Transcript 0:05 Welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. My name is Peter Durrie. 0:12 We are joined later by Nicholas Gvosdev of the US Naval War College to discuss Russia's diplomatic charm offensive targeted at Southeast Asian countries. 0:23 But first, I'm joined as always by WPR's Judah Grunstein for this week's briefing on world affairs. S- so Judah, what was WPR up to this week? 0:32 Well, William LeoGrande wrote a briefing for us about a problem facing the normalization of US-Cuba ties. 0:40 Um, as part of m- efforts by the Obama administration to loosen the embargo to the extent that it can without congressional legislation, it announced regulatory reforms in December 2014 0:55 that were meant to allow US banks to process international transactions between Cuba and non- non-US parties. 1:03 This impacts most transactions that are conducted in dollars, which have to be cleared through US banks regardless of whether or not a, one of the parties is American. 1:14 Previously, US banks as well as international banks with US branches or subsidiaries were prohibited from processing these transactions, uh, in, in order to constrain Cuba's ability to engage in international trade and receive foreign investment. 1:31 I- in his briefing, Bill enumerates the numerous times in the past that banks were forced to pay heavy fines and penalties for violating the prohibitions that were in place, whether or not the infractions were intentional or unintentional. 1:45 And the problem, as he points out now, is that even though the new regulations have rem- removed the prohibition, 1:53 banks are still leery of engaging in these tra- transactions because of their past experience with these fines that they've paid. 2:01 Um, it's, it's a similar problem to what's being encountered by Iran, uh, in the context of the lifting of international sanctions after the nuclear deal, uh, complicated in Iran's case by still being on the list of state sponsors of terror. 2:18 Cuba was recently removed from that list. 2:22 Um, but, but as Bill points out, economic engagement with Cuba was a central component of the logic of normalizing ties, and it was meant really to function as the most effective agent of change within Cuba for the United States. 2:38 Uh, so, so now the banks' reluct- reluctance to follow through puts that in jeopardy, and a- as someone quoted in the briefing puts it, it, it shows that it's, it's easier to impose sanctions than it is to remove them. 2:52 I, I think it's a, it's a very telling, uh, story about the, uh, power that the US has, uh, because it's such a important cornerstone of the, uh, of, of the world market in many pla- in, in many, uh, many respects. 3:05 Yes, it's, it's one of the privileges of being the, the, the global superpower, not just in terms of military, uh, power, but as well, as you say, in terms of influence on the international fin- financial system. 3:20 Uh, one, one sort of broader point about being able to cover this, because WPR isn't a breaking news outlet, and we're not, uh, pinned to the, the current news cycle, 3:34 it allows us to revisit things and follow up on, on news that has, is no longer in the spotlight, but, uh, recent developments or lack of developments in this case, uh, make it newsworthy so, or, or worth paying attention to. 3:50 So that's just sort of a broader, uh, take in terms of how WPR covers, uh, these sorts of stories. 3:58 We're able to look at things that are further off on the horizon because we think they're important or to circle back and follow up on things that were in the spotlight, in this case, for instance, uh, when, uh, President Obama was in Cuba, uh, but that have since fallen off the radar. 4:15 Yeah, and another story that we had, uh, also, uh, fits quite nicely into the, into the approach, uh, by WPR. 4:21 You had a good column by Richard Gowan, um, on Africa's counterterrorism growth industry or, uh, approach, and, uh, that was, uh, so that is, that is a topic that I also look at quite intensive- intensely, uh, in my writing and my work, and I think that Richard has really hit the nail on the head here, um, because he, he, uh, summarizes that currently all the security approaches that, uh, have to do with Africa concentrate almost exclusively on the question of Islamic terror- Islamist terrorism in, uh, parts of the African continent. 4:58 So, uh, obviously that has garnered headlines the world round, uh, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, uh, which has had a few high, very high-profile attacks in the Sahel area, Boko Haram in, in Nigeria and neighboring countries, the president of the Islamic State in Libya, and so on. 5:15 And, uh, Richard details really, uh, really well how, uh, this has pushed, uh, s- uh, supporters or partners like the US to engage with regimes, uh, like, uh, for example, Chad or some questionable elements of the Nigerian, uh, administrations over the time, uh, engage with these partners in, in an effort to curb int- uh, terrorism, uh, but ignoring, uh, the more thorny, uh, aspects of, uh, political reconciliation and the resolution of conflicts, uh, with the danger of essentially, uh, making these conflicts, uh, drag on indefinitely without any solution. 5:56 Yes, and, and, and Richard addresses two, two issues that are, that are salient here, one of which you, you, you've just mentioned The eternal compromise between security and stability on one hand, and political liberali- re- liberalism on the other, and the question of what makes, uh, what makes a country or a region more secure. 6:20 Is it, uh, this, this security first approach, or is it, uh, the ability to actually change governments to have good, uh, non-corrupt governance and to make sure that grievances are addressed? 6:34 The other thing that he addresses, which I think gets less attention because it's a little wonky, but it's actually pretty important, is the question of the multiplicity of actors 6:46 and the wide range of regional and international organizations as well as bilateral relationships that are involved in, in countering this threat, which is a, a real threat, um, and at the same time, uh, can often be used, whether intentionally or unintentionally, or can function, uh, to obscure other things that are as important, if not more important. 7:11 Uh, the, the, the range of actors in some ways is an advantage in that it allows 7:18 more, a wider range of approaches or a wider range of solutions, especially with some Western countries being a little overstretched right now. 7:27 But it can also create a good deal of confusion in terms of, uh, in terms of addressing, uh, what, what is, uh, a, a region-wide threat with particularities in each particular territory. 7:40 Boko Haram is not the same thing as, uh, as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is not the same thing as Al-Shabaab, even if they share certain similarities. Definitely. 7:50 So a, a very good look at that and highly, highly recommendable. And you had another column, uh, by Ellen Lepson, one of your, uh, regular contributors. 7:59 Yes, Ellen wrote her column this week on the broader implications of, uh, a recent New York Times Magazine profile of Ben Rhodes. 8:09 Now, Rhodes, uh, for anyone who isn't familiar with him, is a speechwriter and senior foreign policy advisor to President Obama. 8:17 His official title is Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, which is, uh, a long way of saying he handles the administration's foreign policy messaging and PR campaigns. 8:29 The profile caused controversy for several reasons, one of which had to do with its portrayal of how Rhodes supposedly manipulated the new information landscape, uh, including social media, but also sympathetic journalists and think tank analysts, to sell the Iran nuclear deal to Congress and the American public. 8:49 Uh, it, it's not exactly clear to what degree that portrayal is the author's rendering and to what degree it's, it's based on Rhodes' possibly too forthright, uh, description of how he operated. 9:03 W- Ellen dials in on, on the, on the broader problem, which is the problem of spin. Uh, it's not a new one, and it extends beyond the particular case of the Iran nuclear deal. 9:15 And she looks at the very real challenges that are faced by private citizens as they seek to navigate what she calls the hybrid information landscape. 9:25 Uh, and, and one of the, the fault lines in particular that she, that she pointed out and that resi- resonated for me as the editor of a, a international affairs journal, is this question of people in the information business wearing a multitude of hats. 9:42 So a reporter who is also providing analysis and opinion journalism, or a think tank analyst who is also a policy advocate and former government official at times. 9:53 Uh, it's, it's not as sinister as perhaps what the, the profile, the Rhodes profile 10:00 makes it out to be, uh, in the sense that for the most part, these people are sincere and, and, uh, are able to separate, um, their, their different functions. 10:12 And for instance, uh, f- a, a think tank analyst is not necessarily, uh, uh, embracing a certain point of view because the m- the, the administration, because that's the administration's policy, uh, but is more supporting the administration's policy because they s- that's the sincere outcome of their analysis. 10:32 Uh, at the same time, uh, that it really does pose a real challenge, uh, and because it calls into question, especially in the current context of a very polarized, uh, 10:46 public discourse, it calls into question the old adage that everyone is ti- entitled to their own opinions, but not their own facts. 10:54 And it seems like increasingly everyone, uh, especially the two sides of these bitter policy debates, often have their own, their own facts, uh, that they're deploying, uh, to support their positions. 11:06 And for people, for, for private citizens who are not i- involved in the policy sphere or in the information business, it creates a real challenge, uh, to, in terms of w- their, their trust and, and their ability to access information without the fear that it's being spun or, or doctored or framed or filtered in a way to manipulate, manipulate their opinion. 11:33 Uh, oftentimes in politics now, that is the case. Uh, ob- obviously information... Governments use information, uh, or manage it and, and manipulate it to sway public opinion. 11:46 That's been the case for, obviously, a long time. Uh, but with these new, uh, these new relationships, uh, it really does present, uh, real challenges. Very interesting stuff again this week. 11:58 Thank you so much for joining me, Judah. Thank you. It's been a great pleasure as always. 12:02 [outro jingle]Russia's relationship with Western countries is strained, to say the least, so it isn't surprising that the Kremlin is looking for new partners elsewhere. 12:13 But as Nicholas Gvosdev points out in a recent piece for World Politics Review, Putin's hedge against the West actually predates the Ukraine crisis. 12:22 Join us for this week's report on Russia's courtship of the ASEAN country block. [Instrumental music] I am Nicholas Gvosdev. I am the Jerome E. 12:33 Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the US Naval War College, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. 12:43 Traditionally, Russia has always sought to orient itself towards Europe, towards integrating itself economically and politically with the countries of the European Union, 12:56 most notably with the very effective partnership between Russia and Germany. However, a number of years ago, as relations began to sour between Russia and the West, the Russians decided, 13:13 similarly to the United States, to have a pivot to the Asia-Pacific, that the Asia-Pacific region is the rising economic engine of the world economy. 13:26 It is increasingly, uh, a global power center, and it was important for Russia not to have most of its eggs in the European basket. 13:36 So this was a rationale even before the crisis in Ukraine broke out, even before, uh, you had some of the issues that have really interrupted connections between Russia and the countries of Europe, and certainly between Russia and the United States, to begin looking eastward for alternate markets, new partners, uh, new sources of investment. 14:00 The Russians, of course, primary partner in Asia has been China, but there are also concerns that Russia not go from the frying pan to the fire, which is that Russia could easily be swamped, uh, by the size of the Chinese economy. 14:16 It could easily become, uh, a junior partner, uh, to Beijing, and so there was also a sense that Russia would need to have diversified relationships in Asia, that it could not just simply be a partnership between Russia and China. 14:31 Uh, the Russians have cultivated the Japanese, uh, but have had some issues because, first, of the ongoing territorial disputes, uh, from World War II o- over the Kuril Islands, which have, uh, limited the extent to which Japan can partner with Russia, as well as, uh, Japan's membership in the Group of Seven, the G7 nations, which usually puts it in alignment with European and American policy. 14:59 Uh, it has reached out to Korea. It has reached out to, uh, India, obviously, has a very long-established partnership with India. 15:07 Uh, but in those relationships as well, uh, in many cases, we've hit as far as those relationships can go. The Russian-Indian relationship doesn't have much more room in which it can grow. 15:20 So that only left the countries of Southeast Asia as the largest, i- in a, in a sense, untapped market, uh, for Russia, the, the area where Russia could have the most growth in Asia, where it could develop new partnerships and really begin, uh, to try to find alternates, uh, for itself economically and politically as the relationship with the European Union, uh, and the countries of the West has faltered. 15:47 So 15:48 after sanctions began on Russia because of the crisis in Crimea and then because of the, uh, fighting in Ukraine, uh, after some of the, uh, pipeline projects that were supposed to bring Russian energy into Europe faltered, first the South Stream, then the Turkish Stream project, uh, as sanctions were placed on Russia's ability to gain technology and capital from European markets, 16:15 this led, uh, both the Russian government but also the Russian business establishment to look much more closely at the countries of Southeast Asia, the ASEAN countries, uh, as potential replacements or at least as, uh, alternates for Russia. 16:32 And so you've had this effort culminating in the summit, which just took place in Sochi, uh, to try to bring 16:40 Russia's relationship with Southeast Asia to a new level of development, uh, in the hopes that this can help to give Russia new options, uh, as the relationship with the West appears to be, uh, standing still. 16:55 [Instrumental music] Russia has said the leaders will discuss new mechanisms of cooperation on security, renewable energy resources, and education. 17:06 Now, the main working session will be held on Friday, and talks will focus on economic ties and Russia's export potential. 17:13 Before the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral meetings with some of the ASEAN leaders. [Instrumental music] The purpose of the summit in Sochi 17:26 was to signify, first to the world, that Russia is not as diplomatically isolated, particularly as the Obama administration likes to claim, that, uh, 17:38 world leaders and important world organizations are still coming to Russia, still having meetings, uh, still connecting with the Kremlin. 17:47 So it, it served that purpose admirably to have, uh, the summit of all of the leaders of Southeast Asia in Sochi to meet with, uh, President Putin, Prime Minister Medvedev, and leading representatives of the Russian government and business communities. 18:07 Beyond that, it was also symbolically important because ASEAN had had a summit, uh, earlier, uh, with the United States at Sunnylands, uh, where all the ASEAN leaders traveled to the United States to meet with President Obama. 18:21 So from the Russian perspective, uh, there's a certain degree of diplomatic symmetry, uh, that ASEAN went to the United States to meet with, uh, President Obama. ASEAN comes to Sochi to meet with President Putin. 18:35 So in those symbolic senses, the summit was a success. 18:39 What the summit was also intending to do is to allow the Russians to play catch-up, in that they have not forged over the years as many of the close personal political relationships with the leaderships of the ASEAN countries as has the United States, as has China, as has Japan, as has India, uh, even to some extent the countries of the European Union. 19:05 Uh, so it was important for the ASEAN countries, uh, and their leaders coming to Russia to feel that Russia, that the top Russian leadership was invested in this relationship. 19:16 Uh, and it- that was also achieved at this summit. 19:20 The task going forward, of course, is whether or not the momentum from Sochi continues, which means that it puts some, a degree of pressure on the Russian side to show that it is committed to this relationship. 19:34 It can't just be that Putin went to Sochi, had these meetings, goes back to Moscow, and then forgets about ASEAN, uh, and says, "Well, I've done what I needed to do, and therefore there's nothing else that needs to occur." 19:48 Uh, over the next six months to a year, the follow-ups will be critically important. Uh, do the Russians continue the outreach? Do they continue to show that they have an interest in ASEAN? 20:01 Do they continue to show that the agreements-- And there were some modest agreements. Nothing major came out of the Sochi Summit. 20:08 No earth-shattering economic deals, no, uh, major, uh, reorientation of energy projects or the like, but you did have some, uh, modest, uh, agreements for infrastructure, energy, trying to increase, uh, business ties. 20:24 Uh, but the ASEAN countries are going to look now to the extent to which the Russians move to quickly fulfill these commitments and show that they're interested in expanding the relationship. 20:35 And that means personal investment, and it means that, uh, the Russian president, the Russian foreign minister, the Russian prime minister have to be, uh, directly involved. 20:45 They can't delegate this down, uh, to lower echelons in the Russian government, uh, as in the past, where that's where the ASEAN relationship, uh, was being conducted, if they want this relationship to move forward. 20:59 The Russians did also, uh, appeal to ASEAN in the sense that ASEAN sees itself as a bloc that, uh, is one of the poles of power in the international system, that on its own, none of the countries of ASEAN, certainly none of the smaller countries of ASEAN, are, are world players. 21:18 When ASEAN bands together, however, uh, it becomes a factor in world affairs. 21:24 Uh, the Russians are, are cultivating ASEAN because neither ASEAN nor Russia look very kindly on a global system predicated on the big two or the big three, that somehow China, the United States, and the European Union really are the three major actors in setting the global agenda. 21:46 Uh, the Russians are appealing to ASEAN, saying, "We have a vision of a more multipolar system, uh, one where you would have a role to play, where Russia still has a role to play, uh, where India has a role to play. 21:59 And so for all of us to work together, uh, to ensure that our voices are heard, uh, as agenda setters at the international table, uh, that it's important for us to be there and for us to work together to ensure that that is, that's in place." 22:16 Uh, this idea of a free trade arrangement between the Eurasian Economic Union and ASEAN appeals to ASEAN's sense of wanting to deal with different regional blocs, and the idea that if ASEAN and the Eurasian Union, uh, could create a larger free trade association in Asia, uh, that does not bypass China, does not bypass the other major Asian players, w- would give both the Eurasian Union countries and the ASEAN countries some greater heft, some greater ability to balance against the big players. 22:52 Uh, that is of interest to the ASEAN countries. But again, it comes back to the follow-up. Uh, great talk in Sochi. 22:59 The question is what happens in terms of beginning to go- to negotiate the follow-up arrangements, and particularly whether, uh, Prime Minister Medvedev is going to invest the time and energy, uh, to really keep this discussion between Russia and ASEAN going at, at the highest of levels. 23:17 [upbeat music] To upgrade their Asian air forces, Indonesia and Vietnam are planning to buy Sukhoi Su fighter planes. Thailand wants to buy Russian tanks after United States limited arms sales following the coup in 2014. 23:34 No sanctions, low cost, and decent quality are the main appeal of Russian weaponry. 23:43 Certainly, Russia is looking to continue its preexisting relations with the ASEAN countries that had been part of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. So Cambodia, Vietnam to begin with. 23:56 Uh, you certainly have good relations, uh, between Russia and Vietnam, both in the security field and in the economic field. 24:04 Uh, the Russians are well aware, though, that there's competition, and- President, uh, Barack Obama announcing that the United States is lifting, uh, its ban on selling, uh, weapons to Vietnam, uh, is an important, uh, challenge to the Russians because in the past, the Russians have had very close security cooperation with Vietnam. 24:25 Now, uh, the Vietnamese may be more interested, uh, in being able to see what they can obtain from the United States in terms of advanced military equipment and technology. 24:36 So the Russians will want to make sure that they don't lose any ground that they've, uh, already gained, uh, in its, in their relations, particularly with Vietnam. 24:44 With other countries in the region, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, uh, as the, as kind of the, the, the big players in ASEAN, uh, the Russians are making some of the same moves that they've done with India, with South Africa, with Brazil, which is to say you are emerging powers, you are emerging, developing, developed powers looking to play, uh, a greater role on the global stage. 25:10 This means having some of the attributes, uh, of a more, uh, uh, great power. 25:17 Uh, that is in areas where Russia has always traditionally been more willing to sell technology and transfer technology than, uh, the countries of the West have been, particularly in more sensitive areas such as military technology, uh, nuclear power, uh, space technology. 25:35 So the Russians, I think, will try to tempt some of the other countries, uh, in, uh, ASEAN, uh, that Russia can be a provider of goods and services, uh, that they would like that may not be as forthcoming from some of the other, uh, trade partners, uh, that they have. 25:53 Uh, Russia, of course, is looking to reorient some of its, uh, sales of raw materials as well, uh, from, uh, markets where there have been declines. 26:04 Uh, obviously, there's concern that as the Southern Energy Corridor develops in Europe, uh, and some other projects develop in Europe, Europe may have slightly less demand for Russian energy. 26:15 So the, uh, Russians have made a commitment, uh, that they will look for ways to be able to send more energy, uh, to a growing Southeast Asian market, uh, to work, uh, in terms of l- liquified natural gas, uh, sending oil, working with the state oil companies in Malaysia and Indonesia, uh, both in their countries and perhaps giving them access to lucrative projects inside of, uh, Russia that then can be used to supply, uh, them with, with energy. 26:46 Uh, and, uh, so you, you have some of those relationships. For the Southeast Asian countries, obviously, uh, the ability to, to send goods and services to Russia. 26:56 Um, their ability, uh, particularly Singapore as one of the nodes of the global financial system to the extent that, uh, New York is less hospitable to Russian interests, that London, uh, increasingly may be less hospitable, uh, particularly as sanctions continue. 27:15 Uh, Singapore may, uh, become more important as a way for which, uh, Russian companies can access, uh, global capital markets, and so Singapore can position itself, uh, as an alternate to Russia, uh, as a way to, to access, uh, these international networks. 27:33 Uh, so you definitely have, uh, these bilateral relationships, uh, that can potentially shape up as well. Uh, but again, I think it, one of the things it comes back to is you have at Sochi a good start on paper. 27:47 All the right things were said, but it's going to be a question of the follow-through, whether or not the Russians will invest the time, energy and effort, uh, and will make offers that are, are lucrative to, uh, the ASEAN countries. 28:02 Uh, because right now, uh, the ASEAN states, of course, have other options. They, they can continue to work with the United States. They can continue, uh, their trading relationships with China and India and Japan. 28:13 Uh, ASEAN can continue to forge its institutional relationship with the European Union. So, uh, it's not as if the Russians, uh, present to the ASEAN countries things that they can't get from anywhere else. 28:27 It's a question of whether or not the Russians choose to, to build up on this relationship. Russia's working from a somewhat lower starting point than, say, the United States or China. 28:39 Uh, Russian trade is, with these countries, has traditionally been modest. It's not been insignificant, but it ha-- ASEAN states are not the top trading partners of Russia. 28:49 Russia's not one of the top trading partners of ASEAN states. Uh, there was a decline in twenty thirteen and twenty fourteen. You had, uh, some slight declines in trading volumes. 29:01 Things are up this year, uh, in twenty sixteen. There has been, uh, uh, a real surge of growth forward. 29:08 The Russians are making the claim that trade is up by about twenty percent with the, the, uh, states of the, uh, ASEAN, uh, community. 29:17 Uh, but of course, that still starts from a relatively low level, uh, and therefore, uh, while it sounds impressive, uh, we do have to keep some of those statistics in mind that Russia's not starting from a particularly lucrative position to begin with. 29:33 But what matters for both of these country, for, sorry, for Russia on the one hand, and, and the Eurasian Union as a whole, and for the ASEAN states on the other hand, is that unlike Russia's relations and unlike ASEAN's relationships with other states, these, these are completely-- There's a lot of greenfield territory here. 29:51 Uh, there's a lot of room for expansion and growth of projects, uh, to move forward, and that's where I think you may see a cert-- Again, if both sets of partners are willing to, to invest some of the time and effort in this, you could see a more dynamic breakout in the next few years because really the relationship has nowhere to go but up. 30:12 And these are new markets for ASEAN. These are new markets for Russia. 30:17 And so therefore, uh, there could be some real significant areas of growth, uh, over the next few years, uh, if both sides would, would want to invest in it. 30:27 And then of course, what that means is it does help both sets of partners leverage against their other existing partners. 30:35 Uh, for Russia, if Russia can get, and you know, some of the interesting things at Sochi was the first time you've really heard talks about not simply swaps in oil markets, uh, which is an esta- established practice, but swaps in natural gas markets. 30:51 That is, that Russia, uh, might work with other suppliers of natural gas that may be closer to, uh, the ASEAN countries in order to, to kind of do swap deals with them, uh, I guess to allow these other countries to then have greater access to the European market. 31:07 But some of it is, is the, is the search now for Russia trying to find alternatives so that in the next few years, Europe will still obviously remain Russia's greatest trading partner. 31:18 That's not going to change, but the percentages may shift. 31:21 And Russia's, uh, dependence on European suppliers for goods and services may decline a certain extent if, uh, ASEAN states and other Asian countries for that matter, bringing in Korea and some of the other, uh, Asian industrial powers, uh, you may see a shift in that direction, which would allow Russia to better balance its, uh, its own economic needs and not be as vulnerable as it has been, as certainly as, as it has been over the last few years to Western sanctions being able to disrupt parts of its economy. 31:56 So I think that's something that we're going to see as we keep moving forward. 32:00 And again, again, going back for ASEAN, ASEAN likes the idea, uh, when we look at ASEAN foreign, uh, policy and we look at its economic relations, they very much believe in more diversification. 32:12 The more partners, the better. Uh, the more, uh, countries that are tied in with ASEAN, the better, uh, because that also shields ASEAN against any disruption. 32:23 It shields them against, uh, China from being too overbearing. 32:27 It shields them from what they've experienced at times in the past where the United States gets a bit distracted or loses interest in, in Southeast Asia for a while. 32:38 And so having Russia more firmly integrated into the Southeast Asian political and economic networks just gives them a bit more breathing room, uh, against some of their o- other partners. 32:52 Many thanks to Nicholas for sharing these insights. Make sure to check out his in-depth look at this issue for WPR with Putin's ASEAN outreach, Russia sets sights on Southeast Asia on worldpoliticsreview.com. 33:09 If you haven't done so already, you can subscribe to the World Politics Review newsletter on worldpoliticsreview.com and to this podcast in iTunes or a podcast app of your choice. 33:21 Trendlines is produced and edited by me, Peter Durie. 33:25 You can follow me and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 33:34 Have a fantastic weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines. [outro jingle]
