Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:13 Peter Dury is on vacation this week and next, so instead of the normal podcast format, I'll be joined by WPR senior editor Freddie Dechnatel for two special editions in which we'll take a more detailed look at the foreign policy legacy of former U.S. 0:28 President Barack Obama. This week, we'll look at some of the particular successes and failures of Obama's foreign policy over the eight years he was in office. 0:37 Next, we'll look at the various ways of trying to assess his overall performance in the international arena and how the prism that is used influences the conclusions that are drawn. 0:47 Both discussions will supplement this month's special report, which collects a sample of WPR coverage of Obama's foreign policy from over the course of his presidency. Hi, Freddie. How you doing today? Hey, Judah. 0:59 I'm doing well. How are you? I'm feeling great. So we touched on this topic, uh, a few weeks ago in the podcast, and I think both of us felt that the amount of time we had to discuss it just didn't really do it justice. 1:12 Uh, and so given that, uh, we have, uh, this, uh, this special edition format, uh, to take a more detailed look at a topic, um, uh, I thought that, uh, uh, Barack Obama's foreign policy legacy was the obvious choice. Um, 1:29 to kick off the discussion, I thought we could start with, uh, very, any clear successes, uh, that you can identify in his foreign policy. Um, anything come to mind immediately? 1:42 Um, two, and I think going chronologically, the first would be restoring American credibility abroad. Um, and that was the first thing he did when he came into office after eight years of George W. 1:53 Bush and it's sort of easy to forget that now, but I think that was a huge success right away. And then carrying on from that, um, privileging, uh, partnerships around the world and pr- privileging working 2:07 w- with countries, um, and as you've written and, and as other people have written on, on WPR, sort of seeing the transition to a multipolar world, and that, that covered a lot of bases. 2:18 So that's sort of my, my, my quick answer, which we can get into later 'cause I think there's several aspects to that. Yeah, absolutely. 2:25 And I think it also touches on s- things we'll talk about, uh, next week, uh, because it, it sort of, uh, 2:34 i- i- it reflects the ways in which the world is just so dramatically different now than in the early days of, uh, Obama's presidency. 2:42 And so what we're judging and, and the, the standards we're using to judge it by have, have shifted dramatically. 2:49 Um, I, I guess I would be, uh, a little more specific or, or maybe take what you just said and, and dial it in a little more. 2:57 Um, and I think for me the, uh, the, the major foreign policy success, um, would be the Iran nuclear deal. 3:08 Now, it's a, it's a controversial deal in the sense that, uh, some of its critics believe that, uh, that the terms are a little lenient in the long term, uh, for Iran and that, uh, when the deal does, uh, end or the, the, the period that the deal covers comes to an end, uh, Iran will be in a, a strengthened position to pursue, for instance, nuclear weapons with its, uh, with its, uh, uh, nuclear program. 3:35 Uh, for me though, the deal is a, a very clear success in the sense that it as, as a non-proliferation deal, uh, it essentially closed the pathways to a, a Iranian nuclear weapon. 3:48 Uh, it's puts into place the kind of oversight, uh, by the, uh, the International Atomic Energy Agency, uh, to essentially foreclose the possibility of Iran, uh, developing a nuclear weapon over the course of the deal and afterward. 4:06 Um, and it did all of that through a very stubborn and tenacious diplomatic, multilateral diplomatic effort, um, that required the cooperation of Russia and China, among others. 4:18 It required the, the, the contribution from the European Union and European powers. 4:24 Um, and it wasn't, uh, it was not a guaranteed deal in the sense that it was a priority from the early days of the administration and it took, uh, almost the entire course of, uh, of his two terms to finally open the door to achieving it and then nailing it into place. 4:40 Um, and it, and, and finally and most importantly, uh, it really does foreclose for now, uh, the possibility of an armed conflict between the U.S. 4:49 and Iran or Israel and Iran for that matter, uh, to try to forcibly put an end to the, to the, uh, Iranian nuclear program. 4:58 So for me, that's really the, the crown jewel of the eight, eight years of, uh, of Obama's foreign policy. 5:05 Yeah, I think that's, uh, I generally would agree and I, and I think that we'll see the, the payoff of it hopefully as long as the deal stays in the coming years, staving off, um, you know, a, a nuclear arms race in the region. 5:19 Um, and I, and I just would add that I think that the, the Iran deal i- i- is a great combination in a lot of ways of, uh, what, what I was mentioning about Obama's key success of, of working with allies and, and privileging multilateralism. 5:33 As you said, that was a key, you know, part of the Iran deal. 5:37 But at the same time, i- as you mentioned too, it's, it was also an arms control treaty and it was in a lot of ways similar to arms control treaties that Ronald Reagan negotiated with the Soviet Union in the '80s. 5:48 Um, and so it, it, in, in a lot of ways it, you know, represented, uh, sort of longstanding U.S. 5:53 interests in terms of how you deal with, um, issues like nuclear, uh, arms, nuclear proliferation, um, but it still represented, you know, some of the broader ideals of Obama's foreign policy. 6:05 Uh, another deal, uh, that reflects that, um, that we've covered, uh, pretty thoroughly, uh, at WPR is the Paris Climate Change Agreement, which again contrasted very sharply with the initial efforts by the Obama administration in 2009 in Copenhagen to, uh, to create a, a global consensus. 6:28 Um, and, uh, toward the end of his presidency, he manages to convince, uh, China to take a little more active role, India as well to, uh, to, to, to, uh, uh, put an end to some of its, uh, obstructionism in the negotiations. 6:45 And finally, they walk away with a, with a successful consensus, even if it's not, uh, uh, necessarily binding, uh, a binding treaty. Yeah. I think that the, 6:59 you know, the, the progress made between Copenhagen when Obama came into office and then the Paris deal just before he le- or, you know, in, in, in leading up to his final year in office, and then as well the deal that, um, the US made with China directly on, you know, um, goals to reduce emissions. 7:18 Um, these are the kinds of things that not only are not going to be clearly on the agenda of the new President Trump, but, uh, are the kind of things that for a very long time US presidents, you know, you go back to the Bush era and the Kyoto Protocol that was, you know, on the table for so long and the US never, never signed on to. 7:36 Um, Obama really got over the, uh, got over the hurdles, um, of getting the US to be part of huge international climate agreements. And, uh, 7:47 another individual or particular success, uh, I'd, I'd put it in the success column, is the normalization of, uh, relations with Cuba or the process of normalization. It's obviously, uh, not set in stone. 8:03 Again, this, uh, this effort by Obama to sort of liquidate non-performing assets, if you'd like, uh, in the US diplomatic portfolio. 8:14 Um, so taking this Cold War-era policy of embargo and isolation of Cuba, which had really hampered, uh, uh, America's ability to, um, play an active role in today's contemporary Latin America. 8:30 Um, and turning the page on that, uh, historically, uh, in a, in a pretty courageous way because, uh, when he announces the deal, it's still not terribly clear, uh, whether or not it, it will have a lasting impact on, um, on the Democratic Party's electoral chances in Florida, for instance, uh, among the v- the very strong Cuban American, uh, community there. 8:56 Um, and then pursuing the, the negotiations with Cuba to the best of his ability to, to try to advance it as much as possible to, to make it a, a, a permanent fixture. 9:08 Uh, he didn't quite get to the permanent stage, but, uh, there's a lot of progress that's been made that would be difficult to overturn, uh, without a very compelling reason. And I think that, um, you know, 9:21 that just goes back as well to the, to the Iran deal in, in, in a way of, of Obama breaking sort of longstanding, um, positions that seemed like they couldn't be, uh, tested very much in Washington, that there were sort of official or unofficial barriers to longstanding issues, whether it was Cuba and the embargo or 9:41 less long, but, but, but, but still, um, over the last several years, if not more, you know, dealing with Iran, uh, diplomatically. 9:49 And, and then I guess more broadly on this theme of, uh, of, uh, multilateral diplomacy, uh, and restoring America's standing and reputation and credibility after the, the damage done by the Iraq invasion and also some of the, uh, some of the excesses of the war on terrorism, uh, there's the, uh, the, the G20 global management of the financial crisis in which, uh, the United States played a leading role. 10:20 And it also sort of accent- accentuates this overriding theme of his presidency, which is, uh, that the United States can lead, uh, in a way that also makes room for some of the emerging powers in the world, uh, to lead as well. 10:37 Um, the idea being that the United States, uh, doesn't have the resources to play the same sort of role that it has, uh, historically. 10:45 Uh, and so in pulling back will leave some sort of pockets, uh, or some, uh, uh, some sort of vacuum, and that, that vacuum needs to be filled by responsible actors and, and responsible global citizens. 10:58 Um, I guess maybe unless you have any more particular successes, this might be a good time to transition into some of the p- the, the ways in which, uh, the, the intentions might not have, uh, been, uh, it might not have led to such successful outcomes. 11:16 Sure. Yeah. 11:16 Well, a- actually in, in mentioning the, you know, allowing other, other countries to take the lead on certain things, um, there w- that was positive in some ways, but i- immediately I think about Libya and that was A, you know, one of the criticisms, um, lobbed at Obama for supporting the NATO intervention, um, which was largely, you know, backstopped by the United States militarily, um, that, that Obama was allowing France and Britain to take the lead there. 11:44 Um, obviously given everything that happened in Libya, um, sort of everyone is, is, um, assigned equal blame I think for, um, the disaster that, that happened there. 11:55 I, you know, specifically toppling Gaddafi and then not wanting to shepherd a, an actual political transition there. 12:02 But I think that, you know, th- that plays into, for me, you know, this is the first and again very broad area, uh, I think of Obama's foreign policy failures in the Middle East and I think that starts with Libya 12:15 It also starts with, um, the promises that he made s- in that address that he gave in Cairo in 2009, signaling, um, you know, that US policy in the Middle East would change, whether that was pressuring Israel, um, to stop its settlement building activity and to, and, you know, suggesting that the United States would be a more honest broker in the Israel-Palestine conflict, um, that the US would defend human rights more in the region. 12:42 Uh, there were a lot of promises made in that speech. I remember watching it from Damascus, actually, uh, where I was living at the time, and it, it felt, you know, like a huge 12:53 sort of groundswell moment, um, that finally we had a president who was speaking more honestly about the United States' role in the region, um, and changes that would come. Um, I think especially after, you know, 13:05 eight years of George W. Bush and the long, still, at the time, still going on war in Iraq, um, it's, it's still hard to s- to sort of overstate, uh, how important that seemed. 13:17 And obviously, many of those promises w-were left unfulfilled. Um, I think in, in Obama's defense, you know, 13:26 between the war in Syria, um, and all of the unrest from the Arab uprisings in 2011, uh, we can get into why those promises were not kept. Um, but I would, I would... 13:39 You know, it's, it's a large subject, but I would say the Middle East, uh, represents his, his biggest foreign policy failure. 13:45 In various different ways, um, there's this sense that there were good intentions that led to bad outcomes. 13:52 Um, uh, f- Syria is obviously, I think that the, the area or the issue or the tragedy that will really most dog Obama's legacy, uh, in the short term and in the long term, um, because of the humanitarian tragedy that it's become, uh, and also the catastrophe it's become in terms of the, the refugee crisis in Europe, uh, the, the ways in which it's, uh, sort of impacted, uh, popular opinion in the West due to the terrorism of, of ISIS, for instance. 14:28 Um, in, in Obama's defense, it's hard to see, uh, any of the coun- counterfactuals that are often sort of thrown at him as, uh, uh, to criticize, uh, his real reticence and reluctance to get directly involved, uh, in fighting on the ground. 14:46 Um, and, and yet, at the same time, uh, I find myself personally in the position of s- really agreeing with him step by step along the way, um, and yet being so very dissatisfied with the outcome. 15:03 Uh, and it, Syria, I think, also really very clearly illustrates the unintended consequences and the unexpected, uh, effects of this idea that the US will pull back on, uh, being the first one in, uh, the s- the sort of first responder to global crisis in the sense that what we now see is a, a, a peace process that, uh, might not have very ma- much chance of success but is being led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran. 15:33 Um, and being led by those three countries after an offensive in Aleppo, uh, that violated a lot of the norms of, uh, of, uh, of warfare and, and, uh, and the conscience of, of the, the Western world, um, and the, the world in general. 15:52 Uh, so there you have this, this, this clear illustration of, of the fact that, uh, y- when the US pulls back, it's not necessarily going to be, uh, responsible glo- global actors that will fill the vacuum. 16:07 Uh, in fact, the vacuum might not be filled, and it might lead to this, this sort of, uh, persistent conflict and, and instability. Yeah. I think on, on Syria especially, um, 16:20 on the one hand, y- I think Obama did have the right intentions and, and the people in, in his administration had the right idea of limiting the US involvement, because if they had m- been more directly involved, either in, with an intervention of some kind or with more direct support for Syrian rebels, that they would have effectively, uh, been responsible for whatever outcome in Syria, and that was not gonna happen, um, after the disaster in Iraq. 16:50 Um, but I also think that arguably their biggest mistake, uh, early on was, and many people were, made the same mistake as well, you know, in, in their defense, but saying right away that Assad is going to go, that Assad must go, and the rhetoric was that he is illegitimate and that not only will he go soon, believing that the protesters would, would oust him, but also that he should go, and then there was very little backup, uh, for that rhetoric. 17:16 And so, that created a position where the United States was saying one thing but then really not doing very much to see that happen. 17:23 Obviously, you know, to say Obama didn't intervene or that the US didn't intervene in Syria isn't true. 17:28 They have been involved in various ways in, in backing rebel groups, so I think that the US role in Syria is, and Obama's role that he committed the United States to there is, is more, uh, consequential than, than often gets, uh, gets covered. 17:43 But, but nonetheless, I think that this created this problem of, of saying one thing and then not backing it up enough. 17:50 And so, inevitably, people were, on either side, were going to be disappointed, whether that was Syrians who wanted to oust Assad or Americans who wanted to see Obama defend certain ideals or intervene on humanitarian grounds. 18:04 Uh, he was sort of bound to, to disappoint. 18:08 Uh, another, another area where we see this, uh, this contrast between stated intentions, uh, that seem very sound strategically and logically, uh, and less than satisfying outcomes has to do with China and Asia in general, where the administration in the first term announces, uh, uh, an Asia, Asia pivot, which is then retermed a Asia rebalance. 18:35 Um, and, uh, clearly it's, uh, in response to China's rise in the region. Uh, the idea seems very sound that the U.S. 18:44 is spending an inordinate amount of resources, uh, monitoring and policing the Middle East, uh, when in fact the real center of, uh, strategic evolution in the world over, over the short to medium term is going to be in Asia. 19:00 Um, and so there's this, uh, very well thought out, it seems, pivot, uh, that immediately China takes as a, a, a new form of containment. Um, it seems somewhat successful in the, in, in the early years. 19:16 There's, uh, new relationships with India, new relations, relationship with Vietnam. 19:21 Uh, the Philippines very actively, uh, seeks American protection in some of its disputes with, uh, China, particularly over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 19:32 Uh, the Japan alliance is solidified, South Korea as well, um, Australia. 19:38 And so there's this steady stream of really good news, and yet at the end of his administration, uh, China has unveiled a, a sort of more aggressive policy in the South China Sea. 19:50 They've reclaimed various, uh, islets and rock outcroppings and turned them into, uh, new islands that, uh, man, man-made, human-made islands, uh, that they've now installed, uh, air defenses on and, uh, that can be used for, uh, military aircraft. 20:07 Um, and a s- a real sort of reemergence of geopolitical rivalry, not only with, with Russia, but with, with China, um, in a way that, uh, really undermines the declared, uh, goal, which was, uh, just show America's commitment to the region so that China has every incentive to engage, uh, with the international rules-based system and not try to undermine it or, uh, and run around it. 20:37 Uh, so once again, this, uh, the, this very, uh, defensible logic, uh, that I support each step of the way, and yet at the, [chuckles] at the end of the day, uh, we're in a situation where there's pretty high tension with China that is even being exacerbated by the incoming administration. 20:54 Yeah, I mean, for me, the problem with the pivot and, and, or the rebalance to Asia is, is not, you know, the, a lack of commitment or thought through strategy on, on Obama's part. 21:07 If anything, you know, he's done exactly what he said he would do in terms of extending, um, more support, whether that was economic or, or, or military to, you know, traditional U.S. 21:19 allies in the, in, in the region, and then also reaching out and deepening ties with newer ones like Vietnam. Um, and as we've noted on the site in a couple pieces, uh, recently, really sort of the failures or the, 21:36 um, lack of deliverables on the, on the pivot sort of in my mind are more a consequence of China and the, and the fact of who is the U.S. competing with. 21:45 Um, and, and for a lot of countries in the region, especially in Southeast Asia, they don't necessarily want to be forced to pick one side or another. Um, the U.S. 21:54 obviously has been the historic, uh, you know, since World War II, um, you know, the, the power in, in the region, and obviously China is the emerging power and wants to... 22:04 And there's a, you know, contest for in- for influence, uh, in the region. And I, and I think understandably a lot of countries want to balance that and, and, you know, maintain ties with both the U.S. 22:14 and China, not move too closely to one or the other, and I think that that is what you're seeing. Um, obviously the South China Sea tensions, um, 22:27 are another, you know, wrinkle to, to this that you couldn't, you know, when Obama came into office, um, that wasn't obviously, uh, a problem to deal with. 22:37 Um, but I also think some of that stuff's out of his, out of his hands in his defense as well because you're sort of seeing a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy in part to respond to, uh, domestic tension or domestic issues, um, a slowing down economy, um, Chinese leadership perhaps, you know, 22:55 uh, wanting to shore up nationalist sentiment at home, um, sort of looking abroad s- in, in, in order to compensate for, uh, economic, uh, s- you know, at, at least an economic cool down at home, which, um, was inevitable after so much growth. 23:12 And at the same time, in Obama's defense, there were some positive outcomes with the China, the relationship with China, uh, notably the climate change agreement. 23:22 Um, there was a sort of amicable settlement of, uh, Chinese industrial espiona- espionage, uh, through the intervention of Obama with Chinese President Xi Jinping. 23:34 Um, and so, uh, and China participated very productively on the Iran deal. Um, so a- a- and, and, and also stepped up a little bit more with regard to sanctions on North Korea. So a- again, it's not all one or the other. 23:50 Um, there were some, uh, some successes to the policy. It's just this sense that it, it leaves sort of a, a, a bitter taste in the mouth when, uh, when you look at the, the situation now as opposed to eight years ago. 24:04 Um, I guess two, the two other areas that I think we should cover before we, we wrap up, uh, would be, uh, Latin America, uh, and obviously Russia. 24:16 Um, for me, I think the big criticism o- of Obama in Latin America in terms of policy there, again, kind of grows out of this very smart and strategically sound good intention, which is that, uh, for too long, America's been s- a, a, a loud voice in the room, uh, particularly with regard to Cuba and, uh, various human rights planks that, uh- 24:40 ... haven't necessarily been, uh, credible or consistent with regard to America's historical, uh, involvement in the region. 24:48 Uh, and so Obama has this really smart approach to, you know, just try to let Latin American countries, uh, decide for themselves what's best for Latin America. 24:58 Uh, at the time he takes office, Brazil is in a good position to lead. Mexico is doing very well. Uh, the entire region is prospering. 25:06 Um, and, uh, and there's this real ideological sort of, uh, standoff with Venezuela and some of the leftist countries there that over time begins to, uh, settle in the US' favor. 25:18 Um, but what ends up happening is this, this sort of slide in terms of n- democratic norms and standards, part of... 25:26 partly because the, the US doesn't want to be too vocal about criticizing some of the, the, uh, the sort of constitutional slides towards authoritarianism in Venezuela and Ecuador, Bolivia. 25:38 Um, uh, and, and so here again, you have this, uh, sound approach, a, a, a smart strategy that has payoffs in terms of, uh, America's standing in the region, but in terms of, uh, some of the more troubling aspects of, uh, or developments over the course of, uh, the last few years in particular, uh, leaves a little bit to be desired. 26:00 Yeah. 26:01 I think ev- you could have wanted a more, uh, engaged US policy, whether in defense of, um, democratic norms in places like Venezuela or support, uh, whether that was, you know, political or, or, or more economic, um, or just p- you know, purely through, you know, s- soft power like trade ties with countries like Brazil that have been enduring, um, you know, a, a massive economic crisis after looking like, you know, it was going to be the next, um, hot ec- economy, uh, you know, around the world. 26:37 And I, and I, you know, I think that, um, again, some of these things are, are independent of, of policy made in Washington. 26:43 But I think certainly in Latin America, um, when you see also, you know, growing China ties with Central American countries, for example, um, areas that historically have really been America's backyard, um, I don't think that the US should be preventing countries, obviously, like China or, or whoever from establishing their own ties i- in Central and Latin and, and South America. 27:06 But, um, there is the question of, uh, you know, is that coming at the expense of, of US involvement. And then, uh, I guess finally, we can take a look at Russia and maybe in the context of Europe. 27:21 Uh, four years ago, Mitt Romney famously declared that Russia was the biggest threat to the United States, and he was pretty roundly ridiculed, ridiculed for, for it. 27:33 Um, I don't necessarily think that Russia is a threat to the US in the, in the sort of classical, uh, sense, but clearly, uh, has emerged, uh, as the sort of, uh, 27:48 primary gadfly and, uh, and foil for American, uh, leadership in the Middle East right now, in Europe, uh, definitely posing problems. 27:58 Um, and, you know, again, Obama starts out his administration with the Russia reset, which did get quite a few deliverables, uh, in terms of the Afghanistan war effort, uh, the Iran deal, uh, things like that. 28:12 But, uh, clearly there's a, there's a real troubling aspect to, uh, the Russia's emergence as the, uh, the, the sort of primary American adversary right now. Right. 28:23 And I think that, you know, the, however Russia in- interfered in, in the US election, um, you know, through a disinformation campaign and, and presumably, uh, helping, uh, leak information related just to the Democratic Party, you know, I, there's an, there's one view, and I don't know f- how much I fully agree with it, that, you know, Russia was emboldened to do that, um, in part because of some of Obama's policies, um, or rather they felt that maybe they could get away with it. 28:53 To, to be more direct, becau- uh, a lot of people blame Obama for being weak with regard to Putin. Um, is that something that you agree with? 29:01 Uh, again, I'm, I sort of fa- find myself falling on both sides here because I think that, uh, you know, if you look at, at US support to NATO, for example, you can't say that Obama's been weak there. 29:12 You know, they've been, um, hugely supportive of NATO reinforcing, you know, uh, the Baltic countries, uh, militarily. I don't think that stands up. I also... 29:23 But on the flip side, obviously, uh, you know, Obama, uh, I think h- his natural tendency is to want to work with countries, whether they are, whether they see eye to eye or whether they are, you know, something approaching an adversary, um, or, or are strictly an adversary. 29:43 Um, and I think that, you know, that is, that was evident in Syria, as we've mentioned, um, in the past. Um, but especially, you know, Obama's inclination was not to, um, necessarily be a hawk on, on Russia. 29:57 Um, but I think that Obama's reticence to, to be more hawkish, um, may have, you know, opened up, uh, the possibility for the meddling that happened. I mean, certainly Putin will do what... 30:11 I mean, he, he's certainly going to be emboldened to do, uh, whatever he wants to do. Um, we obviously saw that in, in Ukraine as well. 30:19 I, I think for me, the, the big problem, and we'll talk about this more next week when we, when we talk about the various ways to assess Oba- Obama's, uh, performance and, and legacy. 30:30 The big problem for me is, uh, is really this sense that he has a very clear-sighted and, uh, profound understanding of, uh, global evolutions, of power shifts, of, uh, geopolitics, a very clear understanding of America's residing and persistent power, but also its relative, uh, relatively declining influence. 31:00 Uh, and with regard to Russia, for instance, in Ukraine, he understood very clearly that, uh, the Russians had, uh, escalation dominance. It's right next door. 31:09 Uh, it's a very central national interest, uh, and it's very peripheral to the US. 31:14 So in some ways, uh, I think the big mistake in Ukraine was picking the fight to begin with, um, when it was very clearly something that the Russians would take more seriously than, than the, than the US would. 31:26 Um, and, and yet that same sort of clear-sighted understanding of international affairs that he has, I think might not s- have served him terribly well as a practitioner, uh, because he really 31:43 had, uh, what amounts to a sort of, uh, averse, uh, uh... He, he, he, he had a real sort of escalation-averse approach. Uh, anytime that things got to a sort of confrontation, 31:56 uh, he preferred to, uh, play the clock, essentially, turn towards sanctions, things like that. 32:03 Um, I think it's a smart move in the sense that the US remains the most powerful nation on Earth with, uh, many instruments of power in its arsenal that other countries just don't have. 32:14 And at the same time, there, there, there's a certain point where, uh, if the adversary gains enough tactical advantage, it can sort of shift the strategic balance a little bit. 32:25 Um, it remains to be seen whether that's the case with Russia or with China, for that matter. Um, and I do think that there's something very, uh, persistent about American power. 32:36 It's very sustainable, uh, in, in ways that, that forgive, uh, errors, tactical errors, for instance. 32:44 Um, but again, I think that Russia in general, in particular, and some of the other topics we discussed, uh, point to the difficulty, uh, of assessing Obama, which we'll get to again, as I said, next week. 32:56 But the intentions for me are always good. They, they generally correspond to my way of assessing things and, and thinking about the world. 33:03 Um, and so I'm confronted with the, the fact that, uh, this, this, uh, sympathetic approach, uh, had outcomes that cl- very clearly are, uh, unsatisfying in a variety of ways, notwithstanding the very real successes, uh, that he accomplished, um, and in, in the particular instances we mentioned, but also in that overriding aspect that you opened, uh, our discussion out with, the, the, the reestablishment of American, uh, America's standing in the world, uh, as a, a global actor that follows the rules that it's hel- helped set and, and backstop over the course of the, the past 70 years. 33:47 Yeah. The only thing I would add is, you know, the, the problem with, with good intentions is the, you know, the people that you're dealing with don't always share them. 33:54 And I think that, uh, from Russia to China, um, w- is a hallmark of the Obama foreign policy. And again, that's, that's, you know, some of that is out of his hands. Um, Putin doesn't share his, his view of the world. 34:09 Um, it doesn't mean that Obama was wrong to want to try to deal with people like Putin, um, you know, diplomatically and, and in, you know, with the right intentions, as you mentioned. Yes. 34:22 The, the, the adversary gets a say in, in, in war and geopolitics. 34:27 And, uh, I think we'll have a little more to talk about, uh, with that, uh, in that regard, uh, when we look next week at, uh, some of the ways of, of coming to an overall assessment, not just of, uh, particular successes and failures of Obama's foreign policy, but the overall, uh, legacy that he'll leave behind. 34:48 I think that just about wraps it up for this week. Uh, thanks a lot, Freddy. Thanks, Judah. If you like what you hear on "Trendlines," go ahead and subscribe to it in the podcast app of your choice. 34:58 That will save you the trouble of downloading each new episode. "Trendlines" is produced and edited by Peter Dury. 35:04 You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 35:13 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of "Trendlines." [upbeat music]
