran even, that it was in some countries that they could also act out of their own enlightened self-interest if it meant going along with, you know, the i- the, the fundamentals of, of, um, a multilateral world, the kinds of things that we've been discussing that Obama clearly privileged. 30:03 And I think the problem is a lot of countries acted out of self-interest, and it wasn't necessarily very enlightened. 30:08 And, you know, Russia pursued all of the things that Russia experts and longtime observers said it wanted to pursue and wanted to reestablish in terms of its near abroad, so-called, um, its influence in, in Eastern Europe, um, in, in former Soviet states. 30:25 Um, you know, taking the longer view, that shouldn't have been much of a surprise, uh, necessarily. Um, and- And even if Russia would go along with certain measures, um, 30:37 and certain, you know, goals of Obama's, most of all the Iran deal, um, it didn't mean Russia would also pursue many of its own things for its own direct self-interest, um, even if it undermined Obama's own plans. 30:49 In other words, uh, the logic of Obama's approach is that if everyone agrees to not pursue maximal objectives, then we can all have a better outcome. 31:01 Uh, and, and he tried to, uh, to, to put that into, to implement that. Uh, and, uh, essentially the response was, "Well, that's great. We'll take what you offer, and then we'll still try to get the maximal objective." 31:16 Um, so a-again, it, it, it sort of comes out, comes down to this question of, uh, how, how you judge, uh, his legacy, uh, depends on, uh, w-what lens you use. 31:29 Uh, do, do you feel more strongly that America should not be, have soldiers on the ground in Syria, or do you feel like, uh, the drone warfare program is a horrible human rights, uh, offense and should be stopped immediately? 31:47 Uh, do you feel that America is the i-indispensable nation that always has to bang its fist on the table and, and try to impose outcomes, or do you feel like a multilateral world or multipolar world is inevitable, uh, and that the, the sooner that America sort of makes room for it, the better? 32:04 Uh, I th- I, I think, uh, that's just about all the time we have. 32:08 Uh, just to put you on the spot, in, in the end analysis, as you look back on Obama's eight years, the full eight years in office, do you consider him a successful foreign policy president? 32:20 I think he was successful in many of the things that he set out to do, um, in terms of, you know, the things that we've talked about, transitioning to a more open and cooperative world. 32:32 Um, I also think that sort of at the end of the day, in, in answering that question and also just in, in looking at the sort of full 32:40 scope of, of his au- of, of his administration and of his foreign policy and of the actual, you know, ev-events around the world, um, it showed that it, in, in response to the various hypothetical questions that you were posing in terms of how you look at Obama and, and where you come down on certain issues, all those points tend to be very black and white, and I think that Obama showed that it, it very often is necessary to operate much more in a gray area, um, and that it isn't... 33:08 I know to, to critics, that often seems like he's contradicting himself or he's not following through on his promises, um, but I think that that's just the reality, um, of international affairs and especially the US's place in it currently, that, uh, nothing is, is very black and white. 33:24 And that to me is, is, is the great fear going forward, is that the current President Trump sees the world in black and white, um, not, uh, totally dissimilarly from the Bush administration, and that was really what brought us into Iraq, was a very black and white view of the world. 33:40 The, the, to me, there's also the, the, the question of, or the, the, the factor that most of the most damning, uh, criticisms of Obama, uh, are based on counterfactuals that can't really be proven. 33:54 Uh, for instance, uh, the idea that a, a more robust and early intervention in Syria, Syria might have prevented the kind of, uh, humanitarian tragedy that we've seen now, uh, that there was a way to stabilize Libya, for instance, um, that China would not be as aggressive in the South China Sea if there were a more muscular American response in some way. 34:18 All of these are f-counterfactuals that, again, the, the adversary gets a say in geopolitics, so there's no way of, of knowing for sure whether, uh, whether it was Obama to blame or whether his policies might have avoided even, uh, worse outcomes. 34:33 I think if I had to say, uh, answer my own question, I, I'd agree with you. 34:38 I think overall he's a successful foreign policy president, uh, in terms of restoring America's standing and reputation, in terms of avoiding major mistakes. 34:48 Um, some of the biggest mistakes he made were to declare too early in Syria, for instance, and I think you put your finger on another one, which is not necessarily following up as robustly as he might have. 35:00 But I'll add this, uh, whatever mistakes he made were mistakes that I would have made myself because, uh, overall, over the course of his presidency, I found, I found myself in agreement, uh, with him more often than not, and his instincts, uh, were often the same, uh, that I had in terms of my own reactions to various events. 35:22 Um, so there you have it. Uh, a very complicated presidency to assess because it seems like it was, uh, two or three presidencies in one in terms of the events that, that transpired. 35:36 Yeah, I think the, uh, you, you look at the stages and it's just trying to com-compartmentalize different, uh, moments of his presidency. 35:45 Well, I think we could go on for hours, but, uh, let's, uh, let's wrap it up there. Thanks a lot, Freddy. Thanks, Judah. 35:52 If you like what you hear on Trendlines, go ahead and subscribe to it in the podcast app of your choice. That will save you the trouble of downloading each new episode. Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Dury. 36:03 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 36:12 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines. [upbeat music]
