Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Hello and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. 0:17 My name is Elliot Waldman, and I'm an associate editor here at WPR. Before we dive into today's interview, just a quick reminder to tune in again on Friday for our editors' discussion looking at the week's top headlines. 0:28 It's been almost a week since the U.S. 0:30 military assassinated Qasem Soleimani, a top Iranian general who headed the elite Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the reverberations of that strike are still being felt around the region. 0:41 Perhaps most significantly for the U.S., the killing of Soleimani at the Baghdad Airport has opened up a huge rift in its relationship with Iraq. 0:50 A high-ranking Iraqi commander of the Iranian-backed paramilitary group, the Popular Mobilization Forces or PMF, was also killed in the strike. 0:58 Joining me now to discuss the implications of the Soleimani strike for Iraq and its footing in the broader region is Sajjad Jiyad, managing director of the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies. 1:09 That's an independent think tank in Baghdad that focuses on public and foreign policy issues related to Iraq and the region. Sajjad, welcome to Trendlines. Thank you, Elliot. 1:18 So this is a very fast-moving situation, clearly, and keeping up with the pace of events is hard enough. 1:24 But earlier this week on Monday, we were treated to a really confusing news cycle where a letter was released apparently from the U.S. military command in Baghdad communicating to the Iraqi government that U.S. 1:35 troops were preparing to reposition themselves in response to, uh, the government of Iraq's request that they leave. Now, the Pentagon subsequently clarified that the letter was a draft and releasing it was a mistake. 1:47 But what exactly do we know at this point about Iraq's request and the apparent U.S. preparations to, uh, shift the military's presence in Iraq? 1:55 So yeah, I mean, on Sunday, um, the Iraqi parliament had a special session where they met to discuss the issue of foreign troops, and it resulted in a vote, 2:06 uh, by parliament that calls on the Iraqi government to request foreign troops to leave. Now, with regards to the U.S., the U.S. 2:15 is in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, and their sole mission, the mission that they're authorized to do, is to train, support, and advise Iraqi troops to fight against ISIS. 2:27 And that is the only, uh, reason the U.S. troops are in Iraq, and it is the only legal, uh, reason for the U.S. to be there. And based on this fact, the fact that the U.S. 2:39 had conducted airstrikes in Iraq, killing Iraqi citizens without approval of the Iraqi government, without authorization, uh, par- parliamentarians believe that to be in contravention of the mission of the U.S. 2:53 forces in Iraq. And based on this, they called on the government to push foreign troops out of Iraq. Now, it's not just the U.S. 3:00 It also involves other nations as part of the coalition who have contributed to, uh, having foreign troops based in Iraq to assist the Iraqi forces. 3:09 And it seems that, uh, the Iraqi government is now taking on this, uh, request from parliament and has already begun the steps to negotiate with the U.S. a withdrawal from Iraq. 3:20 The Iraqi prime minister met with the American ambassador on Monday, and he gave him the message that parliament has asked us to, uh, negotiate a withdrawal of foreign troops, and we want, uh, uh, to begin the process, uh, working with you to make sure that, uh, it's a smooth and, uh, you know, secure process. 3:43 At this moment in time, the Iraqi government has not formally asked foreign troops to leave, but it has communicated that it's going to follow up on parliament's request. 3:53 And based on this, I think the events of, uh, yesterday with regards to, um, the Pentagon chasing up, uh, the causes for such a letter being sent to, uh, Iraqi command saying that the U.S. 4:08 troops are preparing to leave, I think that is part of the process where they're preparing. Uh, it may not be happening right away right now, but I do think it looks like the U.S. 4:17 is preparing itself, uh, to withdraw from Iraq. 4:20 I should clarify for listeners that we're recording this on, uh, Tuesday, and by tomorrow when this episode goes live, there's a, a chance that things will have shifted again. 4:30 But for now, uh, what is the significance of this vote and this movement, uh, by the Iraqi government, even though it has not yet been formalized, to ask foreign troops to withdraw, especially given the, the long and, and tortured history, especially on the part of the U.S. 4:46 between Iraq, uh, following the U.S. invasion in, in 2003? I think there's significant moments in, uh, Iraqi-US relations. 4:55 Certainly, um, the Iraqi security forces appreciate how much the US has contributed to the fight against ISIS. Um, I think even pro-US politicians inside Iraq, uh, s- see this as a turning point in relations. 5:09 Um, I think people are very concerned about the possibility for escalation. 5:14 Uh, Secretary Pompeo, uh, was on record, I think earlier today, saying that i- if the U- Iranians retaliate in Iraq, then President Trump will do just what he did a few days ago, which to Iraqis means that the US is willing to carry out su- such airstrikes, is willing to escalate again against Iran. 5:32 And for us, that means, you know, war inside Iraq. Remember, these nations are not fighting in, in the US or in Iran, they're fighting in Iraq. And so I think what is happening is a, a, a shift in Iraqi-US relations. 5:44 I think even people that are very much appreciative of what the US has done in Iraq at this moment in time are saying, "Well, it looks like the US is willing to put, uh, you know, its interests ahead of ours. 5:54 It's willing to sacrifice, you know, Iraqi lives. It's willing to endanger Iraq or harm Iraq just to serve its anti-Iran agenda." And for us, uh, as a public, that's unacceptable. 6:05 And certainly, I think in parliament, they've showed that politically that's unacceptable. So there is a significant movement now to see this through. Um, we have to, you know, um, look at the realities. 6:16 This is, you know, um, a negotiation between countries. Uh, certainly, the Iraqis can just formally ask the US to leave. 6:23 But you saw yesterday there was talk about a potential for sanctions to be applied if the US is asked to leave. Uh, President Trump was certainly threatening that in comments a couple of days ago. 6:33 Uh, there was a report yesterday that even as we speak, sanctions are being drafted. People are studying this and potentially in the US administration, there are those who want to classify Iraq as an enemy country. 6:43 And so after years of being an ally and probably trillions of dollars being spent in Iraq, suddenly the US is looking at itself as considering potentially Iraq to be, uh, an enemy. 6:54 And I think for, for the Iraqi public, this is concerning that these great nations are willing to fight it out in our country. They do not really care about what happens to our country. 7:05 And even though they claim to be friendly and even though they claim to have invested a lot of blood and treasure and so on, at the end of the day, they're just there to fight amongst each other and really not consider what's going on in our country. 7:18 We've had protests for quite a while now in Iraq, but the US didn't really, uh, consider any of that. 7:23 Instead, it's decided to take these actions, um, regardless of what's going on in Iraq because it serves a particular agenda thereafter. Likewise, if the Iranians retaliate, it will be for the same reasons. 7:33 And so I think at this juncture, we're at a, a, a change, possibly a paradigm shift in the Iraqi-US relations. But at the moment, uh, you know, it's still in the negotiation phase. 7:44 So, uh, potentially in the next few days, few weeks, we'll get something a bit more formal, but it does look like something's underway at this moment. 7:51 You touched on a lot of things there that I-- all of which I want to follow up on. 7:55 But first, uh, maybe just briefly, if you could explain why the strike against Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad provoked such a fierce response from the Iraqi government. So I think I could answer that with a question as well. 8:08 If Qasem Soleimani was killed outside Iraq, would there be such a furious response in Iraq? I don't think so. 8:15 The fact that this took place in Iraq, but it also killed in that airstrike a senior member of Iraq's security forces, which is Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. 8:24 Uh, he was, uh, you know, for a few years, he was the deputy of the PMF, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and he was a very senior member of, uh, you know, the Iraqi security forces, and several other Iraqi citizens were killed in this airstrike. 8:38 So the fact was these were done without authorization by the Iraqi, uh, government, without the knowledge of the Iraqi government. They killed Iraqi citizens. They could have endangered other citizens. 8:50 And the fact that the US is, is not, uh, repentant at all. It's not apologized for conducting such actions. It's threatening to do, you know, similar things again. 8:59 And I think that's for us is what the concern is that, uh, the escalation, it, it looks to be happening, you know, in our country without any party interested in de-escalating. 9:08 So we don't really know what the future of the US military presence in Iraq will be at this point, but it seems inevitable that some degree of, of thinning out of the presence or at the very least a, uh, scaling back of cooperation is inevitable. 9:23 What kind of security implications do you think this will have, uh, particularly with regard to the campaign against ISIS, which as you mentioned, is the reason why US troops are there at the invitation of the government of Iraq? 9:35 All the security commanders in Iraq are, are quite, um, apprehensive about the potential for ISIS to be more active if the US begins some sort of drawdown or pullout. 9:45 The, uh, Iraqi forces rely on US, uh, support for, um, 9:52 air operations, for logistical support, for training, for the provision of weapons and munitions, for intelligence, um, even financial support for, for example, the counterterrorism service, our elite forces and the Peshmerga based i- in the Kurdistan region. 10:09 All of these are dependent on, uh, you know, US presence in Iraq, but also goodwill towards Iraq and funding from the Pentagon and so on. And once or if the US pulls out, all of these are, uh, under threat. 10:25 And if the US does pull out and does leave a vacuum and the Iraqi forces are not able to increase their cap- capabilities to meet, uh, all these needs and demands, it i-- there is potential for ISIS to be more active in Iraq, certainly in Anbar and western Iraq, potentially in, in Ninewa and northern Iraq and other hotspots that we've had in Diyala and Salahuddin and, and Kirkuk. 10:47 These areas north of Baghdad have all, all seen activity by ISIS in the last, uh, few weeks and months. 10:53 And certainly, if Iraq suddenly has a drop in its capacity to counter terrorism, then ISIS will be able to take advantage. 11:01 And I think that's one of the fears, um, that the public, but also our, our politicians have is what kind of gap in capacity will occur if the US pulls out, and if they pull out in such a way that there is no opportunity to cover that vacuum. 11:16 So yes, the, you know, security could get worse, deteriorate, that, that is certainly a potential, and our security commanders are worried about the, the potential for a drop in capacity if the US leaves. 11:26 I've seen some terrorism analysts, uh, speculate about whether the Iraqi security forces have the capacity and the ability to counter a resurgence of the Islamic State without, uh, the support and training and logistics that you mentioned, uh, that are being provided by foreign troops. 11:43 What would you say the capability of the, uh, Iraqi forces are, uh, on their own to counter such a resurgence? 11:50 I mean, you know, in 2014 to 2017 when the battles were being fought against ISIS, certainly it was Iraqi manpower that was, uh, you know, doing the fighting on the ground. So the Iraqis have the ability to fight ISIS. 12:03 They, they can, um, you know, pursue ISIS. They are doing so on a daily basis. There are raids against ISIS. There are, uh, counter-terrorism operations almost on a daily basis. 12:13 Um, ISIS is being pursued through vast territory and difficult terrain, through desert, through mountains, through border regions with, with Syria, um, through very hostile weather and territory. 12:26 And Iraqis are gonna be able to do this going forward. The issue is there will be gaps if the US is no longer supportive of such a mission. 12:33 We will struggle to be able to do this, uh, campaign against ISIS or to prevent the resurgence of ISIS very efficiently. 12:40 We'll have gaps in our surveillance, uh, gaps in being able to move troops around effectively, gaps in being able to, uh, prepare our troops for, um, a campaign against ISIS. 12:50 So we will be able to fight ISIS, but maybe not as effectively as we are, we are at the moment. And the concern is if that, uh, effectiveness of the forces drops, that ISIS will be able to take advantage. 13:02 We don't expect ISIS to be able to take over large territories as they did in 2014, take over cities and entire provinces. 13:09 But the fact is, if they're able to penetrate, uh, urban areas, if they're able to begin a campaign of, uh, you know, terrorist attacks, bombings, really shaking people's confidence in, in the Iraqi government and the security forces, that's probably the most damaging thing that you can have, is when you lose the trust and the confidence and the security of local citizens, and that's probably what ISIS will look to do, is to shake that, um, security situation. 13:34 So departure of the US forces won't suddenly mean a collapse in the Iraqi security forces, but it will lead to some gaps potentially, uh, in the fight against ISIS. 13:43 Shifting out to, uh, a broader perspective here, the Iraqi government has for a long time now had this very difficult tightrope to walk between the US, its primary security ally, and Iran, its, uh, very dominant, uh, larger neighbor. 13:59 How will this assassination of Soleimani and, and the fallout we're currently seeing from it affect, uh, Baghdad's balancing act there? I mean, it puts Baghdad in a very difficult position. Um, 14:11 Iran is, uh, Iraq's neighbor, and it always has been and it always will be. The US is currently an ally, uh, you know, previously was an enemy of Iraq, previously was an ally, previously was an enemy and again an ally. 14:25 And, you know, we don't know what the future will hold, but we know for certain Iran will still be Iraq's neighbor in the future. 14:31 So for Iraq, they don't want to be able to-- They don't want to be forced to choose between the US and Iran. They want to be allies of both, friends of both, on good terms, cooperating with both countries. 14:43 The US is a superpower. The US has a lot of interest in the Middle East. The US contributed a lot positively to Iraq. 14:50 Uh, but at the same time, now it looks like the US is willing to forgo part of that and willing to escalate and potentially damage Iraq for the sake of serving, uh, an agenda which includes combating Iran. 15:03 And for us, avoiding this choice has been foremost in our foreign policy, avoiding choosing between these two nations. We've been on good terms with both since 2003. 15:13 And going forward, that's what the priority is for both our politicians and also the public. We want to have good relations with both countries. We want to stop interference by both countries. 15:24 We want to prevent both countries from fighting a war inside Iraq, uh, which will damage Iraq foremost. But at the same time, we need to be able to prevent them from, uh, undertaking actions that we, we don't approve of. 15:36 It's very difficult to do so with Iran because Iran is heavily invested in Iraq. Iran has a, a, you know, a huge presence in terms of groups that are pro-Iran inside Iraq. 15:47 Um, Iran will continue to, to all it can to exert influence over Iraq. Uh, and the US likewise has got a huge investment in Iraq, um, and it's got, you know, 15:57 thousands of troops based in Iraq and spent a lot of money and it's continuing to do so. Uh, both these countries have a lot of influence. 16:03 Up until now, or the last few months, let's say, Iraq has managed to balance relations between the two countries and remain friendly and remain allied with both. 16:13 But it looks like in, uh, you know, the coming weeks, the negotiations will be very serious with the Americans to say, "Well, you've started the steps to put our position, uh, y- you know, very difficult towards maintaining healthy relations with you." 16:27 And likewise, we'll probably have discussions with the Iranians to say, "Well, if you retaliate, you will also make our relations with you, uh, you know, become m- more, more difficult because you are going to escalate against the US." 16:39 So it's becoming very difficult to balance, and going forward, I, I'm not sure if Iraq will be able to balance relations between the two. 16:46 Certainly, if it is going to go in one direction, it will probably go towards a more pro-Iran direction and anti-US direction. That is the, the likelihood. 16:55 But it just depends on, um, if there is a possibility for de-escalation, uh, what kind of moves the Americans make, um, what negotiations can occur with the Iranians to prevent an escalation, and certainly what kind of change can we see in the Iraqi government. 17:09 There, there is an outgoing prime minister. We're looking to have a new government come in. 17:14 Maybe there is a window of opportunity there that allows us to kind of carry on with this policy of non-alignment and friendly relations with both countries. 17:22 What kind of pressure is the government dealing with, uh, from the public? 17:26 You mentioned all these protests that have been sweeping Iraq in the past few months, uh, and, uh, there have been all these clashes with security forces, uh, hundreds of protesters have been killed, and, and a lot of that, those protests w- were because of economic issues and corruption, but also to protest interference in their country's affairs by both, uh, Iran and the US. 17:48 So how does that pressure, uh, deepen, uh, this difficulty for, for the government in Baghdad? Protests are still ongoing. Um, they're, uh, ongoing in Baghdad and several other cities through southern Iraq. Um, 18:02 we're not sure about the impact at the moment. 18:04 There is potential for the Iraqi security forces to, um, clamp down more on the protests, uh, to pressure potentially, uh, the protests to become more anti-US, um, and more pro-Iran. There's potential for that to happen. 18:20 Uh, regardless, I think whether protests continue or i- if they change direction, I think the underlying issues will continue to remain. 18:29 You know, we have problems with service delivery, you know, things around, uh, electricity, uh, safe drinking water, um, health, provision of education. 18:39 We have issues with, you know, reforms, political reforms, with, uh, fighting corruption, and obviously an issue around justice and, you know, these six hundred plus protesters that have been killed in the last couple of months. 18:51 People want to see accountability for that. People want to see justice for those. 18:54 And there are several other issues, you know, i-i-in Iraq that protesters have come out and have felt, um, you know, that they have been ignored and haven't been treated very seriously, certainly not by Iraq and absolutely not by any of Iraq's friends and allies, who seem to have ignored these protests. 19:09 So there is going to be some pressure, I think, on, on, on the government to heed what the protesters, um, demands are, but it- it's caught up in all this geopolitics. 19:20 I'm not sure if they have the capacity to do both at the same time, to deal with the potential of a war escalating inside Iraq between the US and Iran, and at the same time to try to deal with these really, um, deep kind of needs for reforms and change and to speak to protesters and win back their confidence and trust. 19:37 I'm not sure if they have the capacity to do so, certainly not this government, and we're not sure if the incoming government will be able to do so as well. 19:43 But for one thing, Iraqis I think will continue to protest regardless. Maybe, you know, these protests will end and another round will begin in a couple of months. 19:51 While these issues remain, issues around governance, issues around what government is able to do for its citizens, uh, or, or lack of it, I think protests will always be, uh, you know, something, uh, not, not far off. 20:02 And to add to all of those issues that you mentioned, uh, you have this threat by the Trump administration of sanctions that you mentioned earlier. 20:10 Uh, there was a report earlier this week that the, the administration is preparing sanctions that it can impose on Iraq should Trump decide to follow through on his threat. 20:19 Meanwhile, the US has also consistently granted a waiver to Iraq for the sanctions it has imposed on, um, Iranian oil and gas exports. But the threat is always there of that waiver being rescinded. 20:32 And, uh, so how do you think Iraq would respond if, if those waivers aren't renewed, or worse, if the US actually decides to follow through and impose sanctions directly on Iraq? 20:41 Certainly, we, we think the possibility is there that the US will not grant a waiver to, to Iraq on, on secondary sanctions. Um, you know, this has been hovering over Iraq for quite a while now, and 20:54 it's very difficult to expect that Iraq will suddenly be able to meet its commitments, uh, with regards to, you know, the US sanctions and disconnect itself completely from Iran's, uh, economy. 21:05 I, it's-- I don't think it's, it's feasible at this moment in time. And so I think the decision will fall onto the US. Uh, are they willing to sanction Iraq, or are they going to continue giving these waivers? 21:17 Is it, uh, feasible to sanction Iraq and then be able to punish Iraq for, you know, you know, um, falling afoul of those sanctions? We're not sure. 21:26 You know, if Iraq does, is not able to meet its commitments, if it's deemed to be in violation, what is the US going to do about it? What, what punishments are the US going to apply? 21:35 That's unclear at this moment in time. That's, of course, in addition to what you mentioned about potential for new sanctions, primary sanctions. 21:41 Uh, if the US is forced to withdraw or if the US feels that Iraq is suddenly, uh, becoming, you know, hostile towards the US, there is the potential for new pot- uh, sanctions to be applied. 21:52 They would be devastating to Iraq, Iraq's economy. They would also put Iraq on an, on a, on a hostile footing with, with the US. 21:58 Certainly, the entire public and most of the political class would become, uh, strongly anti-US, and I think that would be a danger to US interests throughout the Middle East and not, certainly not something that would be, uh, easily explainable to the American public that after, you know, years of investment of, you know, billions of dollars and all the lives lost, uh, in Iraq, suddenly the US is going to become an enemy of Iraq. 22:20 I don't, I don't think that makes, uh, much sense. But the potential is there. Certainly, President Trump was talking about it, and it's of a huge concern to Iraqis at this moment in time. 22:28 Remember, Iraq suffered tremendously under sanctions in the '90s. Uh, you know, ordinary people were the ones who were crushed by the sanctions. The regime didn't suffer. Saddam Hussein was able to stay in power. 22:37 Him and, you know, the elites around him probably gained from sanctions, but the average Iraqi suffered tremendously. 22:44 The poverty levels, the, the levels of suffering, the people that died due, due to malnutrition, you know, all these other issues, uh, that came about because of sanctions, people still remember them and remember them bitterly. 22:56 A- and if America is threatening Iraq with this, it's, you know, almost an invitation for war. 23:01 So I think, uh, it's not something that's on the table at this moment in time, but the fact that a report saying the US is considering it is deeply worrying for most of Iraqis. 23:10 In terms of the economic ties between Iran and Iraq, Iran has also tried to make a lot of overtures to Iraq to, uh, to try to deepen that relationship, partly because of the, uh, crushing weight of sanctions that have been posed by the US, no? 23:25 I mean, i- for Iran, um, it's extremely important for them to have Iraq remain as a friendly country, but also for Iraq to be invested in Iran's economy and vice versa. 23:36 You know, we trade around a billion dollars' worth of, of, of goods with Iran on a, on a monthly basis. And for Iran, they only want to see that increase. 23:44 And as much as, uh, you know, they have good ties with other countries, I think the, the number one nation that the Iranians look to to maintain healthy relations with is Iraq. 23:54 So I think they're willing to do all they can to, you know, develop the relations with Iraq. 23:58 They're willing to do all they can to influence Iraq and, and to deepen that, and they believe there is strategic depth in maintaining those sort of ties with, with Iraq. 24:06 And since 2003, the Iranians have, uh, done their best at various times using different methods, whether it be, uh, intimidation or coercion, or whether it's You know, through financial opportunities, through development, through security assistance, deepening cultural and religious ties, whatever they can to kind of align Iraq and Iran together. 24:26 And I don't think the U.S. has been very successful in trying to reverse Iranian influence in Iraq. Unfortunately, 24:33 the fact is that they're both still willing to fight each other out in Iraq, regardless of how friendly they are with Iraq as a country. They're both willing to put that aside and fight each other in our country. 24:46 I think that's the concern that we have is despite being friendly with both countries and considered allies, they're willing to, you know, dispense with that and fight 24:59 each other and combat each other's interests and influence in Iraq because they view Iraq as potentially more expendable than the direct conflict between the two. 25:08 So at the moment, Iran is, you know, invested heavily in Iraq and will continue to do so. Iran is a member, sorry, is a neighbor of Iraq and will remain a neighbor for the foreseeable future. The U.S. 25:21 is in the Middle East, is in Iraq at the moment, but we don't know if they will be going forward. They might pull out of Iraq, they might pull out of the Middle East, but Iran will always remain there. 25:29 So for us, I think, you know, we understand that we have to maintain healthy and good relations with Iran and we want to maintain healthy relations with other countries as well. But at the moment, the U.S. 25:39 is making things quite difficult and the Iranians are willing to retaliate as well. And so looking ahead to maybe the middle to long term here, assuming this rift between the U.S. 25:50 and Iraq continues to grow, do you expect Iran will try to capitalize on that? Potentially. I think, you know, the Iranians are strategic and I think they understand Iraq very well. 26:01 They also understand, you know, how the U.S. operates. So I think they will try to take advantage of any rift in Iraq-U.S. relations. It really depends on what the U.S. does, though. I'm sure there are 26:16 officials and diplomats, American officials and diplomats in Iraq who really understand how important it is to be invested in Iraq and who want to maintain relations with Iraq, who believe that there is, you know, a strategic priority for the U.S. 26:30 to remain in Iraq and to maintain healthy relations with Iraq. But, you know, it depends on what people in Washington, D.C. decide. 26:38 If they decide that Iraq has no value, if Iraq is hostile and they should pull out or apply sanctions, then, of course, that deepens the rift. So, I mean, it's not wholly up to Iran how much they influence Iraq. 26:48 It really depends also on what the U.S. wants out of this relationship. 26:52 And I think, you know, we've had a good successful period between 2014 to 2018 where Iraq had a lot of assistance from the U.S., had a lot of assistance from Iran, maintained healthy relations with both countries and did not see any sort of conflict between Iran and the U.S. 27:08 inside Iraq. And these were good for years. I think that's probably what Iraq wants to get back to. 27:13 And I don't think the Iranians would have any problems with Iraq going back to that period where they're friendly with both countries and we've avoided conflict with both and there are no escalations and everybody seems to be getting along. 27:25 And for the U.S., I think that was a good period as well. So probably that's something that we should work to, you know, looking at a potential for Iraq to maintain good relations with both countries. 27:34 All right, Sajjad, thanks very much for joining us today. Thank you. 27:46 Sajjad Jiyad is Managing Director of the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, an independent think tank based in Baghdad. 27:54 If you'd like to comment on the discussion, ask a question, or even suggest a topic for a future episode, I hope you'll drop us a line at podcast at worldpoliticsreview.com. 28:03 Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Dury. You can follow him and World Politics Review on Twitter. And while you're at it, don't forget to leave us a nice review wherever you get your podcasts. 28:13 Thanks for listening, and tune in again next week.
