Transcript 0:00 [intro music] Welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. My name is Peter Dory, and we are back to our regular scheduled program this week. 0:14 Russia has a conflicting relationship with its Muslim population. 0:18 While xenophobia has been on the rise and sometimes been political instrumentalized, the government of President Putin has also strived to form tight bonds with Islamic clerics and elites. 0:28 Robert Crews will join us later to explain the dynamics of this relationship and how the Russian government hopes to use, ho-hopes to use it to fulfill its domestic and international ambitions. 0:38 But first, I'm joined as always by WPR editor-in-chief Judah Grunstein to discuss this week's major developments in international politics. So Judah, what was going on in the world this week? 0:49 Well, we ran a great briefing by Rouzbeh Parsi on Iran's parliamentary elections, uh, the outcome of which has been portrayed by some observers as a victory for the so-called moderates and reformists, and by others as a camouflaged victory for the status quo, uh, mainly because of the pre-election screening in Iran that barred most of the true reformist candidates from running. 1:17 And w-Rouzbeh explains why the results are in fact ambiguous, 1:23 and, uh, he argues that they will probably strengthen the hand of, uh, President Hassan Rouhani to implement some of the economic reforms, and particularly an opening to foreign investment, which was the guiding logic from Iran's perspective behind the nuclear deal, and on which Rouhani has really based his presidency. 1:46 Um, but Rouzbeh cautions that we won't really know for sure who really won this election until the parliament convenes and starts voting on con-concrete legislation, and he explains why that is. 1:59 Um, his, his major takeaway, though, 2:02 is that the elections reflect the Iranian people's disavowal when given the choice of ideological hardliners in favor of, of more pragmatic alternatives, even if, uh, those alternatives don't really correspond to the categories of moderate and reformist that outside observers use to describe them. 2:24 So it's a great piece, very nuanced, and, uh, offers quite a lot of insight into how to really, uh, understand the outcome of those elections. 2:34 And in addition, you also ran a briefing on the response of South Korea to, uh, North Korea's, um, recent launch of a satellite. 2:43 Yes, Jonathan Berkshire Miller, uh, looked at the response, particularly the launch of a satellite using a rocket that could eventually be configured and deployed as an ICBM, an intercontinental ballistic missile. 2:58 Um, and in fact, Seoul just now opened talks officially with Washington on deploying, deploying a missile defense system known as THAAD, which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and it's a system that intercepts missiles at a much earlier point in their traject-trajectory than the Patriot anti-missile batteries that South Korea already has. 3:23 Uh, the, the, the main issues behind this development is that the US has been pushing South Korea to deploy this THAAD system for a while, uh, but Seoul has resisted in order to avoid ch-tensions with China, which is very opposed to, to deploying the system on the Korean palis- peninsula, because it believes that ultimately the system is, is, is meant basically to neutralize its own strategic ICBMs and by consequence, China's nuclear deterrent against the United States. 3:57 So China perceives this as yet another US effort to contain China's rise, and Jonathan's article, 4:05 uh, illustrates the ways in which addressing the region's political and security challenges, particularly on the Korean peli- peninsula, is complicated by a variety of interconnected parts and depe-dependent variables that make even a, a step that seems somewhat logical, very fraught with consequences. 4:24 There's a very interesting parallel, parallel here to Iran, where the US, uh, tried to establish a missile defense system in Eastern Europe and Russia, um, took, uh, exception to that, um, on, on mainly the same re, um, grounds that, uh, that China did in the case of South Korea. 4:42 Very much so, and i-in, in a lot of ways, the arguments are, that, that, uh, Russia and China used are very similar in the sense that, uh, Iran at this point doesn't even really have intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. 4:58 They're still in the testing phases of ballistic missiles, but nothing that could actually reach Europe, so very premature really to deploy that kind of missiles, anti- anti-missile system in Europe. And China is arguing 5:12 w-with some validity that the THAAD system is not particularly relevant or well-adapted to the missile threat that's posed by North Korea's missiles. 5:21 So, so in both cases, there is an argument to be made, at the same time that the, Washington has, has always, uh, countered that it's willing to take into consideration, in particular, Russia's concerns and adapt the systems, uh, to, to respond to them. 5:40 But in both cases, yes, very much a case of, uh, uh, a, a particular sys- weapo- weapon system having ambiguous uses that, uh, that, that create anxieties among major rivals and great powers in the region. Hmm. 5:58 And you, uh, had an, um, a column by Frida Ghitis about a topic that we talked about in some of the, our earlier episodes, uh, the ongoing peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla. 6:13 Yes, Frieda focused in particular on the political headwinds that Colombia President Juan Manuel Santos is facing now, particularly in the home stretch of those talks because both sides set a deadline of March twenty-third for reaching a final deal. 6:32 And they've tentatively agreed already on most of the major chapters of the deal, but they still need to hammer everything into shape and, and finalize the final document. 6:42 And the problem or the, the dilemma that Santos is facing is that it's very clear from opinion polls that Colombia-- Colombians want peace, but at the same time, they're skeptical of some of the particular details of the det-- of the deal as it's been, uh, made public so far, and particularly the chapter on transitional, transitional justice, which many Colombians consider to be too lenient on former guerrillas in terms of the penalties and punishments that they might face. 7:14 And Santos has promised a referendum on the deal, so now he's sort of caught between needing to compromise in the negotiations with the FARC to reach a deal, but also not compromise too much so that he can mobilize popular support for the, the, the final agreement that's signed. 7:34 And as Frieda makes very clear and, and details in her, in her column, his ability to mobilize that support has been undermined right now, uh, in particular by a slowing economy, but also some corruption scandals that have been tied to some high-ranking members of his cabinet. 7:52 So a tricky time for Santos at a particularly crucial moment in the negotiations, and in a lot of ways, the 8:03 stability of the peace agreement that's reached and, and the sustainability and the government's ability to, first of all, have it passed, and second of all, implement it, is very much at stake right now. Okay. 8:17 Very interesting stuff. Thank you for coming in again this week. Thank you very much for having me. It's been a pleasure. 8:22 [upbeat music] Internationally, Muslims in Russia usually make the headlines either as the protagonists of terrorist attacks or the victims of xenpho-xenophobic violence. 8:34 But the relationship between Russ-- the Russian state and its considerable Muslim population is more complicated than, than that. 8:41 For this week's report, Robert Crews of Stanford University joins us to discuss the interesting approach the Kremlin takes towards I-Islam, both in domestic and foreign policy. My name is Robert Crews. 8:56 I teach in the History Department at Stanford University in California, um, where I'm also the current director of the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies. 9:05 Russia actually is, is home to some twenty million Muslims, so in Moscow alone, there may be as many as four million Muslims. 9:13 I think their most striking feature, if I may say, is, uh, or what interests me most about them is the way in which the Russian state has attempted to manage this population, attempted to, uh, especially rely on Muslim clerical elites to act as intermediaries, um, and to, um, most recently, the, the state has been interested in using these Muslim clerics to, 9:39 um, advance Russia's foreign policy goals in the Middle East and South Asia. As in the nineteenth century, early being under Catherine the Great in the late eighteenth century, Russian elites have, um, 9:51 seen Islam as a kind of tradition. You know, it's one that they don't regard on the same plane as Orthodox Christianity, of course, but they appreciate that this is, uh, or they imagine it to be a, 10:03 a force for some kind of ordering, a force for creating social hierarchies, for giving Russian law some kind of extra legitimacy. 10:14 That is, by seeking to, to tie Russian state policies to religious principles, they hope that, that, uh, you know, the sanctity of religion can be, um, applied to Russian law. And they do this by, um, 10:30 by offering patronage to Russian clerics, and that, that's quite subtle and complicated, but in, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, there emerged several different Islamic institutions. 10:41 That is, several different clerical bodies which were hierarchical, which meant to manage mosque communities, which meant to, 10:49 uh, announce the arrival of or proclaim the development of a new kind of post-Soviet Islam at a moment when lots of Russian Muslims wanted to, um, ask questions about the faith. 11:01 What, what did it mean to be Muslim, uh, after, you know, a lifetime, generations of, of official Soviet atheism? 11:09 So all those questions about rediscovering Islam or, or enjoying a revival or kind of renaissance or return to Islam, some would have it, uh, was very much the work of these clerical bodies. And, uh, in order to, 11:23 to realize these plans, to imagine this future, to rethink what religion meant, of course, they needed resources. Um, they needed some way to project their authority. 11:33 In many cases, these figures have looked to, looked to the state for this kind of support. [upbeat music] President Vladimir Putin traveled to the Russian city of Ufa on Tuesday to meet and exchange with Muslim clerics. 11:51 Some political forces use Islam, the radical currents within it, by the way, not typical for Russian Muslims, to weaken our state and create conflicts on Russian soil that can be managed from abroad. 12:06 President Putin took this opportunity to warn unspecified foreign rivals not to use Islam to weaken the Russian state. He was speaking about one thousand kilometers northeast of Volgograd. 12:19 He urged the clerics to help Muslim immigrants adapt to life in Russia to reduce the likelihood of violence. The Kremlin expected to, uh, find in these leaders people who would 12:35 bring the faithful along, uh, that they would have subjects who would be more closely tied to Moscow's policies, that they would, um, adopt a kind of patriotic vision of Islam. 12:49 That- that's certainly been the, the accent of the, the recent Putin years, where Putin has invited these clerics to, uh, cultivate a, a distinctively Russian 12:59 Muslim theological school in which state loyalty and state patriotism are absolutely fundamental to their understanding of Islam. Um, the Russian government has also expected these groups to, or these clerical bodies to 13:16 join in the, the project of policing Islam in, in the Russian Federation. That is, in rooting out, 13:24 uh, so-called extremist viewpoints, uh, rooting out people who might become militants, who, uh, may introduce ideas which they regard as being foreign to Russia's Muslim communities. 13:37 Um, so really it's, these, these people are meant to be, these clerics are meant to be intermediaries who, who work between the state and the population and who 13:47 cultivate the loyalties of, of Muslims, um, towards the Russian state. So in building up these, these domestic institutions, you know, the one aim, of course, was to divert, 13:59 um, Russia's Muslims from looking to, you know, Saudi authorities or Turkish authorities and so on. And in the 1990s, this was very important because, 14:07 uh, the Russians faced a major insurgency in the North Caucasus, firstly in Chechnya, but at times in Dagestan. 14:15 And there too, the Russians pursued a policy of attempting to cultivate Russian authorities who would advance a kind of loyalist cause, but also oppose foreign fighters and foreign missionaries, any people who would attempt to direct Russia's Muslims 14:33 to theological schools or interpretations, um, abroad. [dramatic music] [gunshots] Sophisticated Russian hardware seemingly on Syria's frontline. 14:47 The US says its intelligence also shows Moscow increasing support for President Assad. Moscow has been a key military supplier to Damascus for decades. 14:57 Watching exercises here at home this weekend, Vladimir Putin has his own vision on Syria. He argues that supporting President Assad is now vital to stop the spread of terrorism. 15:10 Most recently, uh, as you know, Russia has taken a greater interest in Middle East politics, particularly in, in Syria and, and in Iran, um, and in the last few months, even in, in Afghanistan. 15:23 So there it's striking to see that, uh, Russia's Muslim elites have been invited to, to speak about Russia's role abroad, to speak to Russian audience, Russian Muslim audiences, but also to 15:38 Russia's, uh, Muslim neighbors to try to tell a global Muslim audience what Russian policy is, and specifically to try to convey the view that Russia has not gone over to the side of the Shia. 15:54 Uh, of course, in Syria, they're backing Bashar al-Assad and in, in Iran, of course, they have a, a close relationship with the Islamic Republic. 16:03 And some critics have said this is essentially, um, an alliance with Shia powers. And one important task that the 16:12 Russian Muslim clerics have been given is to tell their own populations in the world that in fact, they are keen on good relations with all Muslims. 16:22 That is, that they're not partisan, they're not engaged in a sectarian conflict. 16:27 And both these strands, the domestic and the international, came together in 2014 when Russian clerics played a very important role in traveling to the newly annexed Crimea. 16:39 Um, and there, of course, they tried to assuage the anxieties of Crimean Tatars, most of whom are Muslim, um, and Crimean Muslim religious authorities. They tried to convince them that they would be 16:54 safe, they would have security 16:57 as citizens of the Russian Federation, that, that the shift from Ukrainian statehood to Russian statehood would actually be good for these Russian Muslims because they would be joining a larger Muslim community, joining these twenty million Muslims, and that 17:11 they would be stronger, um, as part of this wider community which enjoyed Russian state support. So in Crimea, these, these two strands really came together because, because of course this was, 17:22 uh, this was a foreign territory which suddenly became domestic territory. So the, the Russian Muslim clerics or a number of them were, were pushed forward to mediate that process. 17:34 The domestic part, I think it's been a very striking success, particularly if we look comparatively, if we look at the ways in which 17:43 other European powers, um, or indeed the United States have, have tried to come to terms with, uh, integrating, uh, 17:52 and addressing the interests of large Muslim communities, many of whom are, are immigrants or, or migrants. Somehow, I think the way in which 18:01 Kremlin is attempting to manipulate these figures, and these figures are attempting to in turn use the Kremlin in a particular way. But if you go beyond this leadership and go out into mosque communities, 18:14 these people are, are, you know, of course, very rooted in, in these locales, very rooted, um, within Russian state institutions and, you know, they, they are- 18:25 Often quite patriotic Russians who are also quite loyal to, uh, the Kremlin and to Putin's system of rule. It's not clear that Muslims in Turkey, in the UAE, 18:41 you know, in, in Nigeria, in Iran, that, that any countries would look to Russian Muslim leaders as alternative authorities. And I think the, that's not exactly what the Russian Muslim leaders are trying to do. 18:54 I mean, they're, they're not trying to replace Muslim leaders elsewhere, but they're attempting to gain a seat at the, at the table when larger conversations occur among Muslim elites representing different nations. 19:09 They want, they want to be acknowledged as, as serious Muslim intellectuals. 19:15 They want to be, to be recognized as leaders of a, of a Muslim country, a country that, that, um, i- is a very important Muslim power, as some would put it. 19:23 Um, as, as a power that, that, that acts, um, in a way that is, you know, we would regard it from the outside as imperial, right? But they would see it as, uh, the, the resurgence of Russia's great power status. 19:39 I think many Muslim clerical elites who speak about this, who write about this, 19:44 um, embrace that status for Russia and see that this is also a means for them to elevate their profile internationally and for them to assert some leadership in broader debates about Islam. 19:56 [Instrumental music] 20,000 square meters, six floors, and a capacity of 10,000. This is Moscow's newest and largest mosque, a building that cost about 150 million euros. 20:10 The Russian president himself led the grand opening with special guests in attendance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, both having contributed to building the mosque. 20:22 For Vladimir Putin, the goal was to ease relations with the Muslim community in the predominantly Christian Orthodox country. Traditional Islam today is an inherent part of our country's spiritual life. 20:36 Its human values, as well as the values of our other traditional religions, teach people about mercy, justice, and taking care of their loved ones. European leaders 20:50 don't currently see something that they would like to emulate in their own countries today. I think one would have to highlight, um, the very important fact that for the Russian state, there is toleration for Islam. 21:04 They treat... It's in the Constitution as one of Russia's so-called historical religions. It's often referred to as one of Russia's religious traditions alongside Judaism and, and Orthodoxy and, and Buddhi- and Buddhism. 21:18 Um, but this does not mean laissez-faire toleration in, in the liberal sense that one can believe what one wants. This is very much a, a more limited spectrum 21:30 of theological viewpoints, um, which the state polices, uh, partly on its own, partly through these Muslim clerics. So 21:39 this is, uh, certainly a, we call it a kind of a managed Islam, uh, uh, one that the state is very keen on policing, again, to, to root out what they regard as 21:50 elements of extremism, of militancy, of course, with anxiety being that, that this will eventually lead to acts of terror or of, of some other kind of political opposition. So there, there are questions about, 22:05 in a liberal context, questions about freedom of conscience that, that make this Russian model untenable in, in most countries in, in Western Europe and perhaps the United States and elsewhere. But 22:21 if one looks beyond that, I mean, one has to acknowledge that as a, as a starting point, but if one thinks about, for example, Putin's appearance at, uh, the, a, a mosque opening in September of last year, 22:38 it is quite striking that, that Putin appeared there. 22:40 He spoke about all that was positive about the mosque and all that was wonderful about Russian Islam, and he invited, uh, Erdogan from Turkey and, um, Abbas was there from Palestine. 22:54 There were various dignitaries from across the Russian Federation and, and the neighboring states. Um, and Putin quoted from the Quran and he said very positive things about, about Islam and, and Muslims in Russia. 23:10 And that, something about the tone of that, though it comes from Putin, you know, it's, it's hard, it's... I'm not endorsing, uh, any of his politics, but that was a striking contrast, the way that 23:20 though, though we may call it cynical, though we may call it, um, of course, instrumental, there's no question that it, it is instrumental, but 23:29 to contrast that, say, with Barack Obama's policies, you know, it's equally striking that Barack Obama, uh, visited a, a mosque, I think officially for the first time only two months ago, I think, in the United States. 23:42 Symbolically, uh, Putin's overtures to, to Muslims might be something that European and American elites might look more closely at, um, because it, it sends a, a public message that these people belong here. 23:58 [Instrumental music] My thanks to Robert for these insights. You can read the full article, which is titled A Patriotic Islam? Russia's Muslims Under Putin, on worldpoliticsreview.com. 24:12 Thank you for tuning in again this week. Please make sure to subscribe to Trendlines on iTunes or another podcast app of your choice. It would also be great if you could leave a comment or review there. 24:23 That really helps other people to discover the show and it helps us to make the show better. Trendlines is produced and edited by me, Peter Dory. 24:30 You can follow me and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to pieces covering the issues we talked about today in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 24:39 The additional audio used in the report was sourced from Euronews, the BBC, and France 24. Have a fantastic weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines. [Instrumental music]
