Transcript 0:02 [intro music] Hello, and welcome to Trendlines, a podcast on international affairs by World Politics Review. My name is Peter Durrie. 0:17 Before we get started, a quick reminder that you can find show notes for this and all prior episodes at worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast. 0:24 And if you never want to miss out on an episode, you can subscribe to Trendlines on any podcast app of your choice, including Apple Podcasts and Spotify. 0:32 Until a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine sucked the oxygen out of the room, many observers worried about another global power getting involved in an escalation of violence in its immediate neighborhood, China. 0:44 The Chinese leadership has made no secret of its desire to expand its control over a large share of the South China Sea, as well as the island of Taiwan, bringing it into direct conflict with the strategic interests of the United States and its allies in the region. 0:59 And while these claims have a long history, China has used recent years to systematically build up the military capabilities to support them. 1:07 Practically all actors in the region are either openly discussing how to deter a military intervention by Chinese forces or are quietly preparing for such a scenario. 1:16 But traditionally, much of this deterrence is focused on US assets in the region, especially the Navy's aircraft carrier groups that have long been the ultimate symbol of global power projection. 1:26 But Chinese advancements in the development of ballistic anti-ship missiles and the modernization of its air force and navy, including the deployment of two aircraft carriers, are increasingly putting US deterrence into question. 1:38 Joining me today to discuss Chinese priorities in the s- South China Sea and beyond, as well as the balance of military power and the risk of escalation of conflict in the region, is Timothy Heath, senior defense researcher at the RAND Corporation in Washington, specializing in Chinese military affairs. 1:55 Timothy, welcome to Trendlines. Glad to be here. Just to bring everyone up to speed, what are China's main regional policy priorities? 2:06 How do they conflict with the interests of neighboring countries, the United States, and its allies in the region? 2:12 And historically, how has China's use or the threat of military force evolved in furthering its goals in the region? Well, when we look at China's regional priorities, it... 2:26 I think an important first step is to recognize the overall goals and ambitions of the Chinese leadership. 2:35 The Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping has set out this vision of national revival that he has called the China Dream, and this China Dream requires, first and foremost, a series of domestic policy imperatives, including sustained economic growth, political stability, and, uh, the continuation of Chinese Communist Party rule. 3:01 The reason why this is important is the leadership must always consider how escalation may or may not threaten those domestic goals which are the foundation of Chinese Communist Party rule. 3:16 So it's important to bear that in mind first. Second, when we look at the region, there are a series of issues that the leadership is trying to make progress on from China's perspective. First off, there's Taiwan. 3:32 From Beijing's point of view, Taiwan's continued de facto sovereignty and autonomy is a painful reminder of the country's failure to close the chapter on its civil war and restore its national unity, and therefore the, the leadership is committed to finding a way to, 3:52 uh, gain control of Taiwan. 3:55 Uh, another regional priority is the strengthening of Chinese control over the East and South China Seas, and the reason why they seek that is to, uh, extend a security buffer off its very vulnerable coastlines 4:13 and to gain control over valuable resources such as minerals, fishing, and to, uh, afford better protection to some very important trade lanes, uh, going up and down the coast and through the Indian Ocean. 4:28 So that's another priority. There are, are still some unresolved border issues, such as with India. That's a security priority, regional priority. And then 4:39 I think another important, uh, priority for the Chinese government, foreign policy priority, is, uh, is this, the security needs of the Belt and Road Initiative. That's a s- 4:54 It's a major multi-hundred billion dollar ambitious project to build infrastructure and connectivity with countries through Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, all the way to Europe, through Africa, and even extending to Latin America. 5:13 Many of these countries are very troubled, uh, with their own array of security needs, and if China's gonna be a reliable partner and protect its overseas economic interests, it needs to find a way to, uh, p- provide enhanced security for, uh, its partner countries. 5:32 So there's a long list of requirements for the PLA. 5:37 Um, we mostly focus in the US, especially in the US defense establishment, we mainly focus on the challenge posed by the PLA to Taiwan due to the high risk of escalation. 5:48 But I think it's important to bear in mind all these different needs of the Chinese government, uh, 'cause that, because that allows us to appreciate both the risks and the limitations Uh, on China's ability to escalate any kind of conflict And to, to what extent do these priorities stand in opposition to US interests? 6:12 You've already mentioned Taiwan, um, but what... why exactly is the US interested in, in guaranteeing Taiwanese independence, um, and also, um, opposing certain, uh, priorities of the Chinese leadership en route? Yeah. 6:27 So yes, the US and the Chinese disagree sharply on several issues. There is Taiwan. Taiwan is a long-standing partner of the United States. Uh, it's a democracy, a thriving democracy. 6:41 It's one of America's top 10 or 15 trade partners, and, uh, its location astride a vital shipping lane, 6:52 um, especially for Japan, but South Korea, uh, means that Taiwan's fate bears directly on the health of American alliances in Japan, South Korea, uh, throughout East Asia. So the US has an interest in the fate of Taiwan. 7:10 Um, second, there's the South China Sea and the East China Sea. 7:14 The East China Sea, uh, is an, is a, is an important area for Japan, and again, the US stands by its ally, Japan, therefore, the disagreement between China and Japan over the Senkakus, the US has an interest in seeing that be resolved peacefully out of concern for the well-being of its, uh, ally. 7:36 In the South China Sea, um, the disagreement between the US and China centers on the importance of those waterways. 7:43 The Chinese want to gain a stronger control over those waters really to, uh, in part limit US military access in these waters. 7:53 But the US really values the South China Sea, not only as an important merchant shipping lane, it's a critical conduit for US naval ships traveling to the Indian Ocean and to Central Asia, and therefore, the US military is determined to maintain its freedom of movement through those waters and, uh, a- and the Chinese obviously disagree with that and, and that's a source of tension as well. 8:20 So we should probably emphasize that China doesn't have as r- a very intense history of military intervention abroad, and something that the Chinese leadership would also, uh, point to in, in, in, in these discussions. 8:34 But obviously all militaries, including the Chinese military, um, always try, uh, with historically very mixed results, uh, to prepare for any challenges that might lie ahead for the next war, so to speak. 8:50 And given that, what kind of war is China's military preparing for, and how does that express itself in the terms of weapon systems, military posture, and doctrine that it is developing? Yeah. 9:04 So the PLA, that's the People's Liberation Army, that's the Chinese military's name, has a vision of what they call informatized or in- informationized warfare, and it is building a military around this concept. 9:22 It's this vision of a technologically advanced military that relies on a digital network of sensors, communications, computers, and intelligence and information-sharing technologies in order to allow 9:40 a joint force, including air, naval, ground, missile, cyber, other forces, to operate as a, as a unified, integrated, uh, well-coordinated force. 9:56 The goal of the combat force is to strike the enemy's command and control or key nodes in its ability to operate and inflict a crippling damage that makes the enemy force unable to operate as a cohesive, unified whole. 10:15 This would allow the PLA to defeat each individual platform in turn. Uh, essentially you cut off and isolate every tank or airplane or ship, cut, cut their communication links, and they can destroy each one bit by bit 10:29 as you need to. 10:30 So that's the vision that is driving the, uh, acquisition of stealth fighters, stealth bombers, uh, advanced surface-to-air missile systems, and the s- uh, C4ISR, which is command and control, computer, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, all the digital communication technologies that tie it all together in one integrated network. 10:57 Uh, that's the current vision. Now, it's worth noting that the PLA has outlined an even more ambitious vision of what they call intelligentized warfare for the future. This is where they wanna go. 11:10 They want to go in a direction that builds on the information-centric concept, uh, in direction of greater automation, greater use of artificial intelligence, robots, unmanned systems, 11:26 and the, the goal here is to build a integrated joint force that can 11:32 operate at extremely fast speeds in terms of decision-making and, uh, has great transparency or ability to perceive the entire battlefield, quickly identify adversaries, and be able to strike them, um, in, in, you know, a very fast, uh, combat pace. 11:52 So that's the vision. Now, that's for combat operations. 11:55 That's the main driver of a lot of the PLA's modernization, but I do wanna highlight that there is another aspect to the PLA's development, and that is the focus on non-combat missions, which I think are also very important Um, the PLA recognizes that its most likely missions in the near term for sure, 12:16 and possibly out to the future, are a series of non-combat missions. These include everything from counter piracy to, uh, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, 12:29 those kind of missions, and the PLA is actually devoting, uh, quite a bit of resources to building out capabilities to do those kind of missions and tasks, which it's already doing. 12:40 Um, they're adding large transport aircraft, for example, the Y- the Yun-20, it's the Y-20. 12:47 They are expanding the ranks of the Marine Corps who will serve in these overseas missions from, uh, some, like, 10 to 20,000 to up to 120,000 troops. Um, they're looking to build more overseas bases. 13:02 Um, they have one in Djibouti, but they're looking for additional ones, and they're adding more long-distance, uh, ships, transport, uh, auxiliary or supply ships and, uh, other, uh, large ocean-going ships in order to support these, uh, uh, power projection capabilities. 13:20 So it's a, it's a, uh, multi-directional modernization program that's going on with the PLA. 13:28 And how well would you say is the US military and its allies, how well are they adapted to this vision? 13:40 And in the case of an escalation of violence, um, how well would the US be positioned to, uh, counter some of these ambitions of, uh, of the Chinese military? 13:51 Well, for years, US had a very strong deterrence because we had by far, 14:00 uh, the superior ships, aircraft, missiles, and, uh, and information networks that allowed us to dominate any potential battle. But that picture has changed a lot in recent years. 14:15 The Chinese advances, in particular in surface-to-air missiles, uh, they have some missiles that can range out to, you know, uh, hundreds or if not thou- uh, several hundred nautical miles. 14:29 Um, the advances in anti-ship missiles, which extend, in some cases, out to, uh, three to 5,000 kilometers, 14:39 um, and the advent of new submarines, uh, modern warships, destroyers, frigates, and stealth fighters, all these capabilities together can be used to, uh, inflict heavy losses on any US military force that might try to intervene in a operation near China's coast, such as Taiwan. 15:04 So it is this, uh, this, uh, col- collective group of capabilities, sometimes called counter intervention or anti-access area denial capabilities, that are really stressing the ability of the US military to intervene in any contingency and, and raising questions throughout the Asia-Pacific region about the credibility of US military power. 15:29 What is the political effect of this development? 15:33 So if the US, uh, if the deterrent effect of u- the US military is put into question, if the traditional, um, if the traditional, uh, uh, m- military capabilities of, of the US military are no longer sufficient to, uh, to counter the Chinese military, um, what does that mean for US interests in the region, for, for its relationship with its allies? 16:00 Well, there are several effects that we have observed already. On the one hand, some smaller, vulnerable countries, uh, may start to have second thoughts about how close they want to be aligned with the United States. 16:14 This is most evident in the case of the Philippines, which is very, very vulnerable and relatively poor, and, um, it, uh, it, it sees, uh, a great attractiveness about China's economic power, and this combined with skepticism of US military power might encourage the leaders, uh, such as President Duterte, to, uh, reconsider how close he wants to be aligned with the United States. 16:40 Other countries in Southeast Asia may also start to hedge and, and decide rather than align closely with the US, they will adopt a, a more balanced view that weighs China's interests and, and preferences more heavily. 16:56 Um, so there is that trend happening, but at the same time, there are other countries who are generally stronger, wealthier countries who do not want to be dominated by China. 17:06 They are inclined to, uh, respond to this trend by s- strengthening cooperation with the United States and with each other in, uh, a recognition that only a collective cooperative effort by powerful Asian countries will suffice to deter China's military. 17:26 And you're seeing this with Japan in particular, Australia, India, uh, uh, they have formed the so-called Quad, and then Australia and the US as well as the United Kingdom, they have formed a- another, uh, grouping 17:41 called AUKUS, Australia, UK, Canad- Australia, UK, US, um, and this, uh, cooperative group, security cooperation group similarly is aiming to pool military resources together, uh, in order to strengthen deterrence against Chinese aggression. 18:02 Isn't there also a potential positive effect in the, in this development, uh, in the sense that, um, the risk of losing- 18:12 uh, its large assets in the region in the case of a confrontation, losing a, potentially a carrier group with its thousands of, of, uh, sailors and, uh, billions worth of hardware would make it increasingly unlikely that any US president would even countenance a military confrontation or the escalation of violence in case of an incident, uh, with, with China, and so might open up more, uh, space for a political solution? 18:44 I do think that the risks and costs of ex- escalation are definitely increasing, and this should impose a more, uh, restraining influence on the leaders, not just of the US, but of China. 19:00 Although Beijing may s- may, uh, desire to control Taiwan and, and hunger for the day that Taiwan is under Beijing's control, they have to consider the risk to the broader objectives that I outlined earlier. 19:17 A war with the US could quickly result in the devastation to the economy of China, to the global economy. Uh, it could result in mass death if escalation went to the nuclear level. 19:29 Millions of, or tens of millions or, or even more, uh, Chinese people and Americans and other people could die. Um, 19:37 and, and, and similarly, the PLA could suffer massive losses in hardware, uh, in, in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars or more, that, uh, would be difficult for the Chinese to replace, just as it would be difficult for the US to replace, uh, losses in similar types of hardware. 19:54 So I think, uh, both sides recognize the, 19:59 uh, risks, potential risks and costs of a confrontation, and I think this is one reason why to date we have seen that China has been very cautious in how it, uh, operates near Taiwan and, uh, in, in general, there is a, a restraint I observe in the Chinese behavior. 20:20 Uh, despite the chest-thumping and, and the flights of PLA aircraft near Taiwan to harass and intimidate, the Chinese, uh, still have not really fired any shots in anger against Taiwan, and I think that restraint will likely continue for, uh, a while. 20:38 So from the perspective of the United States and its allies, as well as other countries in the region, 20:44 looking ahead, w- what do you think are, are the most promising options for developing their own military capabilities and, and, uh, together with their, uh, with their diplomatic approach in the region to deter, continue to deter military action by China? 21:03 And from the perspective of China, do you think that the, uh, performance of its m- military and diplomatic strategy so far in the region is, is viewed as a success? 21:15 And how do you think, how is the debate inside China in terms of how to develop this approach further? Uh, I think the United States does recognize that an essential component of deterrence must 21:33 rest with international cooperation with key partners and allies. We have seen under President Biden a renewed effort to integrate the militaries and, and strengthen collaboration between countries like Australia, Japan, 21:51 uh, and other allies and partners, and I think that will remain very important as well, um, because one reason why it's so powerful is, is that it sends a message to China that 22:04 if it starts a war with Taiwan or with the US, uh, the war could quickly escalate into a regional or, or, or even larger scale war, 22:15 and, uh, and there's no way to control a conflict once it gets to that level, and the Chinese, I think, understand that, so, um, that should induce caution. Um, 22:27 finding ways to, to lessen the vulnerability of US forces to Chinese missile attack I think is also important. 22:34 That, that means developing basing access in other countries, um, which the US is doing under a dispersal concept, uh, for, especially for its aircraft, which are very vulnerable. Um, 22:48 so, uh, you know, reducing US reliance on a, a handful of very vulnerable bases like the one at Kadena Air Base in favor of a more dispersed approach, um, a reliance on submarines, which are inherently very tough to find and are very combat effective. 23:07 And then, um, reliance on long-range strike is... Distance matters a lot in these kinds of high-tech wars. 23:16 That can have a very powerful deterrent effect as well, uh, because it sends a signal to China that US may not need to put its high-end aircraft and ships within easy targeting range of Chinese missiles in order to fight in a Taiwan contingency, so those, that can help. 23:34 Um, but I, but I think for the US side, it also remains important to reach out to China, um, and find ways to reduce tensions and, uh, to the extent possible, cooperate with China on, on shared concerns. 23:49 That is also an important way to ensure stability and security for all countries in the region. 23:54 I think all countries in the region welcome that as well, so that'll be part of the US approach, a- and the US is trying to do that, um, un- at least under President Biden. 24:05 For the Chinese, how effective has their approach been? I think it's really a mixed bag. On the one hand, the 24:13 uh, im- impressive military capabilities fielded by the PLA has definitely eroded the credibility of US power and caused countries in the region to, uh, doubt. 24:26 Um, but I, but I think China's military power is really concentrated around its coast. Outside of its coastline, the PLA has very little capability and, and China has no real way to protect its overseas interests. 24:39 Um, this will remain a liability for China for many years, and it's, it's a source of great strength to the US that we have a, 24:47 a global military presence with allies around the world who will help the US protect its interests. China has no allies and very little ability to, uh, project power beyond its immediate coasts. 25:00 The US, at some level, many countries are, are more skeptical than they used to be about US military power. 25:07 But on the other hand, China's p- you know, military advances have also scared a lot of countries and, um, driven countries like Japan, India, Australia, 25:20 and others into the arms of the US and, and strengthened collaboration, uh, to deter China. 25:28 So I think the landscape today is, is, uh, still quite divided and polarized with a lot of countries gravitating towards the US, including Taiwan. Um, its, its relationship with the US has improved a lot in part due to, 25:44 uh, fears in the island about Chinese intentions and military power. 25:50 Um, so yeah, there is a polarizing effect with countries gravitating to the US in some ways, yet, uh, there is at the same time some degree of skepticism among countries in the Indo-Pacific about US military power. 26:05 So quite a mixed bag for China, I think. Thank you for joining me today, Timothy. It's my pleasure. And thank you, dear listener, for joining us as well. Trend Lines is a production of World Politics Review. 26:16 You can find, uh, show notes, uh, for this episode at worldpoliticsreview.com/podcast. Thank you again to Timothy Heath for joining me. Trend Lines is produced and edited by me, Peter Durrie. 26:28 Have a great week, and see you next time on Trend Lines. [outro jingle]
