Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hi, everybody, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. 0:16 I'm Judah Grunstein, WPR's editor-in-chief. 0:19 Before we get started on today's interview, just a quick reminder that you can subscribe to Trendlines on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or the podcast app of your choice, and you can find links to do so at worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast. 0:34 Throughout Donald Trump's presidency, a recurring theme among the Washington foreign policy establishment was how to repair the damage he was doing to America's global standing. 0:45 For many, particularly among the centrist current of the Democratic Party, that meant restoring the traditional approach to American foreign policy that Trump consistently undermined during his four years in office. 0:57 But among some figures on the party's more progressive left wing, returning to the status quo ante is insufficient. 1:05 People like Representatives Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib, and Ro Khanna, as well as Senator Bernie Sanders, began expanding the range of policy discussions and debates in an attempt to advance a progressive foreign policy agenda. 1:20 When Joe Biden won the presidential election last November, there was some question over whether this progressive agenda would be reflected in his foreign policy appointments. 1:30 For now, it seems the Biden administration has opted for a relatively centrist establishment team, but the push for a progressive US foreign policy agenda isn't going anywhere. If anything, it's gathering strength. 1:44 In today's Trendlines interview, I'm joined by Matt Duss, foreign policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders, and albeit many years ago, a WPR contributor. Matt, thanks so much for joining us on Trendlines. 1:56 Glad to be here. Thanks, Judah. 1:58 Uh, you know, it occurred to me, uh, after I'd framed this entire interview around the idea of a progressive foreign policy, uh, that I should actually start by, by asking you, is progressive the right word, or is there some other, uh, framework or, or terminology that you prefer to use when, when discussing, uh, your foreign policy views? 2:20 No, I think progressive, uh, is just a, a fine word. I mean, there, obviously, there's different... 2:26 People define these things in different ways, but I think it matters, okay, what, what do you, what do you fill that term with? 2:31 And I think just stepping back and understanding what we mean by progressive is obviously a, a, a key p- part of understanding that. 2:38 And, uh, at this point, there are, there are a number of figures in Washington right now, um, and I'm thinking of people like, uh, Representatives Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib, as well as, uh, the, the man you advise, Bernie Sanders, um, who are, are expressing, uh, alternative and progressive foreign policy ideas. 3:00 Is there any conscious effort right now to try to articulate, uh, some sort of common platform or shared views that, that could serve as the basis of that, or is it still sort of emerging, uh, y- from the various perspectives? 3:16 No, I would say over the past few years, um, we've d- we've seen a much more, I think, energetic effort to really articulate what a progressive foreign policy means. 3:25 You, you have the leaders you mentioned, my boss, um, Congresswoman Omar and Tlaib, but I would also mention here, um, Congressman Ro Khanna, who I think has been a, a major voice, uh, for this, uh, in the House, um, Congressman Mark Pocan, a number of others. 3:40 But there's also, and this is really important, I think there is a, a, a coalition of groups, you know, grassroots organization, advocacy organizations, um, who are all, who are doing a lot of work on this, who have actually been doing an enormous amount of work going back many years, groups like Win Without War, group, groups about, group, you know, groups like MoveOn, um, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, just to name a few, um, who've been tr- working to define and push a progressive vision of foreign policy, um, not just producing these ideas, but also rooting them in grassroots movements. 4:16 And I think that is where, I think that's what's, that's a very key part of this. It's not something that's just being kind of cooked up in Washington at think tanks. 4:24 It's something that is, that is deeply rooted in Americans' experience, um, in, in connecting it to their, to their, to their actual lives. 4:33 So, so let's get into what a progressive foreign policy looks like for you, and, and, uh, I'm assuming you're speaking for yourself, uh, and not, uh, the, the various people that you mentioned. Right. That, that's right. 4:47 So for, for, for you, what would a progressive foreign policy look like in terms of, let's start with the objectives that it should pursue? Right. Well, I think let's just look at, I mean, what's foreign policy for? 4:58 I mean, the way I approach this, the way Senator Sanders, you know, the way that we've, we've approached this, I mean, foreign policy, the point, you know, the purpose of American foreign policy is to promote the security and the prosperity of the American people. 5:11 Um, I think there's... Anyone can agree with that. Um, it's, it... But I think for progressives, there's an understanding, and this applies to domestic as well as foreign policy, is that 5:23 we have obligations to people beyond just ourselves. 5:26 Like, obviously, everyone wants what's best for them and their family and their community, but I think progressives bring, I think, a glo- a, a global consciousness and an understanding of the importance of solidarity, um, with people around the world, so that when we, you know, the policies that we want our government to pursue in, in creating security and prosperity for the American people is not to export insecurity and, um, you know, and inequality onto others around the world, just being conscious of the consequences of the foreign policy choices that are made in our name, um, and at the very least, trying to do, not to do harm to other communities, and in, and in the best case, trying to come up with, with shared, you know, policies and approaches to meet shared challenges that kind of promote security and prosperity for people around the world. 6:14 And, and to your mind, what are the best instruments, uh, that would be used to, to pursue those objectives or achieve them? Um, and concretely, what would it look like? Yeah. 6:25 I think, you know, multilateral institutions like the UN, like other, other institutions that have been created, especially since, you know, the end of World War II, um, are very important. 6:36 The World Health Organization, um, refugee agencies, humanitarian aid agencies, um, official agencies, but also the work that those, those agencies do in facilitating, um, the work and contributions of civil society groups around the world and, you know, in particular in the affected communities are all really important. 6:54 And that, no, that work is, is often frustrating and slow and hard, but things that are worth doing are, are often that way. Um, 7:02 just for one example, in terms of what a progressive foreign policy looks like in practice, and this is something that's very timely today, I think 'cause, you know, we're seeing the, the start of the, the Iran talks, the Iran nuclear deal talks in Vienna, uh, the proximity talks. 7:16 I think, um, you know, President Obama's diplomacy with Iran, um, from the moment he first, you know, proposed it back as a candidate during the 2008 primary, and though his, his administration pursued that policy, um, in, in fits and starts in the first term, um, because, you know, the, the Iranian government at that time was, was not in a place where it was ready to kind of really engage. 7:40 But, you know, picking up very quickly in, in, after the election of, uh, President Hassan Rouhani in 2013, um, I think that's a, a great example of how progressives would like to approach foreign policy. 7:51 It's a way that kind of, you know, marshaled and, and, and forged a, a strong international consensus around a problem, which was Iran's nuclear program and the potential weapons applications of that program. 8:03 Um, and then ca- came up with a shared solution, um, working with our close allies, working with the P5+1, the UN, um, using instruments of pressure like sanctions, but, but then making clear that there was a diplomatic solution that could be acceptable to all parties, um, obviously including Iran and getting to the, the, the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 8:27 So I think returning to that deal, you know, this is, this is a, a, was, was one of President Biden's strongest and I think most unequivocal commitments as a candidate. 8:37 Um, I think all the Democratic candidates had similar views on this, my boss included, which was that returning to the deal was enormously important, that Trump's withdrawal from the deal was a, a very bad decision. 8:48 Um, but yeah, I think that just the way that diplomacy was pursued, the various tools that were used, um, to get to that agreement, um, give a, a, a good kind of outline of what a progressive, uh, foreign policy looks like in practice and a productive and effective use of American influence and American power. 9:07 You mentioned, uh, multilateral institutions and then as well the P5, uh, +1. Um, i- in this kind of vision, uh, who would be America's natural partners? 9:18 Would it, would it look pretty similar to our alliances and partnerships now? 9:23 Uh, or, and, and what kind of criteria, uh, would be applied to determine who, uh, who is a privileged partner, uh, that the US would work with? Well, yeah, I do think, you know, the P5+1's a good example. 9:36 Um, but particularly with regard to the, you know, the s- the E3 of France, Germany, and UK, um, 9:43 have been three, you know, three of, you know, I would say probably the US's most important allies going back a, a long time. Um, you know, the transatlantic ship remains a very, very important one still. 9:53 I think the, the kind of foundational, uh, relationship, um, in American foreign policy. 9:59 Um, but it's also worth, you know, remembering and recognizing how that relationship came up, the context, the historical context, you know, post-World War II and, and, and the US-Soviet, um, competition. 10:12 Um, so even though I think it's, it's very much worth kind of recognizing the, the importance of that relationship, understanding that the world is changing, um, but what does not change is that alliances are extremely important, um, and particularly alliances with countries that have, you know, generally shared interests and values as I think we do, um, with those countries I mentioned. 10:34 And for countries that don't share our values that, uh, have been historically American partners or US partners, I'm thinking specifically of, uh, say, Saudi Arabia, um, count- some countries in, uh, in, uh, Southeast Asia, Thailand right now, um, would, would there be a, a sort of reevaluation and reconfiguration of those relationships? 10:57 I think there needs to be. 10:58 I mean, I think let's, again, let's remember the historical context of, you know, what, you know, how the US-Saudi relationship was born and how those, those facts have changed considerably, um, over the last, you know, almost, you know, just not quite a century, but, uh, many decades. 11:16 Um, and I think it's, again, going back to the basic principle that, you know, partnerships and alliances are important and very good to have. 11:23 Um, still the question is, you know, to what purposes, um, are those partnerships being put? 11:29 And I think Saudi Arabia, you mentioned, I mean, this is a particular, a country, um, that's pursuing a number of policies both, you know, in the region and domestically, um, that I think a lot of Americans, my boss certainly included, has, has very, very real concerns with. 11:45 Um, it's not the only one, but I think it's a, it's a good example to use. So I think the question is, you know, what do we want out of this relationship? 11:52 What benefit does it serve for the American people, um, for the region? Um, and what, how do we want it to change? Um, and then kind of go from there. 12:03 I, I wanted to start with, uh, what, uh, what your vision is rather than what it's against, because I feel like, uh, oftentimes in these discussions, um, it, the, it, it leads with, uh, with what it shouldn't be. 12:18 But I think, uh, and correct me if, if you disagree, um, a pretty prominent feature of American foreign policy that most progressives oppose is the, the, the disproportionate, let's say, uh, reliance on, on military, uh, instruments and interventions. 12:35 Um, and we've seen recently the, the emergence and, and real amplification of this idea of restraint as a framework for, um, for y-US foreign policy. 12:46 And I guess I wanted to ask, uh, ask you in terms of this question of the use of military force, um, and, and what the threshold and what the criteria is, how would you define that? 13:00 What are the, the, the vital national interests that the United States should be thinking about defending with military force in the framework of a, of a progressive foreign policy? 13:10 Well, yeah, I mean, that's a very, very key question. 13:13 I think the use of military force, the use of violence by any country is, you know, among the most serious decisions, if not the most serious decision that any state can make in the international system. 13:25 So, um, I mean, the way I would look at it is, you know, first of all, is there an imminent threat? 13:31 Is the security of the American people, um, by which I mean the physical security of the American people, um, under threat? 13:39 I mean, that's obviously a case in which, um, you know, military force would be, you know, you know, would be justifiable and, and necessary. 13:47 I mean, that's one of the government's jobs is to protect, um, American security. 13:52 Um, but I think a challenge that we often have is that we've defined security so broadly and defined kind of security interests so broadly and globally that you can really find anyone, you know, you know, you can find someone to make an argument that literally anything that happens anywhere in the world is somehow implicated in Americans', American interests or American security interests. 14:12 And I think that's where we are, I think, having a much, uh, a much, um... 14:19 You know, it's taken a long time, but we're finally having, I think, a much more vigorous debate about the problems with that setup, um, and how that needs to change. 14:27 So I think looking at some of the ways, you know, br- more broadly instead of just a threat to the American people, um, and, you know, to, you know, the actual physical United States of America, I think, you know, I think we do have an interest. 14:40 Americans do have an interest on upholding a set of international norms, um, you know, against, for example, genocide, um, a number of other, you know, uses of kinds of weapons, um, 14:53 in other states that the, the use of force, uh, should be considered, um, and has been used in the past. Now, it has been used in ways somewhat more productively and somewhat less so. 15:03 Um, you know, if you look for a bad example, it's the, the Libya intervention, which began as, you know, or at least was kind of justified in a way that was fairly limited. 15:14 Um, you know, Gaddafi was threatening to overrun, uh, Benghazi, um, threatening a, a mass violence. Um, and the United States led a coalition to stop that. 15:26 And unfortunately, that, you know, evolved fairly quickly into a much larger regime change operation. 15:32 Um, but I do think it's worth stepping back and considering, you know, th-the use of force for that discrete purpose of stopping an imminent threatened, um, you know, act of, of mass murder. 15:42 Um, but I think in cases like that, you need to ask a set of questions. You know, is, you know, is, are we acting within the bounds of international law? 15:51 Have we built a coalition of, of countries and not just acting unilaterally on our own? Um, what, what is the, what are the risks and costs of intervening versus not intervening? 16:02 And what is the likelihood of achieving a better outcome, um, rather than a worse outcome? 16:07 And it's, you know, I think those are just kind of a set of questions that one needs to go through when considering a use of force. What about, uh, security commitments to treaty allies? 16:17 And I'm thinking in particular of, uh, Japan, South Korea. 16:21 Um, uh, uh, c-clearly, there's, there's a, a certain amount of, uh, uh, when you guarantee too much, uh, there's a false sense of security, uh, in the partner country, uh, moral hazard. 16:35 Uh, but i-is there a need to recalibrate or reconfigure America's security guarantees to the, to, to its treaty allies, or are those rock solid in, in terms of how you would, uh, pursue, uh, f- uh, the, this vision of foreign policy? 16:51 I mean, I think it's... One, I think America should be as good as its word when it signs these treaty agreements. 16:57 Um, I think it's important for other countries to be able to trust that the United States is going to do what it has said it will do. Um, but at the same time, I also think it's worth kind of 17:07 looking anew at some of these commitments, whether they are serving not, uh, the purpose as intended, not only for the United States, but for these other countries. 17:15 Um, but I think the, the key thing here is to do this in a way that is, that is open and, you know, that is consulting with these other countries and not simply coming out and saying, "Okay, we're changing everything. 17:25 Surprise, surprise." Um, because the bottom line is I, I do think some Americans have some questions about the extent of American commitments abroad. 17:34 Um, and ultimately, America is going to be a better partner to, to any country if the, the commitments that Ame- the United States has made to these countries have a strong, uh, co- political consensus behind them. 17:48 Um, so I think, you know, having, at least having that debate is, is, is something that's really, really important to do and communicating to these other countries. You know, this is part of our democracy. 17:59 This is part of the political discussion we need to have. Uh, as democracies, I think these countries will understand this themselves. 18:05 Um, but I think we shouldn't, we shouldn't be afraid of kind of reopening the books on some of these commitments, um, for that reason. 18:13 When it comes to this question of, of restraint and particularly, uh, US military force and, and things like forward basing, um, there seems to be a much more disparate, uh, let's say, coalition forming, uh, than around the, the more, uh, focused idea of a progressive foreign policy. 18:33 Is that something that, uh, causes you any discomfort or, or makes you, uh, scrutinize a little bit? Or, uh, i-is it a question of, uh, it's, it's moving in the right direction regardless, so that's fine? When you say... 18:48 Just explain a little bit more when you say disparate coalition. I'd say that, uh... I'd, I'd ex- I, I... By that, I mean, um, there's a sort of offshore balancers, uh, that are sort of more realist than progressive. 19:02 There are people who have a very, uh, uh, I don't, I, I don't know if the word is ideological or moral opposition to the use of force, uh, or war, uh, a real opposition to all use of military force. 19:15 Um, and, and it seems like within the, the, the, the, the restraint coalition, there, there are, there, there isn't necessarily a, a commonly agreed upon set of principles. 19:26 Well, no, I, I, I think that's a, a, a, a good question. I would just... I would use, for example, I think this might be getting at what you're talking about. 19:32 Say, for example, the, uh, the Yemen War Powers Resolution that Senator Sanders introduced, uh, back in, in 2018. Um, you know, it had a, a fairly broad coalition of, of groups supporting it. 19:44 I mean, he introduced it along with Senator Chris Murphy, a progressive Democrat from Connecticut, and Senator Mike Lee, a conservative Republican from, from Utah. 19:53 Um, and I think there was a coalition of, of support behind that effort that reflected, you know, those three original co-sponsors. 20:02 Now, you know, there are some groups, conservative groups, that were supportive of that effort, um, that, you know, I and my progressive colleagues don't agree on a lot with. 20:11 But I think there was a, a, an agreement on this basic principle of, you know, the US should not be supporting this war. The US, the Congress has not authorized US support, uh, for this war. 20:22 Um, this war is creating a humanitarian catastrophe, and the US should end support for it. Um, and I think that's, you know, that's basic coalition politics. We don't have to agree on every little thing. 20:32 Like, you know, Senator Sanders and, and, and Senator Lee don't agree on, you know, uh, uh, abortion or, or taxation or a whole list of other things. 20:41 Um, but they did agree strongly on the basic principles that underlie that War Powers Resolution. 20:46 And I think, you know, their working together, um, in a, in a, in a broad-based progressive and conservative libertarian liberal, uh, coalition of groups supporting that achieved something really important, um, for the broader goal of sort of re-rethinking American foreign policy. 21:03 You, uh, you mentioned the Iran nuclear deal as an example of, of successful dis- diplomacy. 21:08 Um, and, uh, there was, uh, the use, uh, to bring Iran to the table, although there's, there's some dispute about what actually brought Iran to the table. 21:17 But, uh, at the very least, there was the use of, of very coercive sanctions. 21:22 Um, and, uh, I remember something, uh, William Burns said, uh, when I interviewed him, that in the conduct of diplomacy in his experience, uh, he, he always had more success when there was a, a, a, a credible, uh, s-sort of coercive element to it in, in, when it comes to conflictual diplomacy or, or, uh, not necessarily hostile, but, uh, uh, diplomacy that isn't, uh, exactly cooperative. 21:50 Um, so what sort of instruments would, would you like to see the United States use, uh, when it comes to rivals and adversaries that aren't necessarily eager or enthusiastic cooperate, to cooperate for, uh, towards some of the goals that, uh, we're seeking? 22:04 No, I, you know, obviously have a lot of respect for Ambassador Burns. Um, played a key role in the Iran diplomacy. Um, and I think there's, you know, there's a... You know, he makes a very important point there. 22:16 Um, I, I'm not... I don't tend to use the carrot and stick analogy a lot, but I think that's what it's about, incentives and disincentives. Both of these things are important, um, in achieving, um, goals diplomatically. 22:29 Um, but I think the question is, is, are the incentives, are, is there a kind of consonance between incentives and disincentives? 22:36 I think with, for example, the Trump administration's maximum pressure approach, it was all disincentive, right? It was all stick. 22:43 It was just like, "We will pile on these sanctions, and then something will happen, and Iran will submit and do everything we want." And I think we saw that just fail unequivocally. 22:53 Um, I think the, you know, the Obama administration, um, working, you know, primarily through the UN Security Council, passing a number of, of new sanctions, but also working on other issues, such as the human rights issue, uh, the creation of a UN special rapporteur for human rights in Iran, um, which is something that people don't tend to remember as much, but I do think is very important, um, to kind of, to keep focus on a whole range of concerns that we have, um, with the Iranian government. 23:21 But at the end of the day, what made that diplomacy work, um, and there is, I would say there is dispute in, you know, in the kind of, you know, Iran policy and non-proliferation policy community about the extent to which, you know, these aggressive coercive sanctions were the key versus the United States will-- being willing to put other, you know, positive incentives on the table for Iran. 23:45 But, but that aside, I think we can agree that these things all play a role. 23:48 But ultimately, um, you had an Iranian government, uh, that was seated after the election of, of Hassan Rouhani, um, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, that were interested in diplomacy, a faction within the government, um, that was interested in, in exploring these options, and obviously, importantly, the supreme leader who was the, you know, the ultimate final decision maker being supportive of those steps. 24:09 Um, so I think the kind of interests aligned at that moment, um, that brought us to that, that point. 24:14 But yes, going back to the, the original question, I think progressives recognize that there are sometimes, you know- coercive steps, sanctions that can be useful. 24:24 But I would also say here, I think we've become much, much more aware, and we need to become even more aware and more sensitive, um, to the impact that, that broad-based sanctions have on civilians, on non-combatants, on everyday people. 24:40 Um, we see this in Iran, we see this in Venezuela, where, you know, in the name of punishing a government, um, an oppressive, [chuckles] corrupt government, um, we are pressing forward on sanctions that are making people's lives more and more miserable, um, and, you know, ultimately benefiting the most corrupt, um, elements of these governments, um, whose, you know, their own networks are deeply embedded in the economy, so they tend to make more money through the black market because of these various goods and services that are being denied, um, and they're being m- you know, they're harder to get. 25:13 Um, so I think we have to have a very, very serious talk about the overuse of these kinds of broad-based sanctions while looking, I think, more at the use of more targeted sanctions, um, on regime, uh, and government officials who are implicated in some of these abuses, who play role, you know, key roles in some of the issue areas, whether it's nuclear proliferation or human rights abuses that we are trying to change. 25:37 Um, shifting gears a little bit toward, uh, trade policy. Uh, you mentioned, uh, very prominently in your, your definition of progressive, uh, progressive foreign policy, this question of solidarity. 25:49 Um, and, and I, I guess I wanna sort of pursue that a little bit because I feel like in some ways, um, there's been an adoption among certain, uh, let's say, currents of, of, of, uh, progressives, uh, of, of trade policy that's a little more protet- protectionist, uh, a little more in the interests of American workers, um, for obvious reasons. 26:15 As, as you said, a, a government is, is elected to, to protect its, its citizens. 26:21 Do you see a tension there in terms of this, this emphasis, for instance, the Biden administration's emphasis on a foreign policy for the middle class, and this, this historical commitment by progressives to international solidarity and, and solidarity, um, equality, and justice for, uh, not just for Americans, but for, for as, as widely spread around the world as possible? 26:43 Um, I, I understand how one could see a tension there, but I-- Here's where I come at it. 26:48 I think one of the most important things I think we see from the Biden administration is this understanding that, you know, American foreign policy has to be tied to the, the health and welfare of America's working people, America's families. 27:03 Um, 27:04 so I think there is, you know, there's a way in which this can be pitched, and I think you, you see this from, you know, some on the right more that, you know, this is just about benefiting American workers at the expense of others. 27:16 You know, this is the way Trump pitched it, right? Others have been making out, and we've been suffering. Um, but the bottom line, there is some truth to that. 27:23 I think if we look at the kind of broader, you know, neoliberal kind of, um, global trade system, if I can use that term, what we have seen is, you know, you know, you know, multinational corporations making enormous sums of money, and in part doing that by moving jobs overseas where they have, you know, l- you know, they pay lower wages, they pay, um, far fewer taxes. 27:42 Um, and, you know, communities in the United States have just been completely hollowed out, um, and with all the, the consequences and kind of problems that that brings. 27:52 Um, and I think, so I think President Biden and his, his team are, are, are really, you know-- If they are talking about strengthening and rebuilding American democracy, rebuilding the American economy, and, and showing that democracy delivers for Americans, um, is a very, very key part of that. 28:09 And I, you know, I take your point. 28:10 It is possible for that kind of language to shade over into protectionism, into a, a, you know, a kind of different kind of America first, but I do think they are being very careful about that. 28:20 Um, but I would also add this. I think just yesterday, we saw, um, an announcement from Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen about proposing a, a global corporate tax. 28:31 Um, and I think that's, that's really important, um, which is to say that, you know, we're, we, we cannot allow... 28:36 You know, we have to stop this phenomenon, precisely as I just said, of corporations simply moving their operations to one country or another, hunting for the lowest tax rate in a way that, that really harms the popu- the working populations of these countries. 28:51 Um, and I think that was an important step to kind of actualizing this sort of global solidarity that I think progressives have been, uh, supportive of. 29:00 Um, it's a, it's a small step, but an important one, 'cause I think it does show recognition of what, what progressives have been saying for a long time, going back for a long time. 29:09 I think, you know, I made a, a remark, [chuckles] um, uh, on Twitter, uh, uh, about a week ago that I think, that some people, you know, responded to, where I said, you know, we've talked a lot about how, um, the people who protested the Iraq War in 2003 were right, but we need to talk more about the people who protested the, the WTO in 1999 were right. 29:30 Um, and I think what I saw from Secretary Yellen is kind of an affirmation of that. 29:36 I think if you look at the issues that the, the protesters in the kind of anti-corporate globalization movement of 1999, 2000, who protested the WTO in Seattle, who protested the, uh, the IMF and World Bank in Washington in April of, uh, 2000, these were a lot of the issues that they were raising, the way that multinational corporations were taking advantage of this system and accruing huge sum, you know, profits for themselves in ways that damaged these communities. 30:03 Um, and I just-- I'll finish this by saying what that led to and what we've seen now, and I think there's a, there's, there's a, a lot more attention being paid to this now. 30:11 In particular, some really great progressive foreign policy analysts who are writing about this, is the way that this fed inequality, not only in the United States, but globally, inequality within communities in the United States, within the broader United States, between the United States, you know, and the so-called industrialized world and the less developed world, and how inequality is feeding So much of this kind of backlash and this kind of authoritarian populist ethno-nationalism that we've been seeing here in the United States and elsewhere, um, and it shows itself in, in different ways in different, different countries. 30:46 But I think understanding that, um, inequality is, is one of the core problems that we face. 30:53 Um, and you know, I, I, I think that Secretary Yellen's announcement last night was a really important step toward addressing that. 30:59 One thing I guess you haven't, uh, mentioned so far is the, the where, where a human rights, uh, plank fits in. Um, is that something that's front and center, and is it litmus te- litmus test for, for everything else? 31:12 Is it something that the US needs to maybe work a little bit more at home to fulfilling its, its, its foundational ideals? 31:20 Where does that fit into your, to your vision for, for how the US should be conducting itself on the world stage? Right. No, I think it definitely does. 31:27 I mean, that's, that's again, a core premise of progressives' approach to foreign policy is, you know, we at the very least should not be supporting, you know, policies of other countries that abuse human rights. 31:39 Um, we should look at, you know, the, the tools and the influence that we have to change others' behavior. 31:45 But yes, as you said, first and foremost, we need to make sure that we are doing things right here in our own house. 31:50 Um, and we still have a lot of work to do, um, in making sure we are, we are supporting policies of human rights, um, and democracy and, and civil rights and, and, and criminal justice. 32:02 Um, again, I think this past summer, the, the protest, um, the, you know, the, the protests across the country that arose in the wake of the murder of, of George Floyd really drove this home. 32:14 Um, and I do think you, you saw... 32:17 You know, I, I remember, I think that there was a really important shift in some of, um, uh, Joe Biden's rhetoric, um, as those protests were really, um, taking off, and he, he, he made an address, I think it was like early July, where I think you saw really in a, in a very big way a recognition, um, that Trump was not an anomaly. 32:40 Um, that Trump... 32:41 'Cause I think there was a general sense among some of the more establishment candidates and the, you know, that, you know, let's get past this, this weird, you know, eruption, this Trump moment, and get back to normal politics. 32:52 And I know that, that my, my boss and other progressives had been warning against this. The fact of the matter is Trump was a product of the American political status quo. 33:02 Um, and I think that there was a recognition there in that moment that was very important by, by Candidate Biden that, you know, 33:11 w- what we are seeing in our streets is, is kind of, that represents some very deep-seated challenges that, that continue in our politics, the legacy of white supremacy, um, 33:20 that whether we're talking about in employment, in, in, in the judicial system, in the use of violence a-against Black men in our streets, as with George Floyd and, and so many others. 33:31 Um, so I think, uh, you know, confronting and addressing that is, is part of strengthening and, and making good on our own stated commitments to democracy and equality for all in the United States, and ultimately modeling that is going to be the best and most effective thing we can do for human rights around the world. 33:50 So, so in a sense, the, the mirror image of foreign policy as domestic policy, it's domestic policy as foreign policy. 33:56 I think that's right, and I, and I think that understanding the kind of con, you know, mutual relationship, um, between the domestic and foreign, it is a two-way street as, as, as, you know, others have increasingly observed. 34:10 Like, there is... Our militarism abroad and our inequality at home are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing, and they need to be addressed together. 34:19 You, you, we, we kind of flirted with this, uh, topic, uh, with regard to Saudi Arabia, but I wanna sort of, uh, kind of press the nerve, uh, that, that kind of makes everyone uncomfortable- Press it. Press it... 34:31 I think, this, this, this tension between human rights and American values and American interests. 34:38 And, um, just to give an idea what I, what I tell the editorial team at WPR, uh, is that, uh, we don't have the luxury of always being right. Uh, Human Rights Watch has the luxury of always being right. 34:52 Amnesty International has the, the luxury of always being right because they have a very clear advocacy mission. 34:58 Um, and when, when you start looking at, uh, trying to analyze trade-offs or, or, uh, least bad outcomes or, or paths forward, it gets a lot more complicated, and you can no longer always be right. 35:13 So for you, um, in terms of this human rights plank especially, should the United States, uh, with a progressive foreign policy always be right, or does it not have the luxury to always be right? 35:26 Do, do, do, do the interests at a certain point compete in a way that, uh, that makes us a little less comfortable with how we've, uh, carried ourselves? No, I would tend to agree. I mean, 35:37 a, a responsible foreign policy recognizes that sometimes there are going to be tensions and even hypocrisies. Um, the c- the, the challenge is to diminish those tensions and hypocrisies as much as possible. 35:48 Um, and I think what progressives are arguing is that we can do a lot better than we have been doing. 35:54 Um, I think the, the bottom line is, you know, sometimes, you know, you know, governments around the world, there are many imperfect governments. Obviously, United States is one. 36:02 There are others that are far, far more imperfect. Um, some of these we have to work with to advance kind of short-term security goals. Um, but we should recognize what we are doing, um, and not simply proclaim... 36:14 I think, you know, one thing that does enormous damage to the cause of human rights is proclaiming support for human rights while doing the opposite. 36:22 Um, so I think we should just speak realistically, um, about what we are doing. 36:26 And the fact of the matter is the relationship with Saudi Arabia, it, you know, there are certain goals with regard to the Middle East region, um, regard to, to, to, to oil, um, you know, intelligence that is, is gleaned, um- 36:39 You know, one can make an argument for this relationship, but I also think we need to be very, very [chuckles] clear about, you know, the downsides to that. 36:48 The fact of the matter is the crown prince, um, is an oppressive, um, murderous, corrupt leader. Um, we have experience with such leaders in the past. It has not, you know, often not gone very, very well. 37:02 Um, and, and, and we should be clear about that. And, and Saudi Arabia's leadership needs to be clear about that. 37:07 They need to understand, as I hope they do, I think, um, we could be making this more clear, is that, you know, having MBS as the king of Saudi Arabia is going to lead to a much less robust and healthy relationship with the United States than they might otherwise expect, and they may can make their own decision on that basis. 37:29 Uh, one of the, one of the most, uh, I'd say striking shifts in US foreign policy over the last four or five years, uh, has to do with China. 37:38 Uh, the, the, the shift in attitudes, uh, within the US, but also within the DC policymaking establishment or community, um, and then, uh, followed by a real deterioration in relations between the US and China. 37:55 What's your reaction to that and to the, the, the sort of dominant narrative that's emerging about this strategic rivalry and competition between the United States and China? 38:05 Well, I, I think it's interesting 'cause I think, again, I think the, the critique of the sort of neoliberal argument that we're going to help China make lots of money, and then that will liberalize them. 38:16 Um, you know, you saw criticisms coming from the left on that for a very, very long time. 38:21 Um, and I think, you know, Washington has sort of woken up to that, whether or not they will credit the left with that, [chuckles] with, with that, um, I guess remains to be seen. I suspect not. Um, but I'm also... 38:34 You know, the question is, okay, what's, what's the answer now? Um, you know, it's been very interesting to me. 38:40 You know, I would say more than interesting, it's been concerning to see the speed and the vigor with which the sort of Washington foreign policy machine has sort of readjusted its, you know, turned its sights on China as the, the locus of our great civilizational struggle. 38:57 Um, but that is happening. And if, if you remember, I mean, I ve- I remember clearly, I mean, toward the late '90s and into the beginning of George W. 39:04 Bush's administration, people were already gearing up for China, right? You know, you had a lot of talk about this being the next big conflict. 39:11 You had the, the Hainan Island, um, uh, crisis, short-lived crisis with the downing of a US plane. 39:18 And this was gonna be the next big thing, and that was interrupted by September 11th, 2001, and that was sort of put aside and, and the global war on terrorism became the main focus of UN foreign policy. 39:30 But the, the kind of consistent thing here is that there needs to be this big enemy that we can all kind of focus our energies on, and uni- sort of 39:39 unite the c- unite the population and build the, the consensus and energize ourselves, and I think that itself is just disastrous. 39:46 I mean, that idea that we can use conflict, whether against a kind of amorphous enemy as, you know, like terrorism or a more concrete enemy like the Chinese government, to kind of build and create and solidify, um, American political unity is itself an existential danger to the United States. 40:05 That's, that's a dangerous fantasy we should avoid. 40:09 Um, but still, I think we can be kind of clear-eyed about what the Chinese government has been doing, what their kind of goals are, uh, in their region, and more broadly, understand how some of those goals and interests don't align, to put it lightly, with the United States. 40:23 And what are our options for, you know, supporting our interests and values in competition with China, where we need to, in, in cooperation where we absolutely must on certain areas like climate change, like responding to the pandemic. 40:37 Um, but I think, you know, as I see it, for progressives, the goal here is to kind of, you know, to push back and resist this effort to kind of treat, you know, conflict with China as a national unifying project, because I think we've seen the disastrous effects of that over the past 20 years with regard to the global war on terrorism, not just strategically and financially, but in terms of our own politics. 41:00 Um, the way that, you know, the, the war on terror just corroded our own politics in ways that I think are unmistakable now. 41:06 That should be very much on our minds as, as we approach the way we frame up this, you know, the U- US-China policy. 41:14 Uh, before we wrap up, let me, let me ask you, um, there w- there was some talk about you possibly entering the State Department, uh, under the Biden ad-administration. Uh, it didn't work out. 41:25 Uh, without getting into any backstory, um, you're a pretty outspoken guy. You mentioned something you, you posted on Twitter that caused a little controversy. It's probably not the first time or the last. 41:37 Uh, how do you see your role, uh, right now when it comes to, uh, trying to shape the Biden administration's foreign policy, uh, in terms of priorities, implementation, trying to help guide, uh, but also possibly critic- critiquing or, or trying to hold accountable and keep their feet to the fire? 41:55 How do you, how do you see your role, uh, unfolding over the next four years? Well, my role right now is as Senator Sanders' foreign policy advisor. 42:04 So, you know, I'm, you know, I'm certainly happy to talk here and with others about what that means and what, you know, Senator Sanders is trying to advance in terms of progressive foreign policy. 42:13 But, you know, to the extent that I am engaging with, uh, the Biden administration, which I am, uh, uh, pretty regularly, I mean, it's making sure I'm advancing Senator Sanders', um, 42:25 agenda, though obviously I have a role in helping to shape his agenda and, and working through what, what his priorities are. Um, 42:33 but here again, I think what's important about the way Senator Sanders approaches foreign policy and the way he approaches kind of policy generally, whether we're talking about economic, you know, domestic policy, healthcare, is that this is very deeply rooted Um, in movement politics. 42:48 I mean, this was a kind of core part of his, um, you know, uh, presidential campaign both in 2016 and 2020. 42:56 Um, the, the, you know, the, um, the slogan of not me, us, I mean, he, he really means that, um, very, very deep down. 43:03 That is a core to his approach in politics, which is to say, you know, there is important work to be done in Congress, certainly. There is important work to be done by the administration. 43:12 But ultimately, the way we're going to change and improve, um, our policy, um, on a range of issues is to, is to build and mobilize the American people, uh, and movements that can work together to promote ideas, to put pressure on leaders, um, to work together across a range of issues. 43:32 Um, and I think that's the approach that I, you know, have, have... That has kind of guided my work with him on foreign policy. 43:41 And as I said at the beginning, I think that is one of the kind of really important things about foreign policy right now in 2021, is that there is a very active, engaged, and growing, um, grassroots coalition, um, progressive grassroots coalition that focuses on foreign policy, not just moment- you know, not just in terms of, um, specific issues here and there, but as a broader concern in trying to debate, discuss, and articulate what a progressive foreign policy means, um, both in theory and practice. 44:12 Matt, thank you so much for your time. It's been insightful and a lot of fun. Great to do it. Thanks a lot, Judah. 44:17 [outro jingle] If you like what you hear on Trendlines, you can subscribe to it on the podcast platform of your choice, and you can also find links to do so at worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast. 44:31 Trendlines is edited by Peter Dury. You can follow him, myself, and World Politics Review on Twitter. Thanks for listening, and tune in again next week. 44:41 [outro jingle]
