Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hello and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. 0:17 My name is Elliot Waldman, and I'm an associate editor here at WPR. 0:21 Before we dive into today's interview, just a quick reminder to listeners to tune in again on Friday for our editors' discussion looking at the week's top headlines. 0:30 The US military recently confirmed that it has fielded controversial low-yield nuclear warheads on certain submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 0:39 Plans for the new warhead were included in President Donald Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and its explosive yield is roughly a third of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima during World War II. 0:50 Trump administration officials argue that the new warhead will serve as a deterrent for Russia's so-called tactical nuclear weapons, but experts fear that the prevalence of these low-yield nuclear weapons will make an eventual conflict more likely. 1:03 The news of the fielding comes amid broader scrutiny of Trump's record on arms control and non-proliferation issues. 1:09 Just to give one example, the New START Treaty, an important agreement that was signed in 2010 and which limits the number of nuclear weapons both countries can deploy, is set to expire a year from now. 1:19 But Trump is holding off on renewing it in hopes of trying to get a bigger, better deal. So today on Trendlines, we're discussing nuclear strategy and arms control in the age of Trump. My guest is Tom Countryman. 1:31 He's chair of the board of directors at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. 1:36 He previously served for 35 years as a career foreign service officer before retiring from the State Department in early 2017, having most recently been the acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. 1:49 Tom, welcome to Trendlines. Thanks very much. Pleasure to be here. I wanted to start with this recent development that the Trump administration is fielding low-yield nuclear warheads on its submarine-launched missiles. 2:00 Tell us what your reaction was to this and, and what you think are the most important implications of this move. Well, you already made one of the key points that I would make, which is that low yield is a euphemism. 2:13 These are nuclear weapons that have an explosive capability of, uh, five to 10 kilotons. 2:22 That is, as you point out, uh, one-third to one-half the size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945, hundreds of times more powerful than any conventional explosive weapon that the United States possesses. 2:38 So low yield is a term that can best be described as a euphemism. We should talk about both the need for such a weapon and its potential impact on stability, that is, on the avoidance of nuclear war. 2:57 The US already had in its arsenal two low-yield warheads. 3:03 Uh, one is the B61 gravity bomb, which are stored at several locations on US bases in NATO allied countries, and, uh, NATO trains to deliver such weapons by aircraft. 3:20 And the second is the long-range standoff weapon, which is essentially an air-launched cruise missile launched from a, uh, uh, a NATO warplane. 3:33 The administration's explanation of the need for not just one, but two additional low-yield weapons is not very satisfying. 3:46 Uh, first, i- in fact, it strikes me as a solution in search of a problem. If, in fact, the aim is to have a weapon that is... 3:59 has more assured penetration, that is, a better chance of reaching the target, then it raises the question of why we are continuing to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in upgrading the two existing low-yield weapons that the United States possesses. 4:20 Uh, the other argument that's made in favor of a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a low-yield warhead is that it can be delivered more promptly, uh, upon an enemy position in response, for example, to Russian use of a nuclear weapon. 4:41 But there's not been a reasonable explanation as to why a prompt strike is necessary in that condition. 4:51 So we have a, a few problems that go immediately to the question of why we need additional low-yield weapons with additional delivery systems. Uh, it has... 5:07 Beyond the need for such a weapon, we have to be concerned about the impact that it would have on stability. 5:15 The argument is that Russia may be considering, in its nuclear doctrine, the use of low-yield nuclear weapons, of which it possesses about 2,000, in order to end a conventional conflict on its terms, essentially signaling to NATO, in the case of any conventional conflict, that the risk of escalation would exceed anything to be gained by the continuation of the conventional conflict. 5:48 It's not clear that that is, in fact, Russian doctrine today, uh, although the existence of those 2,000 non-strategic or low-yield nuclear weapons raises the question of the actual Russian doctrine. 6:04 Uh, but the argument that the US needs to be able to respond immediately within minutes with a similar weapon in order to deescalate the conflict has many logical flaws. 6:21 It is more likely, as we have seen demonstrated almost any time that the US has war gamed such a situation, that the beginning of a nuclear conflict, even if it begins with a single nuclear weapon on either side, uh, inevitably leads to an all-out nuclear conflict, one that would destroy not just Europe, but Russia and the United States as well. 6:50 It also raises the question of how the Russians would identify once a submarine-launched ballistic missile is coming towards them, whether this is a strategic weapon or a low-yield warhead. 7:06 Uh, the Russian, uh, uh, response on its early warning system would be to assume that any ballistic missile coming towards Russia is in fact a strategic weapon and give them an incentive to launch an all-out attack. 7:25 So rather than stabilizing the situation, the introduction of more rapid means to deliver low-yield weapons actually contributes to the chance of an all-out nuclear conflict. 7:41 In effect, it brings us back to the kind of thinking that dominated both American and Soviet doctrine during the Cold War, uh, which is the concept that you can keep nuclear war limited. 7:56 Uh, I think it's a false concept, and for the US to be building a nuclear strategy around it is extremely dangerous. 8:06 So a lot of strategists seem to think that this new weapon is, is meant to counter what Russia already has in its arsenal, as you suggested. 8:14 Can we infer from that that Russia will view this development as something that puts the two countries at parity, or is it something that Russia is going to respond to and try to counter it with new systems of its own? 8:26 Well, first, I think it is, uh, fallacious to think that the United States must imitate every stupid thing that the Russian military does. 8:38 The Russians right now, for some of the same misguided psychological reasons that motivate Mr. 8:45 Trump's approach, are working on some of the dumbest and most dangerous weapons ever conceived of, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, which I call the Flying Chernobyl, uh, and a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo that could be aimed at American port cities. 9:05 We don't need to imitate what the Russians do, uh, in their very misguided thinking about what promotes stability and national security. 9:18 Rather, what we should be doing is con- is avoiding any blurring of the bright line between a conventional and a nuclear war. 9:30 And what we're doing with the introduction of weapons that are meant to be a bridge between a conventional and a nuclear war is to erase that line and make it more likely that any conventional conflict could escalate into a nuclear conflict. 9:51 The Russians are going to do dumb and dangerous things for their own reasons. We should not worry either about imitating those, uh, dumb decisions or worrying about whether they will imitate ours. 10:08 The idea of a Flying Chernobyl is, is just so terrifying. I feel like if, if we could only get that term to trend, then, then that in itself would be a deterrent against trying to develop more of these weapons. 10:19 You've really delved into these issues related to arms control over the course of your career. In fact, you started as a, a foreign service officer, if my math is correct, during the, uh, Reagan administration, right? 10:29 That's correct. So based on that long experience covering these issues, uh, what really jumps out at you about the overall approach that Trump has taken to nuclear arms and strategy? 10:39 There was the Nuclear Posture Review in 2018, but there's also been his approach to multilateral and bilateral treaties governing these, uh, issues. 10:47 I would put the Trump administration's policy on nuclear weapons as a critical departure from the last 10 presidents, whether Democratic or Republican. 11:02 Every president since John Kennedy has recognized that national security is best served by reducing the risk that the United States would be annihilated in a nuclear war, and that negotiating arms control agreements with Russia, with the Soviet Union, is not a sign of weakness. 11:24 Rather, it's a very hard-headed national security policy that contributes to our defense, that saves us money, and most of all, reduces the risk of an Armageddon kind of war. 11:39 So what you could see if you graphed this is a sharp decline over the years in the number of nuclear weapons. Instead of 35,000 nuclear weapons that the US possessed in the 1960s, today we have about 6,000. 11:57 Uh, a sharp decline in the variety of nuclear weapons. Instead of having a nuke for every occasion, uh, we've slimmed down the number of variations and delivery systems. 12:12 Uh, and instead of a policy that reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in almost any circumstance, up until the Obama administration, the defined circumstances under which the president might consider use of a nuclear weapon have been gradually restricted. 12:35 The Trump Nuclear Posture Review in 2018, on the one hand, is not a radical departure from the Obama Nuclear Posture Review, but looked at in a different way, those trend lines of reduced numbers, uh, reduced variations of weapons and delivery systems, and reduced roles or missions for nuclear weapons, those trends have all been reversed, with the Trump administration, uh, increasing not necessarily the number of weapons, but definitely the number of delivery systems and the variety of delivery systems, and also expanding the definition of circumstances under which the United States might consider use of nuclear weapons. 13:29 That's what's dangerous about this ad- administration, and I think it's motivated in part by a false belief that the United States could make itself invulnerable to nuclear attack. 13:44 That's what motivates the Republican fascination with ballistic missile defense, which no matter what its proponents claim, would never be able to make the United States invincible, uh, from the threat of nuclear, uh, ballistic missile nuclear attack. 14:04 And it is just as fallacious to think that any kind of US technological superiority means that we could fight and win a limited nuclear war. That's the kind of thinking we saw in the Cold War. 14:21 The most positive development, uh, was that both American and Soviets stopped thinking about the possibility of winning a limited nuclear war, but that thinking has returned under the Trump administration's policy. 14:38 And I think the last point is just that the president himself, in keeping with his overall approach, just wants to be able to say, "We've got the biggest and the best and the fastest and the coolest nuclear arsenal in the world." 14:54 Uh, I am certain he gives no thought to the questions of strategic stability and avoidance of nuclear war for which he is ultimately responsible. 15:05 He even, uh, said, I believe, on Twitter that, uh, the United States has a much bigger nuclear button than North Korea or something to that effect, uh, during his sort of shouting match with, uh, Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea. 15:18 I can't comment on the president's obsession with his own masculinity. 15:23 [laughs] So just to be fair, though, the, uh, the Obama administration also wanted to renovate its, uh, nuclear arsenal, and this process of sort of modernizing, uh, nuclear weapons and building them up again did start, uh, in Obama's second term, I believe. 15:40 So how does that differ from what Trump is doing? Well, it actually began in President Obama's first term. Ah, okay. 15:48 After the United States and the Russian Federation negotiated the New START treaty, the next task was to get Senate ratification, uh, consideration of the treaty. 16:01 And in order to get the votes necessary, President Obama agreed to what's called the program of record. That is, not increasing the size of the arsenal, 16:13 but making sure that the warheads were safe and effective and that the delivery systems were modern. That is, uh, the cost that he paid to get Senate ratification. 16:30 And as an important footnote, I would note that if the Trump administration does not renew the New START treaty, and we can talk about that in a moment, it calls into question whether the Democratic Party's commitment to the modernization program, uh, remains valid or not. 16:53 Uh, so I think it's still a very different approach in terms of the Obama administration being committed to a modernization program that is extraordinarily expensive, $1.7 trillion 17:10 over the next 30 years. Uh, in other words, more than $50 billion a year. Uh, and some of that, uh, the cost has been increased by new nuclear programs proposed by the Trump administration. 17:28 So it's a different approach between maintaining the status quo and getting into this notion of superiority and potentially winning a limited nuclear war. Right. That makes a lot of sense. 17:43 So you mentioned New START, and, and I mentioned it as well in the introduction. And you actually wrote a piece for us on this issue, uh, in late last year. 17:53 Tell us of what the most, uh, important implications would be if, if New START were to fall to the wayside and, and not be renewed, and, and also why Trump isn't renewing it. 18:03 Uh, the New START treaty is set to expire on February 5th of next year, after its initial 10-year period. It can be extended For an additional five years just by the signature of the Russian and American presidents. 18:20 It does not need to go back to either the US Senate or the Russian Duma. 18:27 The treaty is important because it limits the number of strategic weapons that each side can deploy to a maximum of 1,550. Now, when you say strategic weapons, that's, that's also somewhat of a euphemism, isn't it? 18:43 It sounds better than saying, uh, great big nuclear weapons. Uh, the standard size in the US arsenal is 300 kilotons, uh, and that's pretty much the standard size in the Russian arsenal as well. 18:59 That's 20 times the explosive power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Uh, so the, um, uh, strategic is to distinguish from low yield. 19:13 And so these are weapons that are based on intercontinental ballistic missiles, on long range bombers, and on nuclear submarines. 19:23 The treaty is also important because it has an unprecedented level of transparency between the two countries. Each country notifies the other before it moves or redeploys any of its strategic weapons. 19:40 So we know very well what each side has and where they are, and that contributes to a sense of stability so that there are no surprise movements of nuclear weapons that send the wrong signal about impending conflict. 19:58 It is the last treaty that limits the deployment of US and Russian arsenals, and if it goes away for the first time in 50 years, we will have no limits whatsoever on what each side possesses and deploys. 20:16 And in addition, we will lose all of that transparency, all of the notifications, the monitoring and verification. 20:24 And that would lead to a situation in which each side will assume the worst about the other side's arsenals and intentions, and that in itself will eventually, not immediately, but eventually spark a new nuclear arms race that will exceed in risk and cost anything that we saw during the Cold War. 20:49 So we hope that the president will recognize that this is low-hanging fruit ready to be picked, that a simple signature on his part will allow him to have an unequivocal foreign policy victory, one that has so far eluded him in the first three years of his term, 21:12 and that it will be a solid contribution to national security, and that it will be welcomed not just by the general public, which strongly supports renewal of the treaty, but also by both Democrats and Republicans. 21:27 So we still hope that the president, uh, will see the blindingly obvious correct path to take and allow renewal of New START. Now, it's not just New START. 21:40 There are also other treaties that Trump has withdrawn from or is, uh, actively endangering. 21:45 That includes the, uh, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF, which was a Cold War era treaty that, uh, put restrictions on, uh, medium range land-based missiles, I believe. 21:56 And then there's also, uh, uh, agreements that govern conventional weapons like the Open Skies Treaty. So putting this all together, 22:06 what is going to be the long-term impact of this approach that Trump is taking and, and how difficult is it going to be for Trump's successor, whether that's next year or in, uh, another four or five years to, uh, to start to put back together this regime of, of arms control treaties? 22:22 Okay, some big questions there. [clears throat] First, the INF Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, was perhaps the most important achievement of the Reagan administration. 22:34 It turned around the Cold War and helped lead to a far more stable relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation. 22:48 The Russians have been violating the treaty for a number of years by building and deploying a new cruise missiles that exceeds the maximum range allowed by the treaty. 23:02 And the Trump administration relied on that Russian violation to justify pulling out of the treaty in August of 2019. 23:14 In that sense, withdrawing from the treaty is justified, but it was not smart. 23:21 The Trump administration did this more out of an ideological antipathy towards any treaties rather than part of a strategic plan to get the Russians to end their violation or to find an alternative military strategy that would avoid any negative effects for our allies in Europe. 23:48 Uh, I'm more concerned [clears throat] this week, uh, in February about the potential for the United States to also pull out of the Open Skies Treaty. 24:02 The Open Skies Treaty is an idea that originated with President Eisenhower. It was, uh, negotiated and ratified during the George Bush Senior administration. It's not exactly a nuclear treaty. 24:16 I would call it a confidence building measure. 24:19 That is, it allows the European states and the US and Canada to overfly each other's territory and take pictures so that you can verify whether there is any kind of threatening military buildup that's going on. 24:37 It has been, uh, in, of enormous value in stabilizing dicey situations in Europe. Uh, the administration is opposed to it because the Russians have violated it at various points. 24:54 The, uh, problem is that withdrawing from the treaty would cost, uh, the US and especially our NATO allies far more than it would cost Russia. 25:08 As a more closed society, uh, Russia has more to hide than the Western countries do. 25:16 Uh, and more importantly, in situations such as the current Russian interference in Eastern Ukraine, it is important for our friends and allies to know just what the Russians are up to. 25:30 So this would be an extremely shortsighted move by the Trump administration. It is one that is opposed by all of our NATO allies. 25:40 Uh, but I fear that as part of the administration's we are tougher than you general approach, that they will pull out of the Open Skies Treaty despite the cost to our security interests. 25:56 It all adds up to a hostility towards treaties that is a hallmark of this administration, and not only when John Bolton was national security advisor, someone who has been a serial assassin of arms control agreements, but something that continues today. 26:17 They are decisions that are made more on the basis of political considerations than on the basis of the true cost to America's national security. Now, you mentioned that Russia has been violating Open Skies. 26:31 What does a violation of that treaty look like exactly? Is it when a country does not allow, uh, another country's planes to overfly their territory? 26:38 It, the Russians have put certain restrictions on overflight of Russian territory. 26:45 Uh, and, uh, that's unacceptable under the treaty, but the correct response is not to kill a treaty that serves Western interests more than Russian interests. 26:57 That would be falling for a provocation, which this administration has done before. Uh, the correct response is to take reciprocal measures to deny Russian advantages that are equivalent to the Russian violations. 27:14 And that's what I hope NATO allies are pushing upon the administration. 27:19 I wanted to also ask you about the implications of the current focus in a lot of countries on developing new delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, and that, uh, includes some of the, uh, ideas that you mentioned earlier that Russia is developing. 27:33 Uh, but, uh, also things like hypersonic gliders, they call them, for, for nuclear weapons. Is there going to need to be a new treaty to, uh, to cover all of these new developments, or, or what's the implication of this? 27:45 It would certainly be desirable to have a new agreement that includes not just the US and Russia, but also China, uh, to limit the number of hypersonic delivery vehicles. 28:00 Hypersonic is not essent- uh, exactly a new thing. Ballistic missiles move with hypersonic speed, in fact, move much faster than any of the new delivery systems being worked on by the US, Russia, China, and others. 28:19 It is not necessarily a nuclear delivery system, although China seems to be focused on using it as a nuclear delivery system. But, uh, 28:31 for the United States, it is far from clear what is the purpose, what is the mission, what is the need for hypersonic delivery vehicles. 28:43 It, uh, is more often justified by the US military as being an area in which we cannot afford to fall behind Beijing and Moscow, rather than as an affirmative need for a system that delivers a prompt conventional strike capability. 29:07 Uh, I would love to see those three countries discuss with each other what are their doctrines, what are their intents, and can we ensure stability by, for example, getting to an agreement that limits the number of such vehicles by each state so that they are not seen as a first strike capability for any of the states. 29:33 I think that's desirable. I have no confidence that the Trump administration is even thinking about it. 29:40 We've talked about some of the reasons why that is, including some of the more harmful, uh, impulses of the Trump administration, but I suppose the strategic thinking in Moscow and Beijing doesn't exactly help either. 29:52 Uh, that's correct. Um, there are certainly feedback loops among the three countries that part of the strategy is reacting to what the other guy is doing. 30:04 So for example, when the Russians build really crazy weapons, as I've mentioned before, 30:11 it's not just because they can do it and they think it's cool, it's because the United States is so focused on ballistic missile defense. 30:21 And they take seriously even the exaggerated boasting of President Trump when he says that the U.S. will make itself invulnerable to ballistic missile attack. 30:34 To Russian ears, that simply feeds their paranoia that the United States is seeking the capability to have a devastating first strike upon Russia. 30:46 And that's why they build weapons that can evade ballistic missile defenses. China is a different story. China has not participated in any of the arms control agreements so far. 31:00 But at the same time, China's nuclear arsenal is only about 300 warheads compared to about 6,000 each for the United States and Russia. 31:13 And even if it increases that number dramatically, it does not seem to be seeking the capability to launch a first strike against either the United States or Russia. 31:28 Rather, it fears such a first strike from the United States and has built an arsenal that is consistent with its promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Now, I don't necessarily 31:43 believe the Chinese no first use policy, but at least their current nuclear arsenal is consistent with that policy in a way that the U.S. and Russian arsenals are not. 31:58 So the three capitals will continue to look at each other, what they're working on, what they say their doctrine is. And until we can get to a real dialogue, first with Moscow and eventually with Beijing as well, 32:18 we will continue to misinterpret and overreact to the dumb things that each of us are doing. Now, to come back to a question I had asked before, what kind of leadership is it going to take from Trump's successor? 32:31 If that's in 2024, there will even be a new president of Russia. So what's it going to take to rectify all this? There could be a new president in Russia in 2024. I'm not sure there will be a new leader. Mr. 32:46 Putin has changed the constitution in a way that Mr. Trump must envy in order to ensure his continued dominance of Russian political life. That's a good point, yeah. What we would hope to see in a different U.S. 33:02 president and in a different American president is a recognition that there is no such thing as a nuclear victory. You cannot win a nuclear war. 33:17 Two leaders who had far greater integrity than the two current leaders, I'm talking about President Reagan and President Gorbachev, explained that very well when they made a joint statement in 1985 that simply said, nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. 33:38 The Trump administration today is incapable of repeating that truism. And as a consequence, we are all at greater risk. 33:50 When we have a president who is more focused on the reality of mutually assured destruction instead of the slogans about American superiority, I think we'll have the capability to have a more rational and a more stable arms control structure. 34:11 Well, Tom, I think it's fair to say that this is the first conversation I've had on the show that has been informative and genuinely terrifying at the same time, but also a little hopeful. 34:21 So thanks very much for joining us. 34:23 You should be terrified and you should be channeling your hope into actively engaging with American leaders and leaders in other countries to get us to a more sane and responsible policy. Well said. All right. 34:40 Thanks very much, Tom. Thank you. Tom Countryman is chair of the board of directors at the Arms Control Association. 34:55 If you'd like to comment on the discussion, ask a question, or even suggest a topic for a future episode, drop us a line at podcast at worldpoliticsreview.com. Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Dury. 35:07 You can follow him and WPR on Twitter. While you're at it, don't forget to sign up for our free daily newsletter. 35:13 It's the best way to keep up with what we're publishing, and you'll also get a code for a 25% discount off an annual subscription. To sign up, go to wpr.pub slash trendlines. That's wpr.pub slash trendlines. 35:30 Thanks for listening, and tune in again next week.
