Transcript 0:00 [intro music] This is Trendlines, a podcast on global affairs brought to you by World Politics Review. I'm Freddie Dehnatel, WPR's managing editor. 0:13 Coming up, WPR senior editor Robbie Corey-Boulet will be interviewing Obi Anyadike about his reporting from Nigeria, where the military's fight against Boko Haram has entered a new deadlier phase. 0:26 Soldiers are poorly equipped and overstretched, and their morale is dangerously low. 0:31 Obi spent time with troops on the front lines in northern Nigeria earlier this year, and his in-depth report for WPR explains how Nigeria lost its way in the war against Boko Haram. 0:42 But first, I'll be talking with WPR's associate editor, Elliot Waldman. Welcome to the podcast, Elliot. Thanks, Freddie. Great to be here. 0:49 So the midterm elections are just days away here in the US, but, uh, this week we're gonna look across the Pacific to Asia, where two big economic rivals are somewhat unexpectedly coming together, and Donald Trump is even responsible, whether he intended to be or not. 1:07 Uh, Elliot, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a rare visit to China last week, a story that you wrote about on WPR this week. What made the trip so significant? 1:17 I think it was significant in a lot of different ways. Um, it's the first trip to, uh, China in an official capacity by a Japanese prime minister since 2011. 1:27 Um, that's largely due to a decline in relations between the two countries over the last few years, mainly over a territorial dispute, um, of a group of islands in the East China Sea that, uh, Japan refers to as the Senkakus. 1:41 In China, they're known as the Diaoyu. Uh, there are also s- uh, a lot of historical issues that, um, the two countries tend to, um, argue over, uh, in a lot of ways. 1:52 But, um, yeah, this, uh, visit by Abe was a way to normalize the relationship and put the two countries on a better footing going forward so that they can cooperate. 2:04 This was the first trip, uh, by a Japanese leader to China in some seven years, uh, since 2011. 2:11 Uh, given how fraught ties have been between Japan and China, as you mentioned, um, over these territorial disputes but other areas, do you think that this is the start of a sort of durable détente, um, or are you a little more skeptical? 2:25 It's hard to say. You know, I think s- uh, in many ways a lot of people hope that it will be more durable, um, particularly people in Japan's business community. Um, there... 2:34 One of the things I wrote about in my piece was that, uh, many Japanese firms are, uh, more, um, excited now about investing in China, given the political thaw. 2:45 And so I think there's a lot of hope that, that it will continue to last and that, uh, Japanese investment can, um, have a more stable environment in China. 2:54 Um, but I think there are also real limits that, um, that the détente faces. Um, the territorial issues that you mentioned just now are not going away anytime soon. 3:04 Um, in reality, J- uh, China's Coast Guard sent a ship through the waters adjacent to the Senkaku Islands, uh, on the same day that Abe arrived. 3:14 Um, so, you know, this, uh, and, and a lot of the historical issues, too, um, are, are very deep-rooted, and, uh, suspicion of Japan is very, um, very prevalent in China. 3:27 I mean, you can go to China and turn on the TV and chances are better than not that there will be a, a wartime propaganda movie showing, you know, Japanese invaders and Chinese fighting back valiantly. 3:39 Um, so yeah, and even on, in Chinese, uh, uh, in the Chinese internet, you saw a lot of users kind of, uh, expressing some trepidation about the, um, prime minister being welcomed in the way that he was. 3:52 So, um, it's hard to say, but I, I think, you know, for now hopes are high and, um, there's also, there's also going to be some, some more visits, uh, and more high-level summits taking place in the next couple of years. 4:05 Um, so hopefully those will be a sign that the, that the two sides can, can continue that. Xi is supposed to be going to Japan next year. Is that right? Yes. 4:15 There's a G20 summit, uh, in Japan that, that Xi, Xi will likely attend. Um, Abe also invited Xi to attend the, uh, opening ceremony of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. 4:25 Um, so that's another sign that, uh, that the two s- the two countries, um, you know, might be on a better track for the next couple of years. Mm-hmm. 4:33 We could always see another round of, uh, Olympic diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Hopefully, yeah. 4:40 Uh, we had a, uh, another briefing recently by Jonathan Berkshire Miller, uh, who writes about Japan and, and Japan's foreign policy, uh, in, in Asia. 4:50 Uh, and he wrote, uh, that for all the warm statements and gestures, uh, this was before Xi's trip, I should, I should say, but, but still when some of this, uh, you know, détente it looked like was, was moving in that direction. 5:04 Uh, Jonathan wrote that for all the warm statements and gestures, the Japan-China relationship suffers from a long-running and structural deficit in trust on a range of issues, and that Japan and China are far from a rapprochement. 5:15 It would seem like you would agree with that. I think so. 5:18 Um, I think that y- you know, despite a lot of the warm, uh, economic, um, engagement that's happening between the two countries, you still see Japan, um, clinging very strongly to, uh, its security ties with the US. 5:32 Um, and, you know, in reality, right after, uh, Prime Minister Abe returned to Japan, he welcomed Prime Minister Modi of India, um, for a state visit, uh, and he was very warmly received. 5:45 In fact, Modi was, uh, the first foreign leader to be invited to, uh, Abe's vacation home in the mountains in Yamanashi, and, uh, the two of them reportedly discussed China there, too. 5:56 So you see, uh, Japan playing this very sophisticated, um, diplomatic game of engaging with China and, and doing business with them where they can, but also seeking to, um, strategically kind of contain them. 6:09 I had two, two other questions, one about Japan and, and then one looking more broadly at the US and, and, and Trump, which we somehow cannot avoid. 6:18 Uh, but on the Japan question first, um, you mentioned, you know, Chinese state media and propaganda framing Japan, uh, in a certain light. Um, you have background working in Japanese media. 6:30 Uh, the Japanese media is obviously very different from the Chinese state-run media, but are there still similar sort of either stereotypes or l- you know, long-running, uh, tensions that you see playing out in the Japanese media about, about China? 6:45 I don't know. That's an interesting question. I think that you don't see it quite as much. 6:50 I mean, one thing that I remember, uh, even from the time I was living in Japan, was this big scare, um, that turned out to be a hoax of, uh, dumplings that were imported from China that, um, were purportedly had cardboard in them, and that it was this, like, kind of Chinese scheme to, you know, export fake dumplings into Japan and cause this big, uh, you know, hubbub. 7:14 But then, you know, it turned out to have no basis in reality. Um, but there, there is still a lot of, uh, you know, animosity that goes both ways, which allows, uh, hoaxes like that to catch on. 7:25 Um, I'm hopeful that, you know, more economic engagement and more people-to-people ties, which was another s- a subject of discussion, um, between Abe and, uh, Chinese leaders when he visited, will lead, you know, the two countries to, uh, to gradually repair those kinds of, um, those kinds of suspicions. 7:43 But for, yeah, for now, that's, uh, that's a, a long-term project. 7:48 And, and on that trade front, um, as you pointed out in your piece, uh, one of the driving factors, if not, you know, the most important driving factor in, in this improvement in ties, especially around trade and the economy, is the trade war that China is involved in with the United States and Donald Trump's very hard line trade policies, which have also embroiled Japan as they've been hit with, uh, a first round of tariffs, uh, from the Trump administration. 8:19 Uh, Japan was able to avoid, uh, later tariffs, um, as part of deal-making that it was, uh, compelled to make with Washington. Um, but 8:30 whether Trump means to or not, he's, he's bringing these two longtime rivals in Asia together, not politically, um, as as you pointed out again, uh, but around these trade issues. Do you think that, um, 8:44 that that means it's, it's more of a momentary, uh, sort of improvement in trade ties or that, uh, this could outlast Trump? That's... I guess that's the, the million-dollar question in a lot of ways. 8:56 Um, you know, and, and that's how I ended my piece as well, whether this, uh, in warm period in, uh, relations between Asia's two largest economies will, will outlast, um, the era of Trump. 9:07 I mean, you see, uh, Trump, you, you know, even this week continuing to threaten further tariffs against China, escalating, uh, the trade war there. 9:16 Um, you know, Bloomberg reported that there will be, uh, uh, further tariffs, um, placed on China if, uh, the upcoming planned meeting between, uh, Trump and Xi doesn't go very well. 9:28 Um, his 10% tariffs on, I think, $200 billion of Chinese imports are also scheduled to go up to 25% at the beginning of next year. Um, so I think, you know, the, the, the Chinese, uh, leadership 9:42 will probably continue, as long as that lasts, to seek out, uh, opportunities elsewhere closer to home. 9:49 Same goes for Japan, where, uh, you know, uh, they haven't really had seen a lot of success, um, with the US on the trade front. 9:57 So far, they've managed to delay and kind of parry a lot of these threats of tariffs, um, but they've already had steel and aluminum tariffs imposed on their exports to the US. Um, so I think, 10:10 you know, as, as long as that, uh, attitude of hostility and unilateralism, um, continues to come from the US, you probably will see, uh, you know, um, Japan and China, which are historically two of, uh, two of the largest trading partners of the US, continue to seek warmer relations with each other. 10:28 And it's playing out also in, in third countries in Asia, uh, where China and Japan, as part of Xi-- as, as part of Abe's trip to China, uh, continued to build on cooperation with each other over, over joint, you know, business interests in other parts of Asia. 10:45 Do you... Tell us more about that, I guess, and, and, and, and how, how close could that cooperation be? Yeah, that's a really important, uh, important point. Um, I think, 10:56 you know, this is an area where Chinese, uh, investment projects, uh, as part of its Belt and Road initiative, uh, which we've devoted a lot of coverage to, um, have really faced a lot of challenges in recent years. 11:08 Um, a lot of countries are now realizing that these projects, uh, may have a debt load that's too high or, uh, you know, may carry, um, environmental or social costs that are not quite worth it, um, and rethinking them. 11:21 Um, and for China, pairing with, uh, pairing up with Japan really gives them a, a, an opportunity to, um, reduce some of that risk and give themselves, um, give their projects a better image. 11:33 For Japan, it, it represents, you know, an even further, uh, business opportunity, opportunities for Japanese companies, uh, and especially to show off, uh, their technological edge. 11:42 You know, they've been involved in the development assistant game in, in Asia for much longer than China has. 11:48 Um, and you know, up until just recently, the, the summit finalized this, but Japan was, uh, was, um, doing development projects in China. 11:57 That was one of the outcomes of the summit, which, uh, ended that status and, uh, set the two countries on, uh, partnership footing to develop, um, countries in the region together. 12:09 Um, so I think, I think that has actually does have a lot of potential. Um, again, it's, it's all subject to the political climate, which could change pretty quickly. 12:18 I mean, just as we saw the two countries cultivate closer relations in a matter of years, in a similar matter of years, you could see, uh, relations drop off again. 12:28 Um, but- With, you know, uh, as a result of any number of, uh, imaginable crises. So yeah, we'll have to see. But I think, um, I think for now it does have a lot of potential. 12:39 And in, in, in the case of, of China's Belt and Road, uh, I feel like it's not that long ago that there were at least stories being floated out there about Japan being part of a US-led initiative to push back on the Belt and Road or to sort of put out a, a US-backed alternative. 12:56 Um, the proposals or at least what was being reported was paling in comparison to what, uh, you know, the Belt and Road involves in terms of many billions of dollars in, in, in all kinds of infrastructure projects. 13:09 Um, is it surprising then that it seems like this is a way for Japan to get involved in the Belt and Road? 13:16 Or is, since it's a, it's a Chinese-led, uh, development project that has a whole host of foreign policy, uh, sort of angles for Beijing, or does it seem like... Do you think that Tokyo sees its own, 13:29 its own interests in, in, in, in, in supporting that too? I think so. I think, uh, you know, I think the, the leadership, um, including Prime Minister Abe, are seeing, seeing it as an opportunity to, um, 13:42 to, to join up with China and, and partner with them and, and reap gains from that, uh, in instances that they can. And, and I think so far they're, they're being pretty smart about it. 13:53 Um, you know, the, this is all happening whi- while we see the Trump administration increasingly taking a more unilateral stance in the region, and in some cases even withdrawing from the region. 14:05 You know, uh, President Trump won't be attending the, um, regional summits taking place in, in East Asia, um, later this month, and that sends a very strong signal to the region that, uh, you know, that, that the US just isn't really as, um, as engaged there anymore, so. 14:22 Mm-hmm, which has been a story, uh, of the first almost two years of the Trump administration, uh, and we'll see how that, uh, story evolves, uh, based on the elections here in the US next week. 14:34 Uh, before we, uh, get to the Who Said That segment, uh, and then turn it over to Robbie, um, do you have any other, 14:44 uh, I guess nearer term views of, of, of, of what to look out for next, uh, in terms of where these Japan-China ties may be headed? 14:54 I think one thing to watch will be, uh, whether a three-way summit between Japan, China, and South Korea materializes in December. There were some reports that that was in the works, um, that China wanted to host that. 15:07 Um, it would be quite something for a Japanese prime minister to visit China again after being there, um, in such a short time. 15:15 Um, but you know, Japan and South Korea are now facing, um, a bit of a, a rocky period in their relations, again over historical issues that are bubbling back up to the surface. 15:25 Um, so whether they can maintain that three-way cooperation between the three big economies of Northeast Asia, I think will be, uh, very important. 15:33 And it'll have ramifications, um, you know, beyond just those three, obviously, uh, for the North Korean crisis, but, uh, you know, also for, um, for broader economic engagement in the region as well. 15:46 So that will be w- an interesting thing to watch. A lot of knock-on effects, definitely, and, and sort of dominoes it seems. 15:53 Uh, well, before we get to Who Said That, uh, I wanted to remind listeners that if you like what you hear on Trendlines, please leave a rating and review on iTunes or wherever it is you get your podcasts, and be sure to subscribe so you don't miss an episode. 16:08 Trendlines is also now available on Spotify. And to follow everything we're publishing on WPR, be sure to sign up for our free newsletter. It includes access to unlocked articles all week long at no cost. 16:20 You can sign up at worldpoliticsreview.com/newsletter. Okay, Elliot, your inaugural game of Who Said That. What do you have? I have, "We will give them 0.1% of our GDP in 10 cent coins." 16:36 Oh, that's great, and I have, I have no idea. [laughs] It's, uh, a senator in Italy from, uh, the League, Matteo Salvini's party, and he said it in the context of a budget dispute with the EU. 16:49 Ah, yeah, I was gonna say, we, we, we, we have some coverage coming up about that. 16:53 Uh, it's an very interesting story between this new hardline populist government in Rome that's also trying to enact an extremely ambitious budget, uh, and now coming to loggerheads with, with Brussels. 17:07 Uh, the quote I have, uh, is... I won't give it too much away, but I will say it's, it's also in Europe. Uh, the question is, is not who said it necessarily, but the, the country in question. 17:18 "The Germans are very clear about Nazism and where it now belongs. We've never really tried to come to terms with our dictatorship." Hmm. That could be, that could be a lot of places. Um, is it someone from Brazil? 17:35 It's actually, uh, a Catalan journalist, uh, in Spain talking about Francisco Franco, whose legacy, uh, really hasn't been dealt with, um, in Spain for decades, but has now sort of reemerged as a, as an issue, um, over the question of Franco's tomb, and also, uh, this quote in particular was from a news story about, uh, an exhibition in Barcelona, uh, about Franco's legacy that included erecting a statue to him, uh, outside, um, the venue where the show was, and the, the statue was immediately vandalized. 18:10 Hmm. Interesting. All right. Well, uh, before we turn it over, uh, were there any articles on the site this week that you wanted to flag for listeners? 18:18 I thought Josh Kurlantzick's briefing on upcoming elections in Thailand was, uh, was a great piece that really highlighted a lot of the, um, issues, uh, facing Thailand right now in terms of the, um, rising clout that the military has and the implications it has for Thai democracy. 18:34 The upcoming election's gonna be really important there, and, uh, reading Josh Kurlantzick's piece really, um, gave me a good sense of the issues. Yeah.... elections, but on, on the junta's terms, as he put it. 18:46 Uh, and I was gonna mention, uh, Wesley Tomaselli's briefing on how Venezuela's implosion is making Colombia's democracy more fragile. 18:55 Uh, Wes points out how, uh, the situation, the dynamic between the two countries has sort of shifted, where historically, uh, Colombia was a nexus of crime, uh, that threatened Venezuela. 19:08 But as Venezuela's political and economic crisis has deepened, it's really sort of become an incubator of crime itself, which is now spilling over into Colombia, where, uh, the government there is obviously now trying, has been for a few years now trying to implement this peace deal with FARC rebels. 19:24 So another, uh, way that Venezuela's ongoing crisis is destabilizing South America. All right. Thanks, Elliot. Thanks, Freddy. And now over to Robbie for the report. 19:35 [upbeat music] In the past six months, an estimated six hundred Nigerian soldiers have been killed in the fight against Boko Haram. 19:45 Obi Anyadike notes in this week's in-depth report for WPR that the losses are a product of the government's lack of focus and the military's flawed tactics and poor execution. 19:55 And as commanders struggle to regain momentum, frustration among the soldiers is mounting. Obi, how are you today? I'm good. Thanks, Robbie. Great. Well, thanks very much for being with us. 20:06 Uh, your story opens with a description of the death of a man named Lirfa Dashe, uh, who was a lieutenant in the Nigerian army. Uh, when was he killed, and what were the circumstances? Okay. 20:18 He, he died in July, uh, in attack on a forward, uh, observation, uh, operation, operating base, forward operating base i-in an area of northeastern Nigeria called Jilli. 20:29 It was an attack by Boko Haram, um, the faction known as ISWAP, which is affiliated to ISIS. Uh, and they stormed through the base, captured it, which was a total and utter shock for the Nigerian army. 20:43 Um, and he died, uh, in the defense of the base. It was a two-hour, uh, gun battle, um, but it ended with the Nigerian troops, uh, basically, uh, retreating. 20:57 The, the attack by Boko Haram was seen, um, but it seems to have been some confusion over, over who the, these guys were, who were approaching the base. They turned up in, in, uh, Hilux, um, 21:13 gun trucks, some of them painted in Nigerian army colors. And it seems some of the, these vehicles had been captured in a, in an ambush, uh, a day or so before, uh, in a place, um, called Boboche. 21:27 Uh, so it seems there was some confusion by the defenders over whether these were actually Nigerian soldiers approaching the base or if it was, if it was a full-on attack. 21:37 And in that confusion, Boko Haram blew open the, the gates, um, using the anti-aircraft guns, um, on, on the vehicles and, and stormed in. And what were the casualty totals for this? 21:51 The Nigerian go- the army's admitted, um, thirty-one or so soldiers died. Um, but there's media reports that maybe up to two hundred, uh, are missing in inverted commas. 22:03 So the, the, uh, the army is, has been, uh, historically quite tight-lipped over casualties. Um, and there's, it's very difficult to find out the truth, uh, as to ca- as to how many might have, might have been killed. 22:18 Uh, yeah. And in any case, as you mentioned, it sounds like it was a pretty demoralizing, uh, incident. 22:24 In what ways would you say this battle speaks to broader problems with the way that the military is operating in the northeast right now? The Nigerian army is, is clearly overstretched. 22:35 Um, they're not in con-complete control of the northeast. 22:38 There are a couple of, they're called local government areas, um, which the, the, the hu-humanitarian community can't access and the Nigerian army has no real presence in at all. Um, 22:52 morale is, is low, it seems, from looking at, uh, Facebook re, um, pages of soldiers and talking to the guys on the ground. 23:02 Um, and it seems that in this, the, the strategy of, of, though it militarily makes sense to set up these, uh, forward operating bases in areas where, um, Boko Haram operates, uh, though that's a, that's a, a valid strategy, the problem is that the, these bases are not well-supplied, there's logistical problems, and in a sense they are, they're small little islands in, in terrain which is, which is hostile. 23:34 Um, and they're really just inviting attack by, by Boko Haram, who are all too happy to do that at this point in time. 23:43 For those who haven't been following the conflict in the northeast, uh, could you describe the origins of the insurgency there? 23:49 I mean, I don't expect you to go through every step of it, but how has it evolved since before Buhari took office? Well, it started as a, as a grassroots Salafist movement. 23:59 Um, there's, you know, there's some Boko Haram, the, the name itself is, is a little bit perplexing. Um, the etymology of it, m-most people seem to assume it means Western, uh, Western education is forbidden. 24:14 Um, but it's, it's a little bit, it's slightly deeper than that. I mean, the meaning of it is to do with fraud and deception. Basically, that, 24:23 that education, um, is a, is a, is, is basically a, a proxy for Western values, um, and they are to be rejected. Um, so it grew out of a demand for, 24:39 um, similar to what we've seen in Saudi Arabia, kind of Wahhabi, Salafist movement That was demanding the strict application of Sharia law in, in the, in northern Nigeria, which is a majority Muslim region. 24:54 Um, rejection of all things to do with the government, um, democracy, um, and constitutionalism was, uh, totally opposed to it. 25:04 Um, and this grew as a movement, um, that had quite a good deal of active support in, in Maiduguri, the main city in the northeast, uh, where these guys were seen as pious, um, 25:18 uh, upstanding guys, uh, led by a, a charismatic, um, scholar called Mohammed Yusuf. Um, there was an ongoing friction with the authorities, uh, and it seems there was an early link, uh, between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda. 25:37 Um, 25:38 slightly predating Boko Haram, there was, there was a movement called the Nigerian Taliban, which most definitely had links with Al-Qaeda, and they-- there was, there was a connection between the Nigerian Taliban leader and Mohammed Yusuf. 25:51 Um, it-- so it seems that from, from very early, from very early stages, the idea of jihad, um, was not alien to this, this burgeoning movement. 26:04 Um, and as that friction increased, um, it led to a clash, uh, between, uh, local police and followers of Mohammed Yusuf. Mohammed Yusuf swore revenge and actually declared war on the, the Nigerian state. 26:19 This was in two thousand and nine. Um, an insurrection s- occurred soon after. 26:25 Mohammed Yusuf was captured, um, by, actually by the army, handed over to the police, and the police killed him, uh, in custody, in cold blood. 26:33 Um, the army seemed to have sol- resolved the problem, it seemed, by leveling Mohammed Yusuf's mosque and, and hunting down any of his followers. But in reality, what happened is that, uh, his followers scattered. 26:48 It seems some made their way to Mali, uh, and other Sahelian countries, and those connections with Al-Qaeda were reignited, uh, or put in play, and Boko Haram rebounded, uh, in twenty ten, uh, as an armed movement. 27:06 Um, and since then, uh, we've seen an escalation of violence, um, and also new skills or new, a new type of insurgency never seen in Nigeria before, which is the use of suicide bombings. 27:20 Uh, even bombings themselves was, was unknown. 27:23 So in twenty eleven, Boko Haram actually managed to bomb the, the capital Abuja and took out the UN building, uh, and also the police headquarters, and that was, uh, a shocking indication that the game had changed quite dramatically. 27:40 Um, and over the, the, over the next few years, it's been a story of Boko Haram, um, able to, it seems, attack at will. 27:50 Um, the, uh, the-- to your original question, the election of Muhammadu Buhari in twenty fifteen 27:59 was on the ba-- or was on the strength of his military background and his commitment or his promise to, to end the insurgency. Um, and over the, the last few years, it seems to have b- it seems to have worked. 28:12 The B- the death toll, which was terrible, um, prior to his election, has subsided. Um, the violence seemed to be in, in some kind of check. 28:27 Um, but what we're seeing now is, is a, is a return to, to the levels of, of, of killing and attacks we haven't seen for quite a while. 28:39 Um, what's interesting this time, though, is rather than, uh, Boko Haram's kind of indiscriminate attack on, on civilians, which still happens, and the s- and the sacking of towns, which they certainly were able to achieve several years back, the focus is now on, on the military, um, in particular these forward operating bases. 28:59 And in light of those military setbacks, are there signs that soldiers are growing frustrated with the way that the war is being prosecuted? 29:07 I think the, the, the war had kind of, maybe we can say two or three phases, but there, there was a period, um, under the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan when the army was in terrible trouble. 29:18 Um, through twenty thirteen, twenty fourteen, it was losing towns. Soldiers were saying that they weren't getting the ammunition, the, even basic ammunition that they needed. They weren't certainly getting the equipment. 29:30 They weren't, they weren't getting fed. They weren't getting paid. And there was a, a complete morale collapse, and the Nigerian army looked like it was really on the ropes. 29:40 Um, it's not to say we're at that situation, that same situation now, but you are hearing-- but there is most certainly a morale problem in the Nigerian army. 29:50 And this last spate of defeats is really pointing at something going very badly wrong with the management and prosecution of the war. 30:02 And that's, if you're talking to ordinary soldiers, again, it's those same things, same issues that were raised at the earlier stages of the war. You're hearing them again. "We don't have the equipment. 30:13 We're being abandoned. Um, the officers aren't, um, basically looking after us as soldiers. What's the point?" Can you tell me a little bit about the process of reporting this story? 30:25 When were you actually traveling in the northeast, and what were your impressions during your visit? Um, I'm not sure if you'd been there before or not, but if you had, um, what do you think has changed since then? 30:37 Yeah, I've been, uh, traveling to the northeast, uh, off and on since twenty eleven, um, so from the early stages. 30:43 Um, this, this trip Because the, the Nigerian army has secured, uh, much of the main towns in the northeast, it meant that I was able to, to travel out of Maiduguri, uh, quite comfortably. Um, 30:59 they-- In some areas, you still have to go by convoy. In fact, in most areas, you sh- you should go by convoy. Um, but you have much freer, um, mobility. Uh, that's one particular change. 31:12 Um, the, the, the, the trajectory of this to the government-- in the government's mind was that we can-- once we secure the countryside, we can start sending the IDPs, who are numbering over two million, back to their areas of origin, and we can start farming again, and, and basically local economy can recover, and people have a stake in peace. 31:35 That was a strategy. Um, in reality, uh, outside of the main town in each local government area, the countryside is still unsafe. 31:48 Uh, so usually, um, the radius around each town is only a couple of kilometers within which people can farm, and that's just the main town. Um, beyond that, it's seen as, regarded as, as enemy territory. 32:02 So that's, uh, an indication that there's still quite a ways to go. Um, and that obviously means that there's a limit to the humanitarian operation. Um, and it, it means that this, this war is, is far from over. 32:17 And at this stage in the conflict, what would you say are the militants' strengths and weaknesses, and what does their strategy seem to be? 32:25 I think we, we also need to point out that Boko Haram h- has split into two, two main factions. 32:32 Um, there's, there's, uh, Shekau, uh, Abubakar Shekau, who's the guy most closely associ-associated with Boko Haram in terms of the international media. 32:42 He's the guy who kidnapped the Chib- Chibok schoolgirls, and his face appears, uh, on the YouTube videos. 32:50 Um, his, his group is, is quite small, and it's shrunk, and it's seemingly contained in s- the Sambisa Forest area. Um, there's another group, which is 33:04 ISIS or Islamic State, is their chosen ally. 33:09 Uh, they swore allegiance to Islamic State, so Islamic State, uh, under Shekau, but Islamic State has chosen a new leader, Al-Barnawi, who's actually the son of Mohammed Yusuf. Um, and Shekau is basically isolated. 33:25 Um, and he's gone back to the original Boko Haram, um, grouping, uh, whereas Al-Barnawi, uh, has, has seems to have, has, uh, been able to make the connections because he's living in the-- he's based in the Niger-Chad border regions. 33:45 It's much easier for him to make the connections to, uh, Islamic State, uh, and the supply of, of weapons and money, um, uh, which gi-- has given him a strategic advantage, and it's his group which is in the ascendancy at the moment. 34:01 And what are the implications of that for Boko Haram's tac-- or the militants' tactics, rather? Uh, w-- There, there's, there's a couple of things as well. I mean, the, the split was based on, on Shekau's, uh, 34:14 strategy of regarding every-- anybody who doesn't live with him in his area as being a target, which means that regardless of whether you're a Muslim or not, if you're not in his, in his caliphate, in inverted commas, then you are, you're a pagan, and you're gonna be attacked. 34:32 So hence, it's Shekau's people that we see launching the female suicide bombers, uh, into Maiduguri and other towns. 34:41 It's Shekau who's been responsible for some of the terrible slaughters, uh, that we've seen in the northeast. 34:48 Al-Barnawi's approach is much more, uh, "Let's focus on the military, they're our enemy," uh, and much less on, on the civilians. 34:58 Talking to IDPs, um, their, their, their take on Al-Barnawi is that he is softer, in inverted commas, um, that there's much greater freedom in, in, um, Al-Barnawi's zones of, of, of, of areas of control. 35:15 Um, you can do your business. They don't bother you so much. There's not so great a restriction on women as there are in, in, uh, in Shekau's area, where women have to stay in the house. They can't farm. 35:28 Um, and it's, it's, it's quite brutal. Um, so that's the kind of the difference in terms of the, the ideology. 35:38 Um, in terms of the military strategy, um, it seems that ISWAP has-- Al-Barnawi's factions, their, their, their approach seems to be to try and secure that border region, which means an attempt to sweep, um, these bases, these military bases out of, out of the northern Borno area, which will then allows them to secure, um, do their business, do their trade, um, move their men in and out of, of the border regions and prepare in s-- in, in, in, in reality to prepare for the expected Nigerian, uh, military offensive. 36:18 Do you have the impression that the government in Abuja is focused on the violence in the northeast right now, or is it focused instead on conflicts between, for example, farmers and herders in the middle belt or on preparations for the elections that are planned for February? 36:33 I think the, the, the focus is i-i-in, in Nigeria election, electioneering starts, you know, eighteen months to a year before the election, the actual election dates. 36:42 The election in, is, the general, g-general election is going to be in February. We're in peak campaign season now. 36:51 Uh, and unless something dramatic happens, uh, in the northeast, um, I don't think, uh, that this is Buhari's focus. I think it's, it's, it's, it's, um, it's definitely Boko Haram's focus because I think they see, 37:08 um, Buhari as, as a fairly dangerous opponent. In the north, in the northeast, he's in-- he's very popular. 37:15 Uh, so I think the Boko Haram strategy could well be to try and play a role in the, in this election, which means if they can stage something dramatic before the election, they're going to try and do it. 37:26 Um, I don't think they want to see Buhari reelected. Um, the, the common... 37:32 I, uh, apart from the fact that Buhari is a northerner, which plays very well in, in the northeast, um, the, there is appreciation that the security situation has improved under Buhari. Um, 37:45 it will be, yeah, it has improved under Buhari. Um, and there's a hope that it will continue to get better. 37:51 I think people are upset that it's still dicey, um, but I think Boko Haram would prefer to deal with somebody else other than Buhari, possibly. 38:00 How does the political salience or prominence of the Boko Haram conflict compare to the last election period in twenty fifteen? I think i-in, in, twenty, in-- prior to twenty fifteen, we had the, 38:14 w-, it, it, the, the Boko Haram conflict was still quite new, and it was still the shock of, of these towns being overrun. 38:22 Uh, you know, the Nigerian military used to have a reputation for professionalism and, uh, it was deployed internationally. Uh, it performed well in, in interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 38:38 Uh, so there was shock of the reality that this, the Nigerian military had clay feet. 38:43 Uh, in reality, the, uh, there was a period of time under military rule where it seems that the corruption had eaten away at, at military capacity, and this was now being seen in their inability to hold on, uh, or to deal with the Boko Haram threat. 39:04 Um, and I think in a sense, it also played to the demands for change. 39:09 So it became an election issue because people who, who wanted to see the back of Jonathan and reformers who thought that Buhari would bring that anti-corruption, um, crusade, uh, to fruition, um, were using, 39:27 to be honest, were using the conflict as, as a rod, uh, to beat Jonathan with. 39:32 Um, so even though at the very end of, uh, of his tenure, the military tide, uh, was beginning to change, it was too late to save his, his, his reelection bid. 39:45 Uh, and he went down to Buhari, um, based on the promise that Buhari would secure the country, um, and, uh, and deal with Boko Haram. 39:53 Uh, this time, um, the focus is much more about the herder, uh, farmer clashes, which are nationwide, um, igniting 40:05 identity politics around, around religion, um, in which the, the, uh, herders are seen as, as, as predominantly Muslim, um, from the same ethnic group as the president, uh, and it's cast in, in, uh, 40:23 in really quite disturbing, um, uh, terms as a kind of a, the, the, the North's agenda to, to infiltrate the South and, and basically to grab, um, southern land. 40:41 Um, it's, we're seeing a social media campaign on both sides, uh, which, which is really quite scary. 40:48 Um, and, and, you know, your, your worst, the worst examples of fake news, uh, you, you'll see in Nigeria around this whole farmer-herder clashes. 41:00 One of the things that comes through in your interviews with security analysts and with some soldiers as well, uh, are these suspicions that the military and government officials might not be interested in ending the conflict, or that might not be their prime goal. 41:15 What is at the root of these suspicions, and how might these officials be benefiting from the situation in the northeast? I think, you know, in these sort of conflicts, conspiracy theories abound. Um, 41:27 I th- I think, a-a-and in the northeast, definitely there, there is suspicion and, and a suspicion that the, the, the, why this war is lasting too long is because somebody's benefiting from it. 41:39 That's the, the, that's how it's cast. Um, I think that's too simplistic. Um, I think at the, you know, at the individual unit levels, yes, you know, we know soldiers take money at checkpoints. 41:50 We know that, you know, I've even heard from former Boko Haram guys who said that, you know, soldiers sell information, they can sell, they sell their weapons, sell their ammunition. 41:59 That, those stories are, are, are, are fairly common. 42:03 And we know that, that among the top brass, the military, the government has admitted that former military chiefs made fifteen billion dollars, uh, out of, out of, um, military contracts. 42:16 Um, so yes, there, there, there's a, there's a problem over, uh, you know, conflictpreneurs, uh, and you'll see that in every, in every war. 42:27 Um, but I think there's also soldiers who, who, who want to get the job done, um, and maybe it's, it's, it's a bit too simple to say that it's all about, it's all about the money. 42:40 Um, but s-certainly, uh, there's big contracts that have been made, and certainly some senior officers, uh, seem to have far more money than their monthly paycheck, uh, would suggest, uh, would be legitimate. 42:55 How might the strategy of both the military and the militants change with the onset of the dry season, uh, whenever that happens, either in November or December? 43:05 I, I think during the dry season, the, the expectation is that the military will push forward, um, and try and, and take these remaining, uh, pockets of, of territory, um, that they've so far been, um, unable to assert a presence in. 43:22 Um, and that the Boko Haram will resist. 43:27 The, the, the idea is that these raft of attacks we've seen starting in July and stretching all the way into this month ha-has been, part of the reason has been to grab as much equipment as they can, uh, with which they can, the-with which they'll try and, and stem the, the government's expected offensive. 43:48 Um, for the government, it's complicated because around December is, is a period called the Harmattan, uh, where visibility is very low. The s- the dust from the Sahara blows in. 43:58 So it means that during that period around December, there won't, there will be even less air cover, um, than there currently is. Uh, so it's going to be difficult s- uh, to see how this is going to, to, um, pan out. 44:13 But I mean, clearly the, the, the government, the army has, has the heavy equipment, in theory, uh, which should be decisive. Um, but Boko Haram is a, is a wily enemy and 44:26 maybe wouldn't even want to take the militia on frontally and will continue this kind of guerrilla warfare, which it seems to be doing quite well at. 44:37 What do you think the Nigerian military needs to do in order to win once and for all in the north? And are these things that you think it's capable of doing or that it's likely to do? 44:48 I think in these, these sorts of situations, I don't, I don't think we should really talk a-about winning. Um, I think at the end of the day, th-this is a political problem, um, that needs to be resolved politically. 44:59 Uh, and also we've seen in other insurgency conflicts that it's, they, it-it's very hard to win, in inverted commas, militarily. We, the Americans have been in Afghanistan for seventeen years. 45:13 I-in Somalia, we've got three African armies backed by US drones and special forces who are still unable to, to, um, to defeat Al-Shabaab. 45:25 I think in, they, they, we have to understand that there is a legitimate, uh, for s- for some people in the northeast, Boko Haram, uh, have a legitimate point. 45:37 Uh, and there is an ideological commitment to what they do, which has some support. 45:43 Um, but in terms of, of how you deal in a counterinsurgency operation or how, textbook how what you should do is, one, you, you shouldn't, uh, prosecute your own people. 45:55 You should be able to identify who your enemy is and deal with those rather than, unfortunately, what we sometimes see in the ni- in this conflict in the northeast, that civilians are caught up in the violence, and the army is unable to distinguish between militants and civilians, uh, and either kills them or detains them, thereby fueling, um, this grievance. 46:20 Um, secondly, I think the Nigerian army is, is a bit hidebound. 46:25 It's, it's, it's based on a, a British military model, which doesn't seem to translate very well into this kind of bush war, um, that they sh- they, they're, they're trying to fight. 46:38 Uh, we saw in 2015 that Jonathan, the former pre-president, brought in a group of South African, an inter-- a, a security company. 46:48 I think the old term for these guys was mercenaries, but I think they would, they would, uh, reject that label. 46:54 Um, and they came in with, uh, their experience of, of the Southern African bush war, uh, which was to pursue aggressively your enemy, um, to keep going, to be resupplied by helicopter if necessary, but you just keep, you track them, and you keep pursuing them. 47:14 Um, and using air power as well. Nigeria has all of, all of that. It has the, the, the armor, it has the vehicles, it has the aircraft, and it has the helicopters. 47:26 Um, but what some analysts are suggesting is that its senior officers, for whatever reason, are not utilizing them to, to the, to the, to the best of their capacity. 47:38 Um, there are some very good officers in the Nigerian army. There are some very highly trained guys there. Um, so what's going wrong? We're not quite sure, but the suggestion is that 47:50 the junior officers know how to prosecute this war, and it would be much better if they were allowed to take charge, um, if they were given the logistical support that, that's required, if they were given the equipment that they keep crying out for, and if they were just giving their soldiers the, the allowances that they're meant to receive, feeding them on time, and generally looking after the guys on the front lines who are doing the fighting and the dying. 48:16 There was hope that, that there could be a negotiated solution to the conflict, and there are some interlocutors who keep holding out that prospect that there could, there could, there could be some kind of, of talks, um, some kind of deal. 48:32 Um, we know the Swiss government has been involved, and ICRC has, has, the Red Cross has tried to facilitate some of this. 48:41 Um, and we know that Jonathan looked at this option, but he could never seem to find out, find who would be the right people to talk to. Um, and the hope was that, 48:52 uh, with the release of the Chibok, some of the Chibok girls, that there was a conduit to Boko Haram to talk. What's happened, especially with the Islamic State-linked faction, is that 49:08 one of the most senior commanders, a man called Maman Noor, who was believed to be amenable to talks, it seems that he was killed in August, it seems to be when he met his demise, which means that the idea of talks now 49:26 is very much perhaps on the back burner or a thing or impossible. If one of the reasons he was killed is because he was seen to be too willing to engage the government 49:40 in some kind of settlement, suggests that Islamic States are not prepared to dialogue. And we know for sure that Shakao in his Sambisa Forest fastness is not a man who would 49:56 ever consider this either, especially seeing as Boko Haram is also under investigation by the International Criminal Court. So, yeah, so I think the idea of talks is for the moment off the table. 50:12 And so the only other option now is some kind of the continuation of a trial of strength between the government and Boko Haram, in which unfortunately civilians are going to pay the price. Thanks, Obi, for that answer. 50:25 It's really important to keep in mind the political context as we try to predict how this conflict is going to evolve going forward. Your piece is up online now on our website. 50:38 Thank you very much for your reporting and for taking the time to speak with me today. Thank you very much. Thanks again to Obi Anyadike for joining us this week. 50:49 If you'd like to read more about Boko Haram's advances in Nigeria and the military's flawed tactics there, you can find his in-depth article on worldpoliticsreview.com. 50:58 You can write to us with any feedback, comments, or even to suggest a topic for a future episode at podcast at worldpoliticsreview.com. Trendlines is produced and edited by Peter Dory. 51:08 You can follow Peter and World Politics Review on Twitter, and you can find links to the articles and issues covered this week in the show notes on worldpoliticsreview.com. 51:17 Have a great weekend, and see you next week for a new episode of Trendlines.
